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Economists have traditionally studied the relationships between labor markets and 
labor legislations paying little attention to the degree and the characteristics of  the 
enforcement of such regulations. This dissertation reports evidence that the 
enforcement of labor protection legislation impacts job flows and employment rates 
and that inefficiencies in the resolution of labor disputes being present policy reforms 
can attenuate them. The first chapter examines the impact of labor market regulations 
on labor market outcomes through the use of enforcement indicators. Using an original 
and exhaustive data set of the individual labor disputes that were brought to the labor 
courts spread over the French territory, the case disposition is found to depend on local 
economic conditions. An instrumental approach using the institutional setting and the 
legal environment of the labor courts allows us discovering that the outcomes of the 
cases, the filing rate and the use of judicial expertise cause fluctuations in labor flows 
and employment rates. The second chapter explores the existence of a prisoner’s 
dilemma when workers and firms are involved in labor disputes and face the choice of 
hiring a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour 
disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal cases, we find 
that a lawyer substantially increases the firm’s probability of winning at trial but has 
little effect on the worker’s victory probability. The gain in taking a lawyer for a 
worker is substantial when the firm is represented. Hiring a lawyer for the firm is 
 beneficial whatever the legal representation of the worker is. This often results in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. The choice of the legal representation of the opposite party, risk-
aversion and pre-trial bargaining effects, quality of the case and non financial costs 
play a role in explaining deviation from the equilibrium. Finally, the last chapter uses 
British data on individual labor disputes to complement the small empirical literature 
on the impact of the allocation of legal costs on judicial behaviours. A shift from the 
American rule of allocation of legal costs (each party bears its own costs) to the 
English one (the losing party pays the legal cost of the winning side) is associated with 
an increase in the settlement rate of labour disputes in the UK  
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1. Introduction  
Economists have extensively studied the relationships between labor markets and 
labor legislations but have paid little attention to the degree and the characteristics of 
enforcement of such regulations. Labor laws are subject to court interpretation and 
could vary over time. As pointed out by OECD 2004 Employment Outlook, even if an 
employer can be sanctioned in case of non-respect of employment protection 
legislation (EPL hereafter), “these provisions are subject to court interpretation and 
this may constitute a major (but often hidden) source of variation in EPL strictness 
both across countries and over time”. Since the seminal paper of Lazear (1990), the 
relationship between labor markets and labor regulations has been mainly studied 
through cross-country analysis where the labor flows or employment rates are 
tentatively explained by country specific qualitative measures of regulation ranked by 
their level of strictness. In a provocative NBER working paper, Freeman (2004) states 
that such cross-country analyses are hardly convincing since “with only 30 or so 
advanced countries, highly correlated outcomes, and infrequent changes in 
institutions, the number of configurations can easily exceed the number of 
independent data points”. Another point of criticism to these cross-country analyses is 
that EPL indices typically used in these analyses are deemed exogenous and 
imperfectly capture how the behaviors of unions, employer federations, or governing 
regulators change over time. 
Taking partly into account these critiques, a recent strand of literature has assessed 
the impact of EPL within countries. It is typically done by measuring the impact of a 
change in legislation targeted to a specific category within a whole country or -in the 
case of the US- the impact of the different timing in the introduction of a new EPL in 
different states. Wrongful-discharge protections were adopted by US state courts 
during the last three decades. Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2004) take advantage of 
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the between-state variation in the timing of the introduction of these labor laws and 
estimate their impact using difference-in-difference estimators. Boeri and Jimeno 
(2003), using the 1990s tightening of the Italian regulation for firms with less than 15 
employees, find that the threshold does matter in conditioning layoff and hiring 
probabilities but find no significant impact on employment growth. Bauer et alii 
(2007) find no effect of the change in the German EPL exemption for small firms on 
worker turnover. 
Unfortunately, this last strand of research suffers from several downsides as well. 
First, these studies do not provide information concerning the degree of enforcement 
of labor regulations. To which extent these regulations were used by workers to 
defend their own interest and are they actually binding for the employers? For 
instance, in the case of the US, even if judicial breaks to the employment-at-will 
doctrine have been judged by some state courts, we have little evidence on the extent 
to which they are used or even known by the workers and to which they act as a 
credible threat to the employment-at-will policy. The state of California recognized 
the application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment 
relationships in 1980. In March and April 1986 about 100 cases were filed in Los 
Angeles which would lead to an approximate number of 1,000 for the whole year in 
the entire state1 (that is about 80 cases for one million of workers). 2 In comparison, 
for France with a very population and GDP similar to those of California, the number 
of cases in any given year is approximately 200,000. Of course, one could argue that 
the law can act on the employer in a pre-emptive way but, to capture any effect in the 
data, this impact should be very strong (or conversely the impact on employment of 
labor courts should be extreme in France). Second, problems of endogenity remain: 
                                                 
1 In 1986, civil case filings in Los Angeles represented about 60% of all civil activity in the state of 
California. 
2 These figures are taken from Dertouzos (1986). 
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court interpretation with the ensuing impact might not be exogenous as market 
conditions could impact the leniency of the courts, the introduction of new laws, or the 
workers’ tendency for litigation.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, our contribution to the literature on EPL impacts 
on labor market outcomes is threefold. First, we consider measures of EPL varying 
across space and time based on the enforcement of the regulation. In France, workers 
can contest the conditions of a firing by filing a case to one of the 264 local labor 
courts. We use information collected by the French Ministry of Justice on all cases 
that were filed over the 1990-2004 period (2 millions of cases) to compute at the local 
level for each year numerous EPL indicators characterizing the enforcement of the 
labor laws: fraction of cases leading to a conciliation between parties, a trial, a 
worker’s victory, dismissed by the court or the worker, fraction of cases where 
workers and firms were legally represented. We match these local indicators with local 
measures of job flows and employment rates. Second, as we work at the level of 
France, a country in which many institutions are centralized and do not vary across the 
French territory (minimum wage, unemployment benefits, wage bargaining…) we 
control for most of the interactions of labor market institutions. Third, thanks to the 
French institutional setting and local measure of legal environment, we adopt an 
instrumental approach to correct for the endogeneity from which the estimations of the 
relationship between economic condition and enforcement of labor laws might suffer.  
The first chapter of this dissertation supports the fact that the enforcement of labor 
legislation impacts job flows and employment rates. Hence, natural questions to ask 
whether the related litigation processes are a source of inefficiencies. In this respect, 
the second chapter explores the presence of a prisoner dilemma in the choice of legal 
representation when a individual labor dispute arises. There is no doubt that a lawyer 
is necessary in many cases: in criminal cases a lawyer is usually appointed by the 
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court when the defendant cannot obtain or pay for an attorney. However, whether or 
not to pay for legal representation is a matter of cost-benefit analysis and strategic 
choice for a wide range of legal conflicts. Each party might trade off legal fees against 
lower expected gains at trial, assuming that legal assistance does not hurt. The return 
to hiring a lawyer might also be influenced by whether the opposite party hires one. If 
one party hires a lawyer in an effort to increase the chance of success, and the opposite 
party does the same, the likelihood of victory might ultimately be the same as it would 
be if neither party were represented. Using this logic, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) 
were the first to formally observe that strategic behaviors in choosing legal 
representation might result in a prisoner’s dilemma game. A dominant strategy for 
both parties is to choose a lawyer to be represented, but in doing so they end up in 
being worse off that if they were not represented. Taking the example of a union and a 
firm bargaining on a wage increase, both parties might neutralize the actions of their 
opponent if they both use a lawyer or if they both do not use a lawyer. On the other 
hand, if only the worker (firm) uses a lawyer, she manages to achieve an additional 
wage increase (decrease). Assuming that this additional increase (decrease) exceeds 
the lawyer’s fees, the following “prisoner’s dilmma” payoff matrix arises:  
Only a few empirical studies look at the gain from hiring a lawyer, and even fewer 
consider it as a strategic choice in a two-player game. The data sets used by these 
authors suffer from some limitations. They take into account only cases solved 
through arbitration and not through the court system. They are specific and not 
representative of the population of cases. More importantly, these papers empirically 
find the necessary conditions for having a prisoner dilemma in term of probability of 
victory3: it is the same when both parties are represented or none of them are 
                                                 
3In case of arbitration, the winning side is the one whose proposal is the closest to the proposal of the 
arbitrator.  
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represented, and it is higher when one party is represented and the other is not. 
Nevertheless, as these data sets do not provide any information on legal fees, they do 
not allow for the computation of the pay-off matrix of the game and the question of 
whether the game represents a prisoner’s dilemma remains. 
The second chapter complements these studies by using two sets of data of unfair 
dismissals brought to courts in France and the UK. Our French data set is comprised 
of administrative records of almost 2,000,000 cases that have been brought to labour 
court from 1990 to 2004. Unfortunately, awards and legal fees are not available, but 
they allow us to compute the matrix of marginal probabilities of victory for a 
population of cases. Our British data set is comprised of two successive samples of 
UK Employment Tribunal cases drawn in 1998 and 2003, containing an unusual rich 
information on the plaintiff and the defendant, including the settlement amount, the 
award in case of trial, the legal representation and its cost, and in case of a tribunal 
hearing, the characteristic of the representation of the opposite party. Using these data, 
the computation of pay-off matrix of the game of legal representation shows some 
evidence of a presence of a prisoner dilemma.  
Policy reforms have been taken to reduce inefficiencies related to the litigation 
process surrounding individual labor disputes. About 200,000 (100,000) unfair 
dismissals cases are filed every year in France (Great-Britain). This accounts for 10% 
of the people claiming unemployment-related benefits in the UK, and it represents 
about 30% of the yearly number of workers enrolling at the National Placement 
Agency in France after having been fired. In addition to the award or the settlement 
amount, legal representation might represent a substantial firing cost for the firm4. As 
noted by Blanchard and Tirole (2004), judges’ interventions are necessary to 
distinguish a redundancy from a misconduct to denounce discrimination or to check if 
                                                 
4 For the UK, legal cost represents about 4% of the yearly net pay of the worker. 
  6
all the legal steps surrounding a redundancy have been followed but labour 
legislations often make the judge act as a substitute for the judgement of the 
company’s management, which is clearly economically inefficient. So is a litigation 
process that induces legal costs of representation that would have been avoided if the 
parties would have managed to reach an agreement “in the shadow of the law”. Hence, 
any reform pushing toward more conciliation and fewer judicial battles in the firing 
decision is a matter of importance for the policy maker and the role of legal 
representation must be under scrutiny. The tools available to the policy maker to reach 
that goal are numerous: caps on awards, allocations of legal costs to the losing party, 
mandatory and preliminary use of an arbitrator to make a conciliation step and so on.  
The third chapter exploits a reform that shifts the allocation of legal cost from the 
American rule (each party bears its own costs) to the English one (the losing party 
pays the legal cost of the winning side). This reform has been implemented in the UK 
in 2001 for individual labor disputes. Using two successive samples of UK 
Employment Tribunal cases drawn in 1998 and 2003 collecting a very rich set of 
information on the plaintiff and the defendant, we assess the impact of this new 
regulation. 
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2. The effects of the enforcement of the employment 
protection legislation on labor market outcomes  
In a provocative NBER working paper on labor market flexibility, Richard 
Freeman (2004) states that -- after more than one decade spent by labor economists 
and international organizations to convince themselves through inconclusive aggregate 
data analyses and cross-country comparisons that a negative relationship between 
employment protection legislation (EPL hereafter) and labor market performance 
should prevail -- it was time to switch to micro-analysis of workers and firms and 
experimental methods. In a seminal paper, Lazear (1990), who uses the unemployed 
benefit and severance payment given to a blue collar with 10 years of service as a 
proxy for labor market flexibility, acknowledges that high overall labor market 
flexibility can prevail without being captured by any of those two variables. Hence, 
one might conclude with Freeman that cross-country analyses are hardly convincing 
since “with only 30 or so advanced countries, highly correlated outcomes, and 
infrequent changes in institutions, the number of configurations can easily exceed the 
number of independent data points”. Another point of criticism to these cross-country 
analyses is that EPL indices typically used in these analyses are deemed exogenous 
and imperfectly capture how the behaviors of unions, employer federations, or 
governing regulators change over time.  
Taking partly into account these critiques, a recent strand of literature has assessed 
the impact of EPL within countries. It is typically done by measuring the impact of a 
change in legislation targeted to a specific category within a whole country or -in the 
case of the US- the impact of the different timing in the introduction of a new EPL in 
different states. Wrongful-discharge protections were adopted by US state courts 
during the last three decades. Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2004) take advantage of 
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the between-state variation in the timing of the introduction of these labor laws and 
estimate their impact using difference-in-difference estimators. The “implied-contract” 
exception law, meaning that the employer implicitly promised not to terminate a 
worker without good cause, is found to have reduced state employment rate by 0.8 to 
1.6%. Boeri and Jimeno (2003), using the 1990s tightening of the Italian regulation for 
firms with less than 15 employees, find that the threshold does matter in conditioning 
layoff and hiring probabilities but find no significant impact on employment growth. 
Bauer et alii (2007) find no effect of the change in the German EPL exemption for 
small firms on worker turnover. 
Unfortunately, this last strand of research suffers from several downsides as well. 
First, these studies do not provide information concerning the degree of enforcement 
of labor regulations. To which extent these regulations were used by workers to 
defend their own interest and are they actually binding for the employers? For 
instance, in the case of the US, even if judicial breaks to the employment-at-will 
doctrine have been judged by some state courts, we have little evidence on the extent 
to which they are used or even known by the workers and to which they act as a 
credible threat to the employment-at-will policy. The state of California recognized 
the application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment 
relationships in 1980. In March and April 1986 about 100 cases were filed in Los 
Angeles which would lead to an approximate number of 1,000 for the whole year in 
the entire state5 (that is about 80 cases for one million of workers). 6 In comparison, 
for France with a very population and GDP similar to those of California, the number 
of cases in any given year is approximately 200,000. Of course, one could argue that 
the law can act on the employer in a pre-emptive way but, to capture any effect in the 
                                                 
5 In 1986, civil case filings in Los Angeles represented about 60% of all civil activity in the state of 
California. 
6 These figures are taken from Dertouzos (1986). 
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data, this impact should be very strong (or conversely the impact on employment of 
labor courts should be extreme in France). Second, labor laws are subject to court 
interpretation and could vary over time. As pointed out by OECD 2004 Employment 
Outlook, even if an employer can be sanctioned in case of non-respect of EPL, “these 
provisions are subject to court interpretation and this may constitute a major (but often 
hidden) source of variation in EPL strictness both across countries and over time”. In 
addition, methodologically, the timing of introduction of a new EPL can substantially 
alter the results. Indeed, Miles (2000) - using a different classification of cases in 
identifying the adoption dates - finds no significant effects. Third, problems of 
endogeneity remain: court interpretation with the ensuing impact might not be 
exogenous as market conditions could impact the leniency of the courts, the 
introduction of new laws, or the workers’ tendency for litigation. Ichino et alii (2003), 
using micro data on labor court cases, focus on this institutional endogeneity of EPL 
enforcement. They show that in the case of an Italian bank of approximately 20,000 
employees among which 409 workers were fired and 86 of them went to trial over 
more than 20 years, a higher unemployment rate increases the worker’s probability of 
winning. In contrast, Marinescu (2006) - using data from a 1992 survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain - finds that a higher 
unemployment rate leads to more severe decisions against the worker, in particular if 
the worker already found another job. 
Our contribution to the literature on EPL impacts on labor market outcomes is 
threefold. First, we consider measures of EPL varying across space and time based on 
the enforcement of the regulation. In France, workers can contest the conditions of a 
firing by filing a case to one of the 264 local labor courts. We use information 
collected by the French Ministry of Justice on all cases that were filed over the 1990-
2004 period (2 millions of cases) to compute at the local level for each year numerous 
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EPL indicators characterizing the enforcement of the labor laws: fraction of cases 
leading to a conciliation between parties, a trial, a worker’s victory, dismissed by the 
court or the worker, fraction of cases where workers and firms were legally 
represented. We match these local indicators with local measures of job flows and 
employment rates. Second, as we work at the level of France, a country in which many 
institutions are centralized and do not vary across the French territory (minimum 
wage, unemployment benefits, wage bargaining…) we control for most of the 
interactions of labor market institutions. Third, thanks to the French institutional 
setting and local measure of legal environment, we adopt an instrumental approach to 
correct for the endogeneity from which the estimations of the relationship between 
economic condition and enforcement of labor laws might suffer.  
As in all of the empirical papers we are aware of, our paper focuses on the impact 
of labor regulations on labor market characteristics and let aside the welfare gains 
from job stability which must be taken into account for policy recommendations7. In 
contrast with the existing empirical literature, our EPL indicators capture some 
dimensions of the quality of labor relations which according to Blanchard and 
Philippon (2004) or Algan and Cahuc (2007) are related to the evolution of labor 
market conditions.  
The next section describes the French labor court institutional setting. After 
presenting a simple theoretical model relating the enforcement of labor laws to firing 
costs we describe our data sets and provides some descriptive statistics. Finally we 
explain our empirical methodology to capture EPL causal effects and presents our 
regression results on labor flows and employment rates.  
 
                                                 
7 See Bertola (2003) for a theoretical model considering risk-averse workers and potential positive 
effect of EPL on welfare. 
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1. Labor courts in France: the institutional setting 
 
1.1. French firing laws  
Three types of events may trigger the firm’s decision to fire a worker: a grave 
misconduct, a lay-off due to a slowdown in the business activity, or an insufficient 
level of competence. Under the current French law, the separation should be declared 
as a redundancy (or economic dismissal). However, in France as in many European 
countries an economic dismissal may entail a more complicated and time consuming 
process as well as the payment of large severance fees. On the contrary, a dismissal for 
misconduct is a faster process - if not challenged by the worker or if confirmed by the 
labor court. Thus the dismissal for “just” cause implies a lower firing cost than a 
redundancy. When fired, a French worker might sue the firm. Since a bill passed in 
1973, every individual dismissal must be justified by a “real and serious cause” and 
the firm has the burden of proof. Without delving deep into 30 years of jurisprudence 
that have made this concept simultaneously blurred and precise, “real” means that the 
wrongdoing justifying the dismissal must be objectively defined, accurate, and in line 
with the mandatory firing notification letter. For example, being ten minutes late does 
not mean being seventy minutes late ; a lack of performance or a lack of trust is not 
considered as “real” if it is not objectively measured. The cause is considered as 
“serious” only if it is related to the professional activity of the worker and if it makes 
the labor relation impossible to continue. There are various degrees of “seriousness”. 
Some lead to “grave misconduct” (for example brawl or thievery) which allows the 
employer to totally deprive the worker of severance payment.  
In addition to the cause of the dismissals, the employee can sue the employer if he 
did not follow the mandatory legal steps of the firing process (for example the 
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employer must notify one week in advance that the employer intends to meet the 
worker in order to discuss his firing). 
As pointed out by Galdon-Sanchez and Guel (2003), EPL legislation in European 
countries gave rise to a double moral hazard problem: a worker fired for misconduct 
has an incentive to sue for unfair dismissal and a firm has an incentive to label 
“misconduct” a separation which, in reality, is a redundancy. Thus, even if this 
phenomenon is obviously hard to detect in the data, the proportion of dismissals for 
economic reasons decreased from 61% in 1993 to 24% in 2004.  
 
1.2. French labor courts  
The French labor justice is mainly dispensed by the "Prud’hommes" which is the 
relevant jurisdiction to every labor dispute arising at the individual level in France. 
There are several labor courts in each Prud’hommes. As the legislators wanted to take 
into account industry characteristics of the cases brought to court, each Prud’hommes 
is divided into 4 sections according to the main activity of the firm: Agriculture, Retail 
Trade, Manufacturing, and Other Activities (mainly Services). A fifth section is 
dedicated to deal with cases involving "managers" irrespective of the activity of the 
firm. 
The judges in the Prud’hommes are not professional judges and can be seen as 
performing a public duty. Each labor court comprises judges representing employers 
and judges representing employees in equal number. These judges are elected every 
five years within lists established by unions and federations. All employees are 
entitled to vote. They select judges in the union lists. Similarly, employers vote and 
select judges within the federation lists. All French establishments are allocated to one 
Prud’hommes. On the employee side, the electoral body includes all private sector 
workers with a labor contract. They are enrolled on the electoral list based on a 
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mandatory administrative reporting from their employer. Unemployed can also vote 
but have to enroll on the list by themselves. On the employer side, in addition to 
employers and business owners, employees entitled to take firing or hiring decisions 
can also vote for employer representatives.  
Prud’hommes are supposedly not very formal and should be seen as conciliation 
boards. Prud’hommes were designed to foster agreements rather than trials. Therefore 
a first and mandatory step in each trial is a conciliation audience where plaintiffs and 
defenders explain their grievance and judges try to push for an agreement. If they do 
not, the case is judged. If an equal number of judges is pro worker and against her, 
there is a tie (“solution de départage”). In that case, a single professional judge decides 
the outcome of the trial.  
In the 90’s, 264 Prud’hommes are spread all over metropolitan France, a labor 
court being at most within a radius of 30 miles from any establishment. Even though a 
majority of plaintiffs are represented by a lawyer, going to labor court is not 
necessarily expensive. For instance, local administration provides a list of benevolent 
specialists (former labor inspectors, for example) who are willing to assist workers. 
Furthermore, low-income workers are eligible to financial help.  
The plaintiff or the defender can appeal the decision of the labor court if the stake 
is larger than a given threshold (about 5,000 euros in 2006). It is worth noting that 
60% of the decisions were appealed in 2004. Among them, 55% of these appeals did 
not overruled the Prud’hommes’ decision, 30% confirmed it “partially”8.  
In case of an emergency, a summary judgment can be made. However, these 
judgments are only temporary and might be overruled afterwards. In this paper, we do 
not consider these summary judgments.  
                                                 
8 Munoz-Perrez and Serverin (2006). 
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For any given case filed in labor courts, the range of outcome is wide. A case can 
lead to a full tribunal hearing and be lost or won. It can be classified as null and void if 
the plaintiff has not shown due diligence in the conduct of her case. The case can also 
be crossed out. This crossing out is less severe than a “null and void” classification. 
The worker can reinstate her case at the point it has been crossed out and does not 
have to restart the whole process. This crossing out can be decided by judges but it can 
also be the outcome of the plaintiff’s initiative.9 A case can either be conciliated 
during the conciliation step or outside the tribunal with a formal agreement sent to the 
court.  
The motives for suing are multiple. The nullification of a dismissal is asked in the 
majority of cases (58%)10. 21% of plaintiffs ask for some compensation that was not 
paid by their former employer whereas 9% of plaintiffs do not agree with the level of 
their severance payment. For most of this paper, we do not distinguish between these 
different motives. 
 
1.3. Recent changes 
The legal environment did not change substantially during our sample period 
(1990-2004).11 In a relative recent past of an institution officially founded in 180612, a 
1979 bill radically changed the institutional settings of the Prud’hommes. First, it 
extended the number of Prud’hommes across France in order to guarantee an equal 
access among workers. Second, it ended the majority rule for electing representatives 
which resulted in a more diverse composition of each Prud’hommes. Thirdly, it made 
                                                 
9 In 2004, only 27% of crossed out cases were reinstated.  
10 In a very vast majority of the cases won by the worker, the worker is not reinstated but receives a 
compensatory award. 
11 Apart from minor changes related to the application of the working time reduction and the 35 hours 
workweek. 
12 Prud’hommes can be traced back to the Middle Ages. 
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the Prud’hommes funded by central administration, which is important for us since it 
gave national rules to the funding and much less reactivity to the local changes in the 
economic environment. 
 
2. Litigation and firing cost: a simple theoretical model 
We do not study here the theoretical impact of firing costs on labor market 
variables. This has been extensively examined elsewhere (see Bertola and Bentilola, 
1992). We just try to illustrate how the enforcement of labor laws is related to firing 
costs. Thus, we need to model the incentive for the employer to commit an unfair 
dismissal and the incentive for the worker to challenge it. We depart from the 
traditional model of litigation proposed by Priest and Klein (1984) or Bebchuk (1984) 
to run a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one proposed by Flanagan (1989) for 
disputes related to the compliance to the National Labor Relations Act in the US. The 
employer can deliberately choose either lawful or unlawful behaviour in firing a 
worker. In the latter case, he incurs a lower cost (cU) if the dismissal remains 
unchallenged by the worker. This cost cU is lower than the cost of a lawful dismissal cL 
.Yet the firm has to take into account the probability that the worker files a suit pf and 
the probability pw. Given the numerous outcomes a case might have, we could broadly 
define pw as the probability of the worker to extract something from the judicial 
process whether it will be trough a formal agreement in front of the court or through a 
conciliation step in the “shadow of the law” after the case having been filed. For 
clarity purpose we define pw as the worker’s probability of winning at trial.  
There is an uncertainty surrounding the decision of the judge because the firm can 
disguise the truth -possibly with the help of legal counselling- or because of the 
potential time-inconsistency of the labor court decisions or the novelty of the case. In 
case of unlawful behaviour, we write the expected firing cost as: 
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( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) UfUwLwf cplcpFcppcE −++−++= 11     (2.1) 
Where F is a compensatory award for the worker and l is the firm’s litigation cost. 
The marginal benefit of unfair dismissal of the firm is:  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) LUfUwLwfUD ccplcpFcppMB −−++−++= 11    (2.2) 
As for the worker, he chooses to challenge his unfair dismissal if his expected gain 
at trial is larger than the unlawful severance payment:  
( ) ( ) 01 >−−−++ UUwLw ckcpFcp      (2.3) 
k being the cost of litigation for the worker. 
Facing an unfair dismissal, the worker sues as soon as: 
( )ULww cFc
kpp −+=>
*       (2.4) 
Knowing that, the employer dismisses the worker unfairly if:  
( ) ( ) 01 <−+−++ LUwLw clcpFcp      (2.5) 
That is: 
UL
UL
ww cFc
lccpp −+
−−=< **       (2.6) 
As soon as the sum of litigation costs is below the difference in “direct” firing 
costs (that is cL-cU) , there may be 3 equilibriums: a low probability equilibrium where 
the firm does not comply as she will not be sued in doing so, a medium range pw 
equilibrium where the firm does not comply even if she is sued since unlawful 
behaviours remain less costly and a high range pw equilibrium where the firm complies 
given the cost of a lawsuit. An increase in pw is associated to a shift from one 
equilibrium to the other along an increasing curve in the firing cost. The filing rate 
should decrease for high level of pw since the firm has an incentive to lawful behavior.  
We consider a cumulative distribution function G for the probability of worker’s 
victory. We assume that this distribution is the same in each Prud’hommes area but 
that the truncation of this distribution varies over the areas according to institutional 
factors. A firm willing to fire L* workers will face the expected firing cost:  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ******* LcppGpcpppGcppGfcE LwwwwwwUww ≤+<≤+<=  (2.7) 
Where c(pw) is an increasing function of pw bounded by cU and cL : 
LwU cpcc ≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛≤ + . 
An increase in the worker’s litigation cost increases *wp  since fewer workers are 
likely to file an unfair dismissal case. An increase in the firm’s litigation cost will 
encourage the firm in lawful behaviors while the firing cost is at its upper bound. An 
increase in F pushes downward *wp . Cases of lower quality (e.g. low pw) might be 
filed. In the same time, a larger award at trial might encourage employers to adopt 
lawful behaviours.  
The parameters of the model can be related to the endogeneity issues when 
estimating the impact of our labor regulation enforcement indicators on labor market 
characteristics. A reverse causation from labor market characteristics to unfair 
dismissal outcomes might appear and the deterioration of labor market conditions can 
influence our EPL indicators. First, according to the legislator, F compensates the 
worker for past and future potential wages loss taking into account the difficulty to 
find a comparable new job. F is likely to be countercyclical of the labor market 
tightness. An economic downturn pushes *wp  downward and 
**
wp  upward which result 
other things being equals in higher firing costs13. Second, drawing on an efficiency 
wage story, we might on the contrary suppose that, facing a higher penalty when they 
lose their jobs, workers put more effort on their job during a downturn and those who 
are fired are in better position to dispute the firing such as the overall distribution of pw 
shifts upward. Third, economic conditions might also alter the overall distribution of 
pw through judges’ behaviors. Judges showing a pro-worker bias when labor market  
                                                 
13 Empirically, Siegelman and Donohue (1995) find that cases of employment discrimination rise in 
downturns and are more likely to be lost. In our model, it will means that the decrease in *wp  more than 
offset the decrease in **wp  when computing the average worker’s victory rate. 
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conditions deteriorate increase the firing cost faced by the firms (see Ichino et alii, 
2003).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 
Firing cost and enforcement of the labor laws 
 
In our instrumental approach we search for sources of changes in the distribution 
of pw unrelated to current local labor market conditions. Aggregating labor flows at the 
level of the Prud’hommes’s area, we interpret differences in local institutional settings 
and local characteristics as variations over litigation costs (k and l) across areas and 
time. Labor judges and judicial clerks involved in labor disputes are unequally 
distributed over the French territory leading to differentially congested labor courts. 
This implies an increasing marginal cost of challenging the dismissal following 
Buchanan’s club theory of public goods and thus a decrease in the firing cost through 
a higher k. The choice of legal representation influences the expected gain from the 
wp  *
wp  
**
wp  
≤uc  lc≤  ( ) lFpcpcp wUwLw ++−+ 1  
Firing cost 
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judicial process for both parties. Once a case has been filed, the worker and the firm 
optimize by choosing a lawyer trading off higher probability to prevail against the cost 
of representation. One might plausibly assume that a larger lawyer density induces a 
stronger competition among them and a higher rate of return for the use of legal 
services. When the worker takes a lawyer, it increases his chance of success pw and 
this has an unambiguous impact on the firing costs. Judges at labor court in France are 
union members and their behaviors affecting pw are likely to be shaped by a long 
tradition of industrial relations adopted by their union at the national level and loosely 
related to local economic developments. We will discuss more in depth the exogeneity 
of these indicators in the following sections. 
 
3. Data sets and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Individual cases data set 
 
3.1.1. Firms’ and workers’ characteristics 
Our data source comes from administrative records made at the level of each 
Prud’hommes and collected by the statistical department of the French Ministry of 
Justice. Their primary goal is to monitor the labor courts’ activities with an emphasis 
on speed of treatment. The data source is exhaustive for the period 1990 to 2004. It 
includes approximately 2 millions of individual cases.14 
Apart from years 1993, 1994 and 1995, the number of cases treated by labor courts 
appears to be stable over the period, in stark contrast to what happened in some 
countries such as the UK where a sharp increase in cases took place (see Figure 2.2 
and Burgess, 1999).  
                                                 
14 We will not consider the 2% of cases involving employers as plaintiffs. 
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For each case, the sex and age of the employee-plaintiff is recorded. There is no 
precise information on her skill-level in the firm. Nevertheless, the “managers” section 
of the Prud’hommes only deals with high-skill employees and managers. Similarly, 
since low-income workers are eligible to financial help (13% of the cases), eligibility 
can be used as a low-income indicator. Approximately one half of these cases are 
susceptible of appeal, which implies that the sums at stake are larger than 5,000 euros 
(in 2005). 53% of the employees are represented by a lawyer.  
Concerning firms’ characteristics, we know the industry, the size and the 
Prud’hommes jurisdiction of the employing firm. However, we can only differentiate 
between firms with more and firms with less than 10 workers. The size of the firm has 
to be known by labor court judges because labor laws differ for small firms; in 
particular, they are less stringent and try to ease the financial costs of firing that could 
hurt them irreversibly. Small firms are overrepresented with 56% of the filed cases 
whereas they comprise 25% of the labor force.  
For each case, the starting date, the ending date, the motives for dismissal, and the 
court decision are recorded. An average case takes one year (343 days) with a standard 
deviation of 9 months.  
 
3.1.2. EPL enforcement indicators 
Using the individual cases data set, we are able to compute several EPL indicators 
for each Prud’hommes. A case can follow various paths and every grouping is 
somewhat arbitrary. For example, as what we call “agreement” is registered by the 
court under the acceptation of both parties, one can argue that it can be interpreted as a 
winning case, a rational plaintiff stopping the judicial process only if her own interests 
have been satisfied. On the contrary, she might realize the low quality of her case in 
term of probability of winning and then renounces to her claims. We start computing 
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the EPL indicator using the most disaggregated classification:  “winning” (resp. 
“losing”, “null and void”, “crossed out”, “conciliated”, “agreement” and “tied”) is 
computed as the ratio of the cases classified as worker’s victory (resp. defeat at trial, 
null and void, crossed out, conciliated, having led to an agreement, having been 
judged by a professional judge) in year t over the number of cases disposed in year t. 
We then group cases in “agreed” (cases conciliated or having led to an agreement), 
“dropped” (“null and void” or “crossed out”) and “trial” (cases having reached trial). 
We also compute the worker’s victory rate at trial (“victory”). 
We can rank a priori our EPL indicators according to what the outcome might cost 
to the firms. The most favorable outcome for the firm is the case being dismissed by 
the court (“Null and Void”) or by the worker (“crossed out”). Even if one can argue 
that these “dropped” cases might correspond to agreements not reported to the court it 
is safer judiciary speaking for both parties to report the deal to the Prud’hommes. The 
less favorable outcome is the case reaching trial and being won by the worker. A case 
leading to a firm’s victory at trial is not obligatory less costly than one classified after 
conciliation or an agreement since it implies additional litigation costs. In the 
theoretical literature, the litigation process is usually considered as economically 
inefficient as the outcome could have been reached otherwise by both parties in a 
bargaining process at lower costs. Hence we can consider that a case reaching trial is 
likely to be more costly than a case conciliated or dismissed. Beyond the outcome of 
the case, we use as an additional EPL indicator and a more direct evaluation of the 
costs related to the suits the fraction of firms and workers that are represented by a 
lawyer during the judicial process. 
About 60% of cases ended by a trial, among which 75% led to a worker’s victory 
(see Table 2.1 and 2.2). Despite the mandatory step of conciliation, only 11% of the 
cases ended at this stage. Taking into account cases that led to an agreement notified 
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to the court or to a withdrawal on the worker’s side, at least 20% of the filed cases led 
to an agreement. 20% is also the proportion of cases having been dropped. All EPL 
indicators display a very strong variance over time and across Prud’hommes. In 
comparison to what is observed in a country sich as the UK, a large fraction of 
workers and firms are represented by a lawyer despite other means of representation 
are available. Despite the conciliation step which promotes a quick and costless 
resolution of the cases, labor disputes seem to induce important litigation costs.  
 
Table 2.1 
Case outcomes: definition of variables 
Names Definition 
Winning Number of workers’ victories at trial over total number of cases 
Losing Number of workers’ defeats at trial over total number of cases 
Null and Void Number of cases classified as "Null and Void" over the total number of cases
Crossed Out Number of cases classified as "Crossed out" over the total number of cases 
Conciliation Number of cases conciliated through the mandatory conciliation step over the total number of cases 
Agreement Number of cases having led to an agreement notified to the judge over the total number of cases 
Tied Number of cases having led to a professional judge’s decision over the total number of cases 
Dropped (Null and Void +Crossed Out)/(Total number of cases) 
Agreed (Conciliation +Agreement)/(Total number of cases) 
Trial (Winning+Losing)/(Total Number of Cases) 
Victory (Winning)/(Winning +Losing)  
lawyerf Number of cases where the firm is represented by a lawyer over the total number of cases 
lawyer Number of cases where the worker is represented by a lawyer over the total number of cases 
Admittedly starting from a high base, we do not observe in France a strong increase in 
the number of cases brought to the labor courts. In absolute terms, the number of filed 
cases increased by 10% over the 1990 to 2004 period. The number of filed cases by 
unemployed workers hovered around five percent over the same period.  
Cross-country analyses of EPL are built using aggregate indices ranking countries 
in terms of labor market flexibility as defined within written legislation. This approach 
leaves aside the degree of law enforcement, conditional on the rules as well as cyclical 
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variation. Numbers in Table 2.2 as well as the very large filing rate (around 25% of 
dismissals are contested in France) should lead us to conclude that the degree of 
enforcement of labor regulations is very high in France.  
 
Table 2.2 
Summary statistics: case outcomes 
Case Outcome Mean* Std. Min Max 
Winning 0.45 0.09 0.00 0.93 
Losing 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.78 
Null and Void 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.62 
Crossed Out 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.74 
Conciliation 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.78 
Agreement 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.73 
Tied 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.77 
Dropped 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.75 
Agreed 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.81 
Trial 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.95 
Victory 0.75 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Lawyer 0.43 0.15 0.00 0.95 
Lawyerf 0.58 0.15 0.00 0.95 
Notes: we first compute the proportion of cases with outcomes i in year t at the Prud’hommes level 
using the data set of individual cases collected from 1990 to 2004 by the French Ministry of 
Justice. We then take the means of these proportions over the 264 Prud’hommes over the 1990-
2004 period.  
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Interior. 
 
Regressing the different indicators of outcomes on local measures of the business 
cycle shows that the enforcement behavior of these regulations is strongly correlated 
with the cycle (see Table 2.3) and that traditional labor regulation indices are highly 
imperfect in this respect. A high unemployment rate is associated with a high trial rate 
and a small number of “agreed, conciliated or dropped” cases. By contrast, the 
worker’s victory rate seems to be less cyclical. If the number of unemployed workers 
is correlated with the number of fired workers, we can compute a filing rate. The same 
table shows that downturns are characterized by a low filing rate but a high 
litigiousness, with workers that are less willing to give up their case. 
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Table 2.3 
Case outcomes and the business cycle 
Outcome variable: Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate (-1) R-squared 
Winning 0.184 (0.16) 
0.856*** 
(0.16) 0.39 
Losing 0.157 (0.10) 
0.0506 
(0.10) 0.28 
Null and Void 0.236*** (0.073) 
-0.613*** 
(0.074) 0.37 
Crossed Out -0.301** (0.12) 
0.331** 
(0.13) 0.53 
Conciliation -0.457*** (0.095) 
0.150* 
(0.082) 0.54 
Agreement 0.180* (0.10) 
-0.774*** 
(0.12) 0.31 
Tied -0.404*** (0.095) 
0.370*** 
(0.099) 0.33 
Dropped -0.0648 (0.13) 
-0.283** 
(0.14) 0.50 
Agreed -0.276* (0.15) 
-0.624*** 
(0.15) 0.46 
Trial 0.341** (0.16) 
0.907*** 
(0.17) 0.41 
Victory -0.143 (0.15) 
0.305** 
(0.15) 0.31 
Filerate -0.589*** -1.079*** 0.59 
 (0.17) (0.21)  
Notes: Each row displays the regression of an outcome variable on the current and lagged local 
unemployment rate and Prud’hommes fixed effects. The local unemployment rate is defined as 
the number of unemployed enrolled at the local branch of the National Employment Agency 
(ANPE) over the 1999 census local workforce. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Justice. Others from Insee. 
 
3.2. Local employment data set 
Local employment flows at the establishment level are computed from the 
SIRENE files, maintained at the French statistical institute (INSEE). These files give 
the precise location (city within a “département”) for each establishment. We compute 
a set of Davis and Haltiwinger (1992) indicators over the 1990-2004 period: job 
creation (both at the extensive and the intensive margin), job destruction (both at the 
extensive and the intensive margin), and net job creation variables over the 1990-2004 
period (using Haltiwanger (1989)’s definitions). These measures are aggregated by 
industry (service, trade, manufacturing) and size of the establishments (more or less 
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than 10 employees) at the city level as well as at the Prud’hommes level, using a 1999 
correspondence between cities and Prud’hommes provided by the Ministry of Justice. 
In comparison with cross-country analyses, these indicators also show a high 
heterogeneity across periods and the 264 areas.  
To measure local unemployment, we use the number of unemployed as registered 
at the National Labor Agency (ANPE) for each city as well as the city labor force as 
measured at the 1999 Census. Finally, from 1997 on, we are able to distinguish the 
reasons for losing one’s job (economic or personal dismissal, entry into the labor 
force, end of temporary contract...) 
In order to test the impact of EPL on employment rates, we use multiple waves of 
the French Labor Survey. In March of every year the French Statistical Institute 
(INSEE) conducts a Labor Force Survey (Enquête sur l’Emploi), interviewing roughly 
130,000 people who are asked a set of standard questions. In particular, we know for 
each individual his or her “département” of residence.  The “Départements” are the 
French equivalent of the American county. There are 95 départements in metropolitan 
France. We use the Labor Force Survey for the years 1990 to 2004. So, for each 
département and year, we construct averages of the following variables: employment-
to-population rates by sex, age, and level of education, share of workers in temporary 
jobs, share of workers employed part-time but would rather work full time. From the 
French Public Employment Service, we obtain the share of long-term unemployed 
(unemployed for more than one year). Our business cycle indicator is the regional 
change in GDP15 as computed by INSEE.  
 
 
                                                 
15 There are 22 régions in Metropolitan France. Each region is composed by approximately 4 
“départements”. 
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3.3. Election data set 
The elections for the Prud’hommes are crucial in France -at least for the trade 
unions- as they are the only way to assess unions’ representativeness at the national 
level. Over the period under review, 4 rounds of elections took place, in 1987, 1992, 
1997, and 2002. For each round, we collected the share of judges affiliated to each 
union as well as the number of judges by section at the Prud’hommes level. The 
number of judges did not change from 1993 to 2002.  
For the 1992, 1997 and 2002 rounds we have the turnout rates and the number of 
workers who were enrolled on the electoral lists for each Prud’hommes. Union shares 
of votes are rather stable over time but display a great deal of heterogeneity across 
Prud’hommes (see Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4 
Share of judges by unions 
Union Mean Std Min. Max. 
CGT 37% 11% 0% 71% 
CFDT 28% 10% 0% 63% 
FO 22% 7% 0% 50% 
CFE-CGC 8% 4% 0% 21% 
CFTC 4% 6% 0% 44% 
Note: Number of observations: 1056 (264 Prud’hommes over 4 electoral terms) 
Sources: French Ministry of Labor 
 
3.4. Additional judicial data 
In France, each lawyer has to get licensed and registered at the Bar (“barreau”) in 
order to be entitled to practice. We know the number of lawyers registered at each 
“barreau” from 1996 to 2006. It allows us to have a local estimate of the number of 
lawyers by employed worker. As there are fewer bars in France than 
Prud’hommes(181 versus 264), we match each Prud’hommes to the closest bar using 
orthodromic distance and compute the number of lawyers available to employees 
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depending on one single Prud’hommes. Using the 1999 Census, the national average 
is 77 lawyers per 10000 employees, going from a minimum of 14 (Creuse) to a 
maximum of 868 (Paris). From our micro data set on Prud’hommes cases, we are able 
to compute the number of workers who were represented by a lawyer at the labor 
court. We observe a very high correlation (0.68) between the lawyers’ densities 
computed from these two different sources. Lawyer data cover a shorter period than 
our other instruments (1996-2004). 
In addition, we obtained two other measure of labor laws enforcement: the number 
of “greffiers” (clerks) employed by the Ministry of Justice attached to tribunals in the 
area of each “Tribunal d’instance”16, closest to the labor court (“Staff” hereafter) over 
the 1992-2004 period17 and the number of greffiers directly employed at the local 
labor court but over a shorter period (1997-2004). “greffiers” are civil servants in 
charge of all the administrative tasks, which include assisting the workers in filing 
their cases as well as writing the judgment terms.  
 
4. Identification strategy 
 
4.1. An instrumental approach 
 
4.1.1. Estimating equations 
We estimate the following econometric model:  
tptptptptptp EPLBCBCLabor ,,1,2,1, εγδβαα +++++= −     (2.8) 
Where EPLp,t is an enforcement of EPL indicator at the unit of observation p and 
for the year t. BCp,t is a business cycle indicator. The unit of observations is the 
                                                 
16 As there is more “tribunal d’instance” than Prud’hommes(460 versus 264), we use again orthodromic 
distance for the matching. 
17 Data linearly interpolated for 1993 and 1994. 
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Prud’hommes or the département area. Our labor market variables Laborp,t are either 
the labor flows at the Prud’hommes level or the employment rates, relative 
employment rates, unemployment rates and labor flows at the département level. δp is 
a Prud’hommes or département fixed effect; γt  is the year effect and εp,t is the error 
component. In each regression, observations are clustered at the local labor market 
area level. The labor market areas defined by the jurisdiction of the Prud’hommes 
show a large heterogeneity in size of employment. Half of the Prud’hommes accounts 
for about 80% of the 1991 total employment. We weight our regressions by the share 
in the total employment at the start of the period under review (1991).  
We are interested in estimating the parameter β measuring the impact of the 
judicial activity on the labor market characteristics. As underlined in section 3 the 
judicial activity might depend on the current labor market conditions and we wish to 
adopt an instrumental approach to estimate a causal effect projecting our EPL 
indicators on instruments Z , business cycle indicators, yearly dummies and local labor 
market fixed effects:  
tptptptptptp ZBCBCEPL ,,1,2,1, υγδλμμ +++++= −     (2.9) 
Given the lack of time variability of some of our instruments, we will also consider 
pooled regressions. As our observations are clustered at the local labor market level, 
this covariance structure  is less intrusive encompassing a “traditional” random effect 
covariance structure. 
Clearly, the business cycle BC is endogenous and needs to be instrumented: 
unobserved economic shocks might simultaneously impact the quality of the cases 
brought to labor court, bias the judges in their decisions, and affect the labor flows. To 
do this, we instrument the measure of local business cycles (number of unemployed 
registered at the local employment agency on the 1999 local labor force) by the 
national unemployment rate using the following relation: 
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tpaggregateptptp UU ,, ημγδ +++=     (2.10) 
Then, we use the predicted value Û of U by (3) to compute our exogenous 
measure of cycle BC as ( ) UUU /ˆ−  where U  is the average of the predicted local 
unemployment rate Û. At the département level, we alternatively use this indicator and 
the regional GDP18 which is the most disaggregated measure of economic growth 
available in France on a yearly basis. 
 
4.1.2. Instruments 
Suitable instruments for estimating the parameter β must explain the average 
outcomes observed at the level of the labor court or the département and being 
exogenous to current labor market developments. We claim that the institutional 
settings of the Prud’hommes itself and the local legal environment provide convincing 
instruments.  
 
Lawyers 
One of our instruments is the number of lawyers enrolled at the local bar scaled by 
the total employment of the Prud’hommes area or the département in 1991 (“lawyer 
density” hereafter).  A high lawyer density is likely to reduce legal fees thanks to a 
higher competition (see Siegelman and Donohue, 1995 for a similar argument). It also 
helps to disseminate legal expertise and judicial knowledge of labor disputes among 
the population of workers. 
It should correspond to a lower cost of litigation for the worker and hence 
influences the outcome of the case.19 One could argue that the lawyer’s choice of 
                                                 
18 A region in France groups on average 4 départements. 
19 Logit regressions using our data set of individual cases reaching the trial stage shows that hiring a 
lawyer against a unrepresented firm increases the probability of worker victory by about 4%. 
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location depends on local economic conditions. First, labor disputes are only a small 
amount of the total number of civil cases (11% at the national level20). 
 
Table 2.5 
Predicting powers of labor flows on staff and lawyer density 
Flows= Job Destructions Job Creations Job Net Creations 
  lawyers staff lawyers Staff lawyers staff 
Flows (-1) -0.00106 -0.0000414 -0.000151 0.0000736 0.000754 0.0000984 
 -0.0009 -0.00034 -0.0011 -0.00018 -0.00054 -0.00029 
Flows (-2) -0.000687 -0.000363** 0.00113 -0.000234 0.00119 0.000115 
  -0.00047 -0.00017 -0.0016 -0.00039 -0.00091 -0.00025 
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.11 
Observations 2112 2904 2112 2904 2112 2904 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses.*** p< 0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Observations 
are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1996-2004 (2,112 obs.) or 1992-2004 (2, 904 obs.). Each 
regression includes year and Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes' 
jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights.Clusters: Prud’hommes level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments. 
 
Second, in order to get licence to practice, a lawyer must enrol the local bar which 
jurisdiction the Prud’hommes belongs to. This requirement and the building of a 
reputation and a clientele induce a low mobility of lawyers from a region to another. 
Moreover, a lawyer typically enrolled the bar the city where she studied and her 
location preference is likely to be unrelated to the incidence of labor disputes 
litigation. Supporting this, lagged labor flows are found to have no predicting power 
on lawyer density including fixed effects and yearly dummies (see Table 2.5). Thus 
the lawyers’ density influences judicial outcomes through the cost and the efficiency 
of the litigation process but being supposedly exogenous to current labor market 
developments makes it a plausible instrument. 
 
 
                                                 
20 See available on line Info Stat justice (2005) « Une évaluation de l’activité des juridictions en 2004 » 
Numéro 80.  
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Clerks and judges 
We also consider as instruments the number of judges and staff in charge of 
dealing with judicial cases scaled by the local 1991 employment. They are likely to 
have an impact on judicial decisions as well. Judicial activity can be modelled as a 
production function for the case disposition. Benstock and Haitovsky (2004) using a 
panel data on Israeli courts find that judges complete more cases as their caseloads 
grow and complete fewer cases when new judges are appointed to their court. In the 
case of Prud’hommes, the sociological literature21 supports this results discovering 
that facing an increasing number of cases and having to meet some productivity 
requirements, judges tend to be more meddlesome implying crossing out more cases 
for administrative reasons to speed up the process and lighten their burden. Less 
judges or staff would imply more dismissed cases which clearly diminish the firing 
costs of the firm.  
In the same vein of our lawyer density indicator, we consider the total number of 
ministry of justice civil servants working at the civil court independently on the type 
of cases they deal with. Their allocation planned at the national level responds to 
budget constraints and changes in the local caseload. At stressed before, 
Prud’hommes’ cases represent a small share of the total civil case load and their 
steady number across the years is unlikely to have driven massive reallocations of 
judicial personnel. We check again that the clerks’ density can not be well predicted 
by lagged labor flows (see again Table 2.5). 
As mentioned before the number of judges of Prud’hommes changed only twice 
over the period under review and hence the variation in the judge density is mainly 
cross-sectional. This stability and the allocation of judges across Prud’hommes let us 
claim that their density is exogenous from local economic development. The number 
                                                 
21 See Bonaffé-Schmidt (1987). 
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of judges is the outcome of past decisions (“Réforme Boulin”, 1979). As already 
stressed, Prud’hommes’ judges are unequally spread over the French territory. Before 
1979, the cost of the Prud’hommes was born by the local administration and their 
creation mostly depended on a bargaining process between unions, firms, and the local 
administration. For instance, in those years (before 1979) 6 “départements”22 out of 95 
did not have a single labor court. In 1979, a legislation pushed by the Minister of 
Labor Robert Boulin transformed the financing and made it depend exclusively on 
central government resources. In addition, at least one labor court had to be present in 
every zone endowed with a civil tribunal (“Tribunal de Grande Instance”). Since then, 
every additional change in the number of judges within a labor court or the opening of 
a new labor court depends on the outcome of a bargaining between the unions, 
employers’ federations, local, and national government. The process is supervised by a 
national agency (“Conseil national de la Prud’homie”). This system generated strong 
rigidities with the consequence of essentially freezing the number of judges. This 
number stayed roughly the same since 1979; every bargaining party preferring the 
status-quo.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the dispersion of the Prud’hommes across the French 
territory. We compare the proportion of the judges working at the local Prud’hommes 
with the size of the local labor market in 1992. 
                                                 
22 A French “département” is equivalent to an American county. 
  33
Sources: Election data from Ministry of Labor. Employment data from the Insee Sirene files on 
establishments 
Figure 2.2 
Allocation of judges 
 
For similar labor market sizes, the number of judges in some Prud’hommes is 
twice that found in other Prud’hommes. Turning to labor court activity, we plot in 
figure 2.3 the average number of cases disposed every year by judges, which can be a 
measure for judges’ productivity. Hence, in some Prud’hommes, judges deal with 10 
times more cases than judges in other Prud’hommes.  
Judges are elected in December. Some changes took place in 1992 (in comparison 
with 1987) and in 2002 (see tables 2.6 and 2.7). Digging into administrative archives 
of the French Ministry of Labor, the number of cases brought to labor courts seems to 
be the main apparent quantitative indicator used to decide these changes.23 Thus, nine 
                                                 
23 In the US, the Administrative Office of the United States Court uses statistics over the average time 
spent by judges to handle a case of a given type to give an appraisal of judge allocation.  
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labor courts were closed in 1992 because less than 100 cases were examined in a year. 
However, not all labor courts with less than 100 cases a year were closed.  
 
Sources: Election data from Ministry of Labor. Employment Data from the Insee Sirene files on 
establishments. 
Figure 2.3 
Productivity of judges across Prud’hommes 
 
Table 2.6 
Number of judges by section and change over the electoral terms 
Change in % between term t and term t-1 (t/t-1) 
Number of judges in 1987 1992/1987 1997/1992 2002/1997 
Manufacturing 2213 -15 0 -9 
Service 1266 0 0 11 
Trade 1831 5 0 1 
Management 1278 10 0 4 
Total 6588 -1 0 1 
Sources: French Ministry of Labor. 
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Table 2.7 
Breakdown of change in the number of judges across the 264 Prud’hommes 
 1992 Election 2002 Election 
 Manufacturing Service Trade Manufacturing Service Trade 
lost 3 judges or more 17 4 4 7 0 0 
lost 2 judges 17 0 0 8 0 0 
lost 1 judges 16 2 6 27 1 25 
no change 44 85 58 56 79 58 
gained 1 judges 3 5 17 1 9 9 
gained 2 judges 1 2 10 1 5 3 
gained 3 judges or 
more 
1 2 6 0 6 4 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: read as % of Prud’hommes that lost (or gained or no change) x judges in the election year t 
Sources: French Ministry of Labor. 
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Sources: Election data from Ministry of Labor. Employment Data from the Insee Sirene files on 
establishments. 
Figure 2.4 
Change in judges in 1993 and productivity of judges 
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Figure 2.4 also shows that, along a very wide range of judges’ productivity, no 
change took place (30 cases a year per judge being a rough threshold for an increase in 
the number of judges). Besides, lags of labor flows are unable to predict the change in 
the number of judges that occurred in 1993. We try to give a sense of what might go 
on in the next lines. Labor courts are divided into 4 “sections” according to the 
industry of the firm (Agriculture, Retail trade, Manufacturing, Services). Labor court 
elections in France are the only way to gauge the representativeness of a union and are 
critical for them. CGT, the most important union in France, is traditionally well 
represented in manufacturing and is reluctant to accept a reduction in the number of 
judges allocated to the manufacturing section, even if the share of workers employed 
in the manufacturing industry has declined in the geographical area.24 To illustrate this 
point, we regress (using 1993 data) the local share of judges in a given section on the  
corresponding share of local employment (see tables 2.8 and 2.9). We clearly see that 
there is no significant link between these shares in the manufacturing sector and that 
the service industry is locally under-represented. 
 
Table 2.8 
Breakdown of judges and employment by industry 
 1990-1992 1993-2002 
 Employment Judges Employment Judges 
Manufacturing 35% 41% 53% 37% 
Trade 47% 33% 36% 36% 
Service 18% 26% 11% 27% 
Notes: A change in French classification of products occurred in 1993. Proportion are averaged out 
over the period under review. Number of observations: 264 Prud’hommes 
Sources: Election data from Ministry of Labor. Employment Data from the Insee Sirene files on 
establishments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 However, some judges were reallocated from a section to another in 2002, mostly from “Agriculture” 
and “Manufacturing” to “Trade” and “Services”. 
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Table 2.9 
Misallocation of judges by industry 
Dependent variable: 1993 local share of judges in the 
industry 
Manufacturing Trade Service 
1993 local share of employment in the industry 0.00156 0.203*** -0.451*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.031) 
Observations 264 264 264 
R-squared 0.00 0.19 0.21 
Notes: Columns (2) (3) and (4) display the regressions of the proportion of local number of judges 
allocated to industry i in the national aggregate on the corresponding proportion of employment.
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
Sources: French Ministry of Labor, Insee Sirene Files 
 
The judge and staff densities influence the disposition of the cases through a 
congestion effect. Their allocation depends on institutional settings which outcomes 
seem largely disconnected from local economic developments and let us think that 
they offer the characteristics of good instruments. 
Looking for a more time varying indicator of the congestion effect, we also use as 
instrument the lagged duration of judicial process. A high duration is likely to deter 
the workers to file a case and ease judicially speaking the firing of workers. 
 
Union shares of votes 
We also use as instrument the share of judges working at the local labor court and 
affiliated to one of the unions running for the Prud’hommes elections. The union color 
of the Prud’hommes is likely to influence the judicial outcomes. Prud’hommes 
elections in France are keys to determine the representativeness of each union among 
the labor force. A large share of votes increases bargaining power at the firm and the 
national level. For instance, over the period under review, a share larger than five 
percent at the national level was a necessary condition to allow a union to take office 
in a firm with more than 50 employees and this irrespectively of the representativeness 
of the union at the firm level. The political platforms of the unions for these elections 
are their bargaining behaviors. CGT is often perceived as a hard line union with a 
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strong political left ideology and is less prone to negotiate: the CGT leader was a 
member of the central committee of the communist party until 2001. From 1995 to 
2004, the CGT signed on average one third of the collective agreements at the industry 
level against around seventy percent for the CFDT sixty percent for the CFTC25. 
CFDT and CFTC are known as softer and more likely to conciliate. One could argue 
that facing a higher probability to lose their jobs workers would tend to vote for hard 
line unions. First, it would imply that every worker’s opinion is to favour clash over 
dialogue to obtain what they want. Second, as shown by Andolfatto (1988) the map of 
union votes overlaps the map of political votes and is more related to traditional 
culture and local industrial history than to current economic condition. The moderate 
Western France is characterized by a high turnout in favor of CFDT and CFTC and 
contrasts with left territories from the south west and the north voting for CGT. Third, 
we showed that the institutional setting of the Prud’hommes makes appear (putting it 
midly) some discrepancies between Prud’hommes characteristics and local economy 
characteristics. Judges’ behaviors determined by their union affiliation and a share of 
local votes independent of current local economic developments –remember that an 
election takes place only every five years- let us think that the union color can 
instrument convincingly the judicial activity.  
We can note the variety of origins in our instruments: “staff” comes from the 
allocation by the central government of civil servants into local jurisdictions, “judges” 
and the union colours at the Prud’hommes are set by the institutional settings of the 
Prud’hommes and industrial relations, “lawyers” is related to location preferences of 
the lawyers. 
 
                                                 
25 See page 63 « La négociation interprofessionnelle en 2004» part 2, page 63.Rapport du Ministère du 
Travail. Available on line at http://www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/NC_2004_-
_2_La_negociation-2.pdf. 
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4.1.3. Results 
When possible, we test the (statistical) validity of our instruments by the Sargan-
Hansen tests of over identification. 
 
Labor flows and employment rates: pooled regressions  
Pooled regressions on case outcomes confirm the results found in the sociological 
and the industrial relations literature.26 A large judge density leads to a larger number 
of cases reaching trial and a lower number of cases dropped or dismissed. A strong 
presence of the CFDT insures more conciliations (see Table 2.10). 
 
Table 2.10 
First stage pooled regressions at the Prud’hommes level 
  winning Trial conci drop 
Judges 24.90*** 27.46*** 0.787 -28.25*** 
  (7.63) (7.80) (6.30) (7.20) 
Staff 3.690 3.248 -2.298 -0.950 
  (2.27) (2.03) (1.91) (1.60) 
%union share     
FO -0.00893 0.0124 0.111* -0.124* 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.061) (0.071) 
CFDT -0.0618 -0.108** 0.347*** -0.239*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.043) (0.055) 
Others -0.0461 -0.105* -0.0577 0.163*** 
  (0.051) (0.055) (0.047) (0.043) 
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.19 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%.. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1992-2004 (3,168 
obs.). Each regression includes year and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 
1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Sirene files on establishments 
 
A large trial rate decreases the volatility of labor flows. The conciliation rate 
instrumented by the share of CFDT judges in the total number of judges leads to 
                                                 
26 We find similar results using the data set of individual cases (see Table 9). 
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similar results. On the contrary, a high drop rate causes higher employment 
fluctuations (see Table 2.11).  
Table 2.11 
Instrumental pooled regressions at the Prud’hommes level 
 Winning trial Conci Drop 
Dependent variable: Job Destructions   
EPL -0.959*** -0.865*** -0.253*** 0.725*** 
 (0.32) (0.26) (0.055) (0.14) 
P-value Hansen J statistic 0.26 0.35   
Dependent variable: Job Creations   
EPL -0.683*** -0.648*** -0.234*** 0.664*** 
 (0.25) (0.22) (0.058) (0.14) 
P-value Hansen J statistic 0.11 0.14   
Dependent variable: Job Net Creations   
EPL 0.276** 0.218*** 0.0191 -0.0613 
 (0.12) (0.081) (0.030) (0.047) 
P-value Hansen J statistic 0.1 0.04   
Instruments Staff,Judge Staff,Judge CFDT Judge 
Test of excluded instruments F 4.82 7.32 62.5 19.22 
Observations 3168 3168 3432 3432 
     
Notes: Each regression includes year and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes' 
jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and 
for the years 1992-2004 (3,168 obs.) or 1991-2004 (3, 432 obs.). Clusters: Prud’hommes level. 
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
 
We are able to run an over identification test on the trial rate. With regards to the 
critic values computed by Stock and Yogo (2005), Judges and staff are considered 
together as rather weak instruments as the F statistic is a little above seven. The 
Hansen J Test does not reject their validity.  
At the département level, we find that the staff and the lawyer densities increase 
the trial and the winning rate (see table 2.12). The lawyer density is negatively related 
to the number of cases that are conciliated but positively to the number of cases that 
are dismissed. Lawyers might filter out the low quality cases but might harden the 
judicial process for the ones likely to win. The share of CFDT judges is positively 
associated to the conciliation rate like at the Prud’hommes level but negatively to the 
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drop rate. Our instruments are both satisfactory in term of F statistics and Hansen 
tests. 
Table 2.12 
First stage pooled regressions at the Département level 
  winning Trial conci drop 
Judges 12.90*** 11.45***   
  (3.93) (4.32)     
Staff 25.94* 40.08***   
  (13.3) (14.6)     
Lawyers   -0.567* 1.668*** 
      (0.32) (0.57) 
%union share     
CFDT   0.364*** -0.206** 
   (0.059) (0.089) 
R-squared 0.26 0.30 0.40 0.14 
Observations 1235 1235 855 855 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 95 Départements and for the years 1992-2004 (1,235 
obs.) or 1999-2004 (855 obs.). Each regression includes year and regional business cycle 
indicators. Départements 1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: Départements level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. 1991 employment from Sirene files on 
establishments. 
Some of the results obtained by our pooled regressions at the département level 
displayed in table 2.13 are puzzling: the conciliation rate and the trial rate both reduce 
labor flows the former even leading to a net job creations which is consistent to what 
we find at the Prud’hommes level. Nevertheless, their impact on the employment and 
unemployment rates go in opposite direction. A positive net job creations caused by a 
higher trial rate even translates into a LOWER employment rate. This could be 
reconcile if we consider that the trial rate has a short term impact on labor market by 
reducing labor flows which leads to a long term negative impact on the employment 
rates. However, we should then observe a similar impact for the conciliation rate and 
this is not the case. One could argue that Labor Force Surveys are totally different 
alternative data sources for assessing labor market performance that the SIRET files. 
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Table 2.13 
Instrumental pooled regressions at the Département level 
Dependent 
Variable: Winning H Trial H Drop H Conci H 
Job Destructions -0.459** 0.065 -0.543*** 0.141 0.491** 0.236 -0.216*** 0.303
 )0.22(  )0.20(  )0.22(  )0.08(  
Job Creations -0.208 0.0581 -0.321 0.106 0.628*** 0.13 -0.311*** 0.181
 )0.23(  )0.20(  )0.21(  )0.08(  
Net Job Creations 0.251** 0.995 0.222*** 0.554 0.137 0.893 -0.0952 0.614
 )0.11(  )0.08(  )0.12(  )0.06(  
Employment rate -0.907*** 0.198 -0.929*** 0.362 -0.333 0.21 0.461** 0.392
 )0.34(  )0.32(  )0.46(  )0.18(  
Relative 
Employment 
Rates:                 
Female/Male -0.883** 0.115 -1.030*** 0.205 0.174 0.186 0.142 0.309
 )0.40(  )0.36(  )0.43(  )0.16(  
15-34 yrs/35-49 
yrs -0.397 0.453 -0.411* 0.585 0.166 0.311 0.000746 0.377
 )0.26(  )0.25(  )0.29(  )0.16(  
50 yrs+/35-49 yrs -0.904** 0.0912 -1.180*** 0.161 0.909*** 0.333 -0.486*** 0.307
 )0.43(  )0.30(  )0.33(  )0.18(  
<High 
School/Some 
College -0.0467 0.183 -0.111 0.244 -0.788** 0.34 0.602*** 0.53 
 )0.29(  )0.23(  )0.31(  )0.19(  
Unemployment 
rates, Part-time 
and temporary 
jobs: 
                
Unemployment 
rate 
0.431** 0.436 0.408** 0.731 0.538* 0.169 -0.491*** 0.466
 )0.19(  )0.17(  )0.28(  )0.12(  
Youth 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.300** 0.167 0.343*** 0.27 0.172 0.0803 -0.235*** 0.192
 )0.14(  )0.12(  )0.16(  )0.08(  
% Short Term 
Unemployment (< 
1 year)  in Total 
Unemployment 
0.0245 0.187 0.06 0.219 -1.781*** 0.628 1.060*** 0.31 
 )0.34(  )0.33(  )0.62(  )0.22(  
Temporary jobs 0.309*** 0.624 0.283*** 0.968 -0.0599 0.995 0.039 0.771
 )0.11(  )0.10(  )0.07(  )0.04(  
Constrained Part-
time 
1.221*** 0.438 1.131*** 0.906 -0.35 0.0795 -0.167 0.179
 )0.41(  )0.42(  )0.50(  )0.20(  
Part-time 0.756*** 0.192 0.732*** 0.465 -0.310* 0.582 0.165 0.483
 )0.23(  )0.21(  )0.19(  )0.10(  
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Table 2.13 (Continued.) 
Instruments Judges, Staff Judges, Staff Lawyers, CFDT Lawyers, CFDT 
Test of excluded 
instruments F 7.66 10.34 8.89 19.41 
Observations 1235 1235 855 855 
Notes and reading:  -.459 (second row, second column) corresponds to  the estimated parameter associated to the 
"winning" indicator in an instrumental regression where the dependent variable is job destruction and the 
instruments are the judge and the staff densities (first to last row, second column). 0.065 (second row, third 
column) is the p-value of the Hansen J statistic of this instrumental regression. 7.66 is the F statistic associated to 
the first stage regression. “H” for the p-value of the Hansen J statistic of the instrumental regression. Robust 
standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
Observations are for 95 Départements and for the years 1992-2004 (1,235 obs.) or 1996-2004 (855 obs.) . Each 
regression includes year and regional business cycle indicators. Départements 1991 total employment is used as 
weights. Clusters: Département level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. 1991 employment and Labor flows from Sirene files on 
establishments. Employment and unemployment rates from the French Labor Force Surveys 
 
Labor flows and employment rates: fixed effects 
The addition of labor courts or départements fixed effects should allow us to better 
account for unobserved local effects that might be correlated with both Prud’hommes 
characteristics and local job flows without biasing estimated effects. Besides, our fixed 
effect estimates give us a more coherent picture than our pooled regressions. 
 
Table 2.14 
First stage fixed effect at the Prud’hommes level 
  Conci drop lawyerw 
Judges  -46.02** 101.3*** 
    (19.9) (24.0) 
Staff -4.301*   
  (2.36)     
Lawyers 3.052**   
  (1.23)     
%union share    
FO  -0.122** 0.127* 
  (0.062) (0.072) 
R-squared 0.30 0.08 0.62 
Observations 2112 3432 3432 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1990-2004 (3,432 
obs.) or 1996-2004 (2,112 obs.) . Each regression includes year Prud’hommes and local business 
cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: 
Prud’hommes level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Sirene files on establishments. 
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At the Prud’hommes level, the conciliation rate and the drop rate are the case 
outcomes that can be explained by some of our instruments which is unfortunately not 
the case for the trial rate (see table 2.14). An increase in the lawyer density and a 
decrease in staff depress the conciliation rate. The judge density decreases the drop 
rate but increases the fraction of workers represented by a lawyer. The FO share of 
judges decreases the drop rate and increases the legal representation. A high 
conciliation rate, a large fraction of worker lawyers and a small amount of dropped 
cases reduce job destructions resulting in net job creations as no impact is found on 
job creations (see Table 2.15).  
 
Table 2.15 
Instrumental fixed effect at the Prud’hommes level 
EPL indicators: conci drop Lawyer w 
Dependent variable: Job Destructions   
EPL -1.178** 0.410** -0.226** 
  (0.52) (0.17) (0.094) 
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.48 0.86 0.37 
Dependent variable: Job Creations   
EPL -0.0427 -0.0882 0.0572 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.086) 
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.34 0.79 0.99 
Dependent variable: Job Net Creations   
EPL 1.135* -0.498** 0.283** 
  (0.59) (0.20) (0.11) 
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.66 0.99 0.41 
Instruments Judge,Lawyer Judge,FO Lawyer,FO 
Test of excluded instruments F 6.45 5.01 10.61 
Observations 2112 3432 3432 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1992-
2004 (3,168 obs.) or 1991-2004 (3, 432 obs.). Each regression includes year and local 
business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as 
weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on 
establishments. 
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As in the pooled regression case, our set of instruments has a better explanation 
power at the départements level and we are able to select more than one instrument 
and run over identification tests that confirm their validity (see Table 2.16). 
 
Table 2.16 
First stage fixed effect at the Département level 
  null and void Trial victory conci lawyer w lawyer f 
Lawyer -2.709** -6.235** 4.464*** 6.226** 7.083*** 9.058** 
  (1.23) (3.09) (1.49) (2.68) (1.67) (4.48) 
Staff 1.814**    4.364*** -18.31*** 
  (0.73)       (1.30) (3.53) 
Judges     279.9***  
          (89.6)   
%union share      
FO       
       
CFDT       
       
Others    -0.163***   
        (0.059)     
R-squared 0.18 0.41 0.11 0.45 0.52 0.46 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 95 départements and for the years 1996-2004 (855 obs.)  
. Each regression includes year and département and local business cycle indicators. Département 
1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: Département level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Sirene files on establishments. 
 
The victory and conciliation rates, the fraction of workers and firms represented by 
a lawyer cause lower employment fluctuations (see Table 2.17). This goes along with 
lower female and youth employment rates and an increase in long term unemployment 
rates. A more pro-business tribunal through a higher “Null and Void” rate would lead 
to opposite effects. 
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Table 2.17 
Instrumental fixed effect at the Département level 
Dependent variable: 
Null and 
Void H Victory H Conci H 
Job Destructions 2.217* 0.877 -0.786* 0.261 -0.593** 0.174 
 )1.28(  )0.45(  )0.23(  
Job Creations 1.576*** 0.295 -0.748** 0.303 
-
0.352*** 0.057 
 )0.57(  )0.29(  )0.12(  
Net Job Creations -0.64 0.463 0.0384 0.261 0.241 0.686 
 )0.95(  )0.32(  )0.22(  
Employment rate 0.862** 0.176 0.00364 0.187 -0.111 0.529 
 )0.43(  )0.43(  )0.20(  
Relatige Employment Rates:             
Female/Male 1.811** 0.136 -0.0134 0.141 -0.328* 0.459 
 )0.91(  )0.60(  )0.17(  
15-34 yrs/35-49 yrs 3.318*** 0.165 -0.431 0.165 
-
0.887*** 0.794 
 )1.19(  )1.01(  )0.28(  
50 yrs+/35-49 yrs -1.182* 0.327 0.142 0.236 0.261 0.71 
 )0.67(  )0.58(  )0.24(  
<High School/Some College 0.413 0.213 -0.815 0.25 -0.0862 0.236 
 )1.03(  )0.56(  )0.30(  
Unemployment rates, Part-time and 
temporary jobs: 
            
Unemployment rate -0.602 0.407 0.335 0.496 -0.0166 0.103 
 
 
)0.51(  )0.25(  )0.25(  
Youth Unemployment rate 0.232 0.282 0.062 0.249 -0.178 0.218 
 )0.29(  )0.16(  )0.15(  
% Short Term Unemployment (< 1 
year)  in Total Unemployment 9.295 0.75 -2.439*** 0.456 -5.145* 0.361 
 )5.89(  )0.85(  )3.10(  
Temporary jobs -0.312 0.294 0.027 0.182 -0.116 0.0232
 )0.25(  )0.12(  )0.12(  
Constrained Part-time -0.883 0.187 0.935* 0.394 -0.054 0.0492
 )0.88(  )0.56(  )0.43(  
Part-time -0.268 0.239 0.296* 0.424 0.00294 0.193 
 )0.38(  )0.17(  )0.16(  
Instruments L,S L,S L, Others 
Test of excluded instruments F 
11.00 
 
9.25 
 
9.49 
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Table 2.17(Continued) 
Dependent variable: Lawyerw H Lawyerf H 
Job Destructions -0.498*** 0.468 -0.415** 0.289 
 )0.15(  )0.17(  
Job Creations -0.317** 0.136 -0.262* 0.163 
 )0.14(  )0.15(  
Net Job Creations 0.181 0.526 0.153 0.719 
 )0.16(  )0.14(  
Employment rate -0.0104 0.374 -0.216*** 0.264 
 )0.19(  )0.07(  
Relatige Employment Rates:         
Female/Male 0.145 0.0891 -0.450*** 0.204 
 )0.27(  )0.14(  
15-34 yrs/35-49 yrs -0.231 0.266 -0.753*** 0.565 
 )0.36(  )0.18(  
50 yrs+/35-49 yrs 0.00964 0.352 0.270** 0.718 
 )0.30(  )0.12(  
<High School/Some College -0.366 0.502 0.0407 0.14 
 )0.24(  )0.25(  
Unemployment rates, Part-time and 
temporary jobs: 
        
Unemployment rate 0.094 0.491 0.0912 0.351 
 
 
)0.16(  )0.12(  
Youth Unemployment rate -0.0311 0.562 -0.0689 0.316 
 )0.09(  )0.06(  
% Short Term Unemployment (< 1 year)  
in Total Unemployment -1.331*** 0.427 -2.44 0.714 
 )0.40(  )2.21(  
Temporary jobs 0.120* 0.281 0.0724* 0.646 
 )0.06(  )0.04(  
Constrained Part-time 0.226 0.417 0.0554 0.124 
 )0.27(  )0.21(  
Part-time 0.0488 0.149 0.0147 0.182 
 )0.11(  )0.09(  
Instruments L,J,S L,S 
Test of excluded instruments F 11.94 18.51 
Reading:  2.217 (second row, second column) corresponds to  the estimated parameter associated to the 
"null and void" indicator in an instrumental regression where the dependent variable is job destruction 
and the instruments are the lawyer and the staff densities (first to last row, second column). 0.877 
(second row, third column entitled “H”) is the p-value of the Hansen J statistic of this instrumental 
regression. 11.00 is the F statistic associated to the first stage regression. Robust standard errors are 
between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are 
for 95 Départements and for the years 1996-2004 (855 obs.) . Each regression includes year and 
département and regional business cycle indicators. Département 1991 total employment is used as 
weights. Clusters: Département level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. 1991 employment and labor flows from Sirene 
files on establishments. Employment and unemployment rates from the French Labor Force Surveys. 
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Labor flows and employment rates: firm size 
We next consider the role of firm size. There are theoretical, institutional and 
sociological reasons that make such distinctions meaningful.  
Boeri and Jimino (2001) in a partial equilibrium model explain why small firms 
should be subject to less restrictive labor regulations. Small firms differ from large 
firms by lower monitoring costs that allow them to offer lower efficiency wages. If the 
firing costs were the same across firms, small firms would tend to choose a level of 
employment below the optimal level without job provisions. Hence, workers support 
less regulation in small firms. Bertola (1992) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) underline 
that the more volatile the business of the firm is the more constraining the firing costs 
act on the dynamics of the labor flows. Hence, small firms should suffer more from 
high firing costs.  
In France, a dismissal deemed unfair by the judge is compensated by a sum which 
cannot be lower than 6 months pay, for workers employed by a firm with more than 10 
employees. Below this threshold, the compensation is left to the discretion of the 
judges. In addition, when the firing process is deemed unlawful because the advance 
notice period or the various mandatory meetings were not satisfactorily set up by the 
employer, the fines are less severe for small firms than for large firms. Sociological 
studies also show that the body of the judges on the employer side is made of small 
business owners with a more practical approach of the law enforcement. On the 
contrary, the body of judges on the employee side mostly comprises union members of 
large firms with a very formal approach. Looking at the worker’s victory rate at trial 
based on our individual-level dataset, it is higher in small firms (76% against 70%). 
Despite this high victory rate at trial, workers in small firms are more likely to follow 
a conciliation procedure and only a small proportion of cases lead to a tie. 
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Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Justice.  
Figure 2.5 
Share of small establishment cases 
 
In addition, despite having lower monitoring costs, small establishments’ lack of 
judicial knowledge and human resources expertise reinforces the binding effect of 
labor regulations. Indeed, over the period, the share of small establishments within all 
cases brought to the labor courts has increased from 40% to almost 90% (see figure 
2.5). This change can be interpreted as increasing regulations towards small firms. By 
contrast, it is often interpreted as a successful “escape from labor courts” strategy by 
large firms which face such stringent regulations and penalties. This strategy appears 
to be implemented by pre-separation bargaining and large separation costs (see 
Kramarz and Michaud, 2007).  
Coping with unobserved heterogeneity through fixed effect, we find that the 
Prud’hommes characteristics are found to have an explanatory power mainly on cases 
of employees of small firms and we hence can not run a comparative analysis taking 
into account the endogeneity issue. Pooled regression where the drop and the 
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conciliation rates are instrumented by the judge density and the share of CFDT judges 
allow us to compare the impact of judicial activity along these two dimensions. We 
find that an increase in the drop rate causes significantly larger labor fluctuations in 
larger firms and results in net job destruction only for small firms. An increase in the 
conciliation rate impacts negatively more labor flows in large firms than in small firms 
(See Table 2.18).  
 
Table 2.18 
Instrumental pooled regressions at the Prud’hommes level by firm size 
 
Filing rate and legal representation 
We define the filing rate as the ratio of the number of cases that have been brought 
to the Prud’hommes over the number of the workers that have been fired over the 
same period AND enrolled at the local National Employment Agency (ANPE). This 
variable is a proxy of the pf   of our model since one can sue his employer without 
being enrolled at the ANPE.  
 Small Firms Large Firms 
EPL indicators: drop conci drop  conci 
Dependent variable: Job Destructions   
EPL 0.740*** -0.182*** 1.140*** -0.340*** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.30) (0.08) 
Dependent variable: Job Creations   
EPL 0.533*** -0.026 1.225*** -0.304*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.30) (0.08) 
Dependent variable: Job Net Creations   
EPL -0.207*** 0.156*** 0.085 0.036 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Instruments Judge CFDT Judge CFDT 
Test of excluded instruments F 27.18 54.2 13.51 41.61 
Observations 3432 3432 2989 2989 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1991-2004. Each 
regression includes year and local business cycle indicators. Small firm have less than 10 
employees. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: 
Prud’hommes level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
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We instrument the filing rate by the lagged average duration of a case. Like our 
judge density indicator, we can interpret the duration as an indicator of congestion. 
The time it takes to judge or to conciliate a case is likely to depend on the resources 
available in each labor court. We assume that this indicator has a more deterrent effect 
on the worker incentive to file than on the firm incentive to comply and thus is 
decreasing with the strictness of the labor regulation. Our micro data set on labor court 
cases provides us with several useful dates: date of filing of the case, date of the first 
attempt to conciliate the parties, date of the first hearing, and date of termination of the 
case. We computed for each labor court and each year various averages: total duration, 
duration before the first attempt to conciliate, duration between this attempt and the 
start of the trial, and duration between the start and the closing of the trial. All these 
durations display negative correlation with judges’ density. Changes in duration at 
various stages of the trial are likely to be driven by exogenous factors, such as changes 
in administrative resources available to the local court, in particular the Tribunal 
d’Instance. Such changes should be orthogonal to changes in labor flows.  
 
Table 2.19 
Instrumental regressions: filing rate 
Dependent variable:  Job destructions Job creations Net Job creations 
Filing rate -0.464*** -0.205* 0.259* 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) 
Hansen J Statistic 0.37 0.93 0.38 
R-squared 0.09 0.40 0.52 
 
The first stage of our instrumental regression show as expected that the filing rate 
is positively related to the lawyer density and negatively related to a lagged average 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1996-2004 (2,132 
obs.). The regression includes year and Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. 
Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes 
level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
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duration of the case (F=12.5). A larger filing rate lowers job flows volatility resulting 
in net job creations (tables 2.19 and 2.20). Hansen ‘s test support the statistical validity 
of our 2 instruments. 
 
Table 2.20 
Filing rate: first stage regression  
Dependent variable:  Filing rate 
BC -0.305*** 
 (0.11) 
BC(-1) -0.0827 
 (0.086) 
Lawyer 5.162*** 
 (1.07) 
Duration(-2) -0.0260 
  (0.017) 
R-squared 0.47 
F statistic 12.52 
 
4.2. A Regression Discontinuity Approach 
 
4.2.1. Matching process 
The first stages of our instrumental pooled regressions show that the judge density 
can be interpreted as a measure of the strictness of employment protection legislation: 
a higher judge density raises the rates of trial and worker’s victory. However, as the 
number of judges does not change over most of the period under review, we are 
unable to deal with unobserved Prud’hommes heterogeneity using fixed effect 
regressions. We undertake a regression discontinuity approach in order to deal with 
the potential endogeneity bias that might arise if the allocation of judges depends on 
local current economic conditions. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1996-2004 (2,132 
obs.). The regression includes year and Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. 
Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1991 total employment is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes 
level. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
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Among the population of the 36,562 cities of metropolitan France, we match each 
city with its closest and second closest neighbors according to the orthodromic 
distance. We select the matches where both cities do not belong to the same 
prud’hommes jurisdictions (3,993 cities). We focus on the period over which there has 
been absolutely no change in the number of judges (1993-2002). We match our 
database of selected cities with our Insee siret files that provide labor flows at the city 
level. About 14% of the selected cities did not experience any labor flows over the 
period because the (private) total employment was nil. 76% are present over the whole 
period. Hence our final sample is of 3,109 cities. The selected cities are very close the 
last centile being of 7,8 km and the average distance being of 3,6 km. In 1999, the 
median population of the cities is of about 400 inhabitants. Each Prud’hommes is at 
least represented by one match in our data set, the maximum being for the 
Prud’hommes of the city of Tours represented in 24 matches. 
 
4.2.2. Estimation and results 
We estimate the following equation: 
( ) tcctpptpctpc JudgesJudgesFlowsFlows ,'',',',, εδα ++−=−   (2.11) 
Where c and c’ are the matched cities and “judges” is the judge density of the 
jurisdiction of the Prud’hommes they belong to. δt are yearly dummies.  
 
Table 2.21 
Regression discontinuity: labor flows and judge density 
  Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation 
Judges -0.328 -17.03*** -16.70*** 
  (4.93) (5.60) (6.02) 
Observations 17873   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1%. Observations are for 3109 pair of cities belonging to different  Prud’hommes 
jurisdiction over the 1993-2003 period.  Each regression includes year. Clusters: city match. 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
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We do not apply any weight and cluster the observation at the level of the match. 
Table 2.21 shows that the judge density reduces the creation of jobs leading to a net 
destruction of jobs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The impact of the EPL on labor markets has most often been assessed through 
cross-country analyses which make it hard to control for all various potential 
interactions between the labor market institutions. Within country analyses have most 
often used difference-in-difference estimators and tended to ignore the extent to which 
EPL was enforced and was acting as a binding constraint for the firm or the worker. 
Both of these strands do not address the problem of EPL endogeneity and enforcement 
of the EPL. By contrast, in order to measure EPL in France --a country with a highly 
regulated labor market—we use the time varying judicial activity of the local courts in 
charge of ruling the individual labor disputes (Prud’hommes). We find that the 
disposition of the cases depends on the business cycle which shows that EPL indices 
capturing the strictness of the EPL but enable to render the degree of enforcement are 
fragmented. Instrumented by the institutional settings of the Prud’hommes and their 
legal environment, the case disposition is found to have an impact on local labor 
markets. Large victory and agreement rates, a small rate of dismissed cases, an 
intensive use of lawyers cause lower labor flow volatility. Yet impacts on net job 
creations are not significant. Using labor force surveys we show that a decrease in 
labor flows volatility goes along with a lower employment rate, lower female and 
youth employment rates, and increases in the long term unemployment and temporary 
jobs. The French employment regulation is more binding for large firms than for small 
firms. The soaring share of small firm cases in the total number of cases over the last 
decade would support that large firms implemented strategies to escape from labor 
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courts. Our instruments do not have a strong explanatory power on the disposition of 
large firm cases. Pooled regressions show however that the conciliation and the drop 
rate impact relatively more on large firm labor flows.  
From a welfare perspective, judicial activity allows to increase job stability and to 
protect workers from employer abuse and unfair dismissals. The downside is to 
exclude from the labor markets unskilled and inexperienced workers and let workers 
employed in less productive jobs. Policy responses to soften the judiciary battle by 
giving incentives to reach an agreement at a lower cost could both improve the welfare 
both along the employment right and the economic efficiency dimensions. 
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3. Labor disputes and the game of legal 
representation  
Significant amounts of money are spent in legal representation every year. There is 
no doubt that a lawyer is necessary in many cases: in criminal cases a lawyer is 
usually appointed by the court when the defendant cannot obtain or pay for an 
attorney. However, whether or not to pay for legal representation is a matter of cost-
benefit analysis and strategic choice for a wide range of legal conflicts. Each party 
might trade off legal fees against lower expected gains at trial, assuming that legal 
assistance does not hurt. The return to hiring a lawyer might also be influenced by 
whether the opposite party hires one. If one party hires a lawyer in an effort to increase 
the chance of success, and the opposite party does the same, the likelihood of victory 
might ultimately be the same as it would be if neither party were represented. Using 
this logic, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) were the first to observe that strategic 
behaviours in choosing legal representation might result in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game. A dominant strategy for both parties is to choose a lawyer to be represented, but 
in doing so they end up in being worse off that if they were not represented.  Taking 
the example of a union and a firm bargaining on a wage increase, both parties might 
neutralize the actions of their opponent if they both use a lawyer or if they both do not 
use a lawyer. On the other hand, if only the worker (firm) uses a lawyer, she manages 
to achieve an additional wage increase (decrease).  
Assuming that this additional increase (decrease) exceeds the lawyer’s fees, the 
following “prisoner’s dilmma” payoff matrix arises:  
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Table 3.1 
Game of legal representation 
  Defendant uses: 
  A lawyer No Lawyer 
Plaintiff uses: 
A lawyer d ll
p
ll ,, ,ΠΠ  d nllpnll ,, ,ΠΠ  
No Lawyer d lnl
p
lnl ,, ,ΠΠ  d nlnlp nlnl ,, ,ΠΠ  
 
where k ji,Π  is the pay-off with k=p (plaintiff) or d (defendant) and i(j) indices the 
representation of the plaintiff (defendant) with l for lawyer and nl for no lawyer. The 
necessary conditions for the prisoner’s dilemma would be that 
p
nlnl
p
nll
p
lnl
p
ll ,,,, , Π≥ΠΠ≥Π  ( d nlnld lnld nlld ll ,,,, , Π≥ΠΠ≥Π ) for the worker (firm) to choose 
to be represented and d nlnl
d
ll
p
nlnl
p
ll ,,,, , Π≤ΠΠ≤Π  for the parties’ incentives to lead to 
the low equilibrium. Hereafter, we call (L,L) the case when both parties are 
represented, (NL,NL) the case when neither party is represented, (L,NL) the case 
when the worker is represented but the firm is not, and (NL,L) when the worker is not 
represented but the firm is.  
Only a few empirical studies look at the gain from hiring a lawyer, and even fewer 
consider it as a strategic choice in a two-player game. Using a sample of grievance 
arbitration awards, Block and Stieber (1987) find that the outcome of the arbitration 
does not differ when both parties are represented by an attorney versus when none of 
the parties are represented. The probability of prevailing increases only when one 
party hires an attorney and the other party does not. Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) and 
Wagar (1994) display similar findings. More recently, Halla (2007) using data on 
divorce cases, finds that hiring a lawyer is beneficial for the wife only if the husband is 
not represented. Data sets on litigation share the common downside of lacking 
measures of the intrinsic quality of the case27, a factor that might affect optimizing 
                                                 
27 In this paper, a case is considered as of “good quality” from the perspective of the plaintiff.  
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behaviour leading to the choice of legal representation. The data sets used by these 
authors also suffer from some other limitations. Except for Halla (2007), they take into 
account only cases solved through arbitration and not through the court system. They 
are specific and not representative of the population of cases: Block and Stieber (1987) 
use a sample of 454 cases rendered in the Michigan and 759 cases published by the 
Bureau of National Affairs during the years 1979-1981. Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) 
exploit a data set containing 217 union-employer cases resolved by final-offer 
arbitration in New Jersey from 1981 to 1984. Halla (2007), which offers a more 
comprehensive data set, employs 2,436 divorce cases taken from five district courts in 
Austria between 1997 and 2003. More importantly, these papers empirically find the 
necessary conditions for having a prisoner dilemma in term of probability of victory28: 
it is the same when both parties are represented or none of them are represented, and it 
is higher when one party is represented and the other is not. Nevertheless, as these data 
sets do not provide any information on legal fees, they do not allow for the 
computation of the pay-off matrix of the game and the question of whether the game 
represents a prisoner’s dilemma remains. 
In this paper, we complement these studies by using two sets of data of unfair 
dismissals brought to courts in France and the UK. Our French data set is comprised 
of administrative records of almost 2,000,000 cases that have been brought to labour 
court from 1990 to 2004.  Unfortunately, awards and legal fees are not available, but 
they allow us to compute the matrix of marginal probabilities of victory for a 
population of cases. Our British data set is comprised of two successive samples of 
UK Employment Tribunal cases drawn in 1998 and 2003, containing rich information 
on the plaintiff and the defendant, including the settlement amount, the award in case 
                                                 
28In case of arbitration, the winning side is the one whose proposal is the closest to the proposal of the 
arbitrator.  
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of trial, the legal representation and its cost, and in case of a tribunal hearing, the 
characteristic of the representation of the opposite party.  
About 200,000 (100,000) unfair dismissals cases are filed every year in France 
(Great-Britain). This accounts for 10% of the people claiming unemployment-related 
benefits in the UK, and it represents about 30% of the yearly number of workers 
enrolling at the National Placement Agency in France after having been fired. In 
addition to the award or the settlement amount, legal representation might represent a 
substantial firing cost for the firm29. As noted by Blanchard and Tirole (2004), judges’ 
interventions are necessary to distinguish a redundancy from a misconduct to 
denounce discrimination or to check if all the legal steps surrounding a redundancy 
have been followed but labour legislations often make the judge act as a substitute for 
the judgement of the company’s management, which is clearly economically 
inefficient. The judicial process of a firing decision is offered as an explanation for the 
poor performance of the French labour market. Hence, any reform pushing toward 
more conciliation and fewer judicial battles in the firing decision is a matter of 
importance for the policy maker and the role of legal representation must be under 
scrutiny. The tools available to the policy maker to reach that goal are numerous: caps 
on awards, allocations of legal costs to the losing party, mandatory and preliminary 
use of an arbitrator to make a conciliation step and so on. They would be particularly 
justified if the plaintiff and the defendant are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma or if 
legal representation is chosen and turns out to be a sunk cost.  
The next section describes our data sets and the English and French institutional 
settings and provides descriptive statistics. We estimates afterwards the marginal 
probability of victory and the pay-off matrices for the English data set before testing 
several potential explanations to justify the form of the pay-off matrix observed in the 
                                                 
29 For the UK, legal cost represents about 4% of the yearly net pay of the worker. 
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data: risk-aversion, reputation, representation of opposite party, quality of the case and 
pre-trial bargaining effects. The last section discusses of the impact of potential 
selection bias on our results.  
 
2. Data Sets and Descriptive Statistics 
 
2.1. The British case 
In Great Britain, the Employment Tribunals (ET hereafter) have been in charge of 
adjudicating disputes between employers and individual workers since the 
Redundancy Payment Act of 1965. They acquired jurisdiction over unfair dismissals 
with the Industrial Relation Act of 1971. The trial is chaired by a professional judge 
assisted by two lay-members- one with an employer background and the other with a 
trade union or employee representative background. The lay judges are chosen by the 
administration from lists of persons proposed mainly by trade unions and employer 
groups. 
Surveys of unfair dismissal have been conducted about every five years since 
1975. Until 1998 samples were comprised of on average 650 matched cases where 
both the employer and applicant were interviewed. Each case can be withdrawn, 
settled or go to a full hearing. Over the last two waves, about 20% of the cases went to 
full hearing.  Information on whether the opposite party has legal representation is 
available only for cases that are brought to court. In order to get a sample large enough 
for a statistically robust analysis, we use the 1998 and 2003 waves of the Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications series. These waves do not represent a sample of 
matched cases. The 2003 wave is composed from a random sample of 4,517 cases 
divided into two independent samples of applicants (2,236 cases) and employers 
(2,281 cases). Each of the 2003 samples were drawn across all jurisdictions from 
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tribunal cases completed between March 2002 and March 2003. Both samples are 
representative of cases completed in Great Britain during this period. The 1998 wave 
is also composed of two independent samples of applicants (1,384 cases) and 
employers (1,292 cases) representative of cases that have been registered between 
January 1995 and April 1997.  It is worth noting that in case of a trial, for each case 
the characteristic of the representation of both parties is known.  
Bearing in mind the drawbacks of any information gathered ex-post and requiring 
recalls, the information collected from employers and applicants are obviously richer 
in the British surveys than the one administratively collected in France. Table 3.2 lists 
the variables that we use in our multivariate analysis: characteristics of the employee -
before and after the judicial process-, characteristics of the firm, the representative, the 
settlement offers, the costs of litigation, the amount awarded are provided at a detailed 
level. Reasons for decision made along the process such as reasons for not being 
represented, for withdrawing or for rejecting settlement are given. Information is also 
given on the way the dismissal was handled —with or without a formal meeting or a 
written notification, or on the presence of a human resource department or unions at 
the workplace- which could help us to understand the bargaining process between 
employer and employee. Ex-post subjective expectation over the outcome of the case 
that can be used as a proxy for the quality of the case perceived by the party but is 
collected for only one of the party involved. As the cases are not matched, some of the 
information gathered on the employers and the employees is richer and more précised 
in their respective surveys. However, we give priority to the size of our samples and 
restrict ourselves to the variables present simultaneously in the 1998 and 2003 waves 
and in the employee’s and in the employer’s surveys. 
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Table 3.2 
Variables description: British data 
Variable Description 
Costrule Dummy equal 1 if case of 2003 wave 
Economic Activity  
VAT Regional VAT deregistration rate 
UE Regional Unemployment 
Case 
Characteristics  
settle Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case settled) 
withdw Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case withdrawn) 
dismets Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case dismissed) 
trial Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case reach full hearing) 
appwin Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if applicant win at trial) 
chanceplus Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if likely to win) 
chanceeven Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if even chance) 
chanceless Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if likely to lose) 
unfair Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  unfair dismissal) 
breach Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  breach of contract) 
wages Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  wage contract) 
discri Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  any discrimination) 
redund Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  redundancy payment) 
writproc Written Procedure (dummy, equal 1 if applicant issued with written 
statement stating terms and conditions of employment ) 
warningdes Warning before dismissal (dummy equal 1 if the employer warned the 
applicant before dismissal) 
discus Discussion before filing (dummy equal 1 if the issue was discussed by 
employer with applicant before application 
Applicant Characteristics 
age Age 
female Female 
ann_pay Annual Pay (base year 1997) 
bpay1 Annual Pay  (dummy, equal 1 if less than 10,000 pounds) 
bpay2 Annual Pay (dummy, equal 1 if between 10,000 and 15,000 pounds) 
bpay3 Annual Pay (dummy, equal 1 if between 15,000 and 20,000 pounds) 
bpay4 Annual Pay  (dummy, equal 1 if more than 20,000 pounds) 
tenure Tenure in years 
btenure1 Tenure  (dummy, equal 1 if less than 1 year) 
btenure2 Tenure (dummy, equal 1 if between 1 and 3 years) 
btenure 3 Tenure  (dummy, equal 1 if between 3 and 7 years) 
btenure4 Tenure  (dummy, equal 1 if more than 7 years) 
Applicant Characteristics 
managerprof Occupation (dummy, equal 1 if Managerial/Professional occupation) 
lowskill 
Occupation (dummy, equal 1 if Elementary Occupation or Process, Plant, 
and Machine Operatives occupation) 
partime Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if employed part time) 
union Union (dummy, equal 1 if union present at the workplace) 
unionmemb Union Member (dummy, equal 1 if applicant union member) 
currempl Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if currently employed) 
moremoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns more money 
in her new job) 
samemoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns same amount 
of  money in her new job) 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Applicant Characteristics 
lessmoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns less money in 
her new job) 
Firm 
Characteristics  
asizew1 Workplace size (dummy, equal 1 if less than 25) 
asizew2 Workplace size (dummy, equal 1 if bewteen 25 and 49) 
asizew3 Workplace size (dummy, equal 1 if bewteen 50 and 250) 
asizew4 Workplace size (dummy, equal 1 if more than 250) 
public Public/Private/Non Profit sector statys (dummy, equal 1 if public sector) 
private Public/Private/Non Profit sector statys (dummy, equal 1 if private sector) 
nonprofit Public/Private/Non Profit sector statys (dummy, equal 1 if non profit sector) 
sicgp1 Industry (dummy equal 1 if agriculture and fishing) 
sicgp2 Industry (dummy equal 1 if mining and utilities) 
sicgp3 Industry (dummy equal 1 if manufacturing) 
sicgp4 Industry (dummy equal 1 if construction) 
sicgp5 Industry (dummy equal 1 if whole and retail) 
sicgp6 Industry (dummy equal 1 if hotels and Rest.) 
sicgp7 Industry (dummy equal 1 if Transports, Comm. And Utils) 
sicgp8 Industry (dummy equal 1 if finance) 
sicgp9 Industry (dummy equal 1 if other services and public administration) 
ea Firm is member of employers association (dummy equal 1 if member) 
nbcases0 Previous Experience with ET (dummy equal 1 if no experience) 
nbcases1 Previous Experience with ET (dummy equal 1 if at least one case) 
Representation,Cost and Award: 
lawhear 
Representation at hearing (dummy equal 1 if lawyer, sollicitor or barrister 
represented applicant) 
emplawhear 
Representation at hearing (dummy equal 1 if outside lawyer, sollicitor or 
barrister represented employer) 
lwlf Dummy equal 1 if  lawyer and firm both represented by a lawyer 
lwnlf Dummy equal 1 if  the worker is represented by a lawyer but the firm is not 
nlwlf Dummy equal 1 if  the worker is not represented by a lawyer but the firm is 
Nlwnlf Dummy equal 1 if  neither the worker nor the firm are represented  
settlemoney Monetary Settlement (if any) 
award Award at Trial if any 
legalfee Legal fees personally paid (if any) 
 
Workers and firms choose not being represented in a large fraction of cases. 
Twenty five percent of firms take a lawyer against eighteen percent of the workers. As 
shown in Table 3.3 a majority of cases involves no lawyer at all (55%). Firms and 
workers can obtain legal help through other means than the hiring of a lawyer. A 
union member or a workmate or an administrative officer can help the worker in 
dealing with her case. Similarly a firm can find guidance through an employer’s 
association or a in-house lawyer. We consider that the game of legal representation 
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consists in choosing to pay or not for legal expertise and exclude these other sources 
of legal help from our analysis. Of course, one can claim that a fraction of the cost of a 
union’s membership or a federation’s membership or part of the pay of an in-house 
lawyer correspond to the potential use of legal expertise when an unfair dismissal is 
brought to trial but our data do not allow us to evaluate the cost of this service. The 
proportion of workers represented by a union member is of seven percent. The fraction 
of employer represented by an employer’s association is even smaller (5%).  
 
Table 3.3 
Legal Representation at Trial 
 British data set French data set 
Representation Worker Firm Worker Firm 
None 0.55 0.32 0.13 0.17 
Lawyer 0.18 0.25 0.62 0.72 
Union/Employers’ association 0.07 0.05 0.23 0.04 
Others 0.20 0.39 0.02 0.07 
Observations 826 698 1135852 1125551 
Notes: Frequency counts of workers and firms by types of legal representation. “Others” might 
include family/friends, workmates, civil servants, human resources specialist, etc… 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003 and Prud’hommes data from French Ministry of Justice. 
 
The costs of litigation are reported for the respondent of the questionnaire in the 
British data. Legal fees are the “total costs personally paid” by the worker  or “paid by 
the organization”  net from the part potentially covered by a trade union a legal 
insurance or legal aid or any fees paid by a third party. Assuming the risk-neutrality of 
both parties, for each party and each case ((L,L),(L,NL),(NL,L),(NL,NL)) we write the 
pay-off as: iii CpJ −=Π  where p is the probability of worker’s victory, Ji  the award 
and  Ci  the legal cost, i=w(worker) or f(firm). We consider the “American” rule of 
allocation of legal costs. Apart from litigation cost, the worker stands to gain what the 
firm loses and Jw=- Jf . We display in table 3.4 the ex-post gains observed in the raw 
data for the firms and the workers. Firms and workers are better off not being 
represented and a Nash equilibrium will be the (NL,NL) case. Firms decrease 
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substantially the worker’s gain by hiring a lawyer but this decrease is smaller than the 
additional legal costs the firm incurs. 
 
Table 3.4 
Pay-off matrix (British data) 
  Defendant uses: 
  A lawyer No Lawyer 
Plaintiff uses: A lawyer 1193,-6033  1604,-4948 No Lawyer 1254,-4621 1456,-1977  
Notes: The mean of the award is computed on the samples of workers and firms, e.g. 1249 
observations. The mean of the worker’s legal cost is computed on the samples of workers, e.g. 
648 observations. The mean of the firm’s legal cost is computed on the samples of firms, e.g. 554 
observations. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. Observations: 1254. Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma potentially arising from the computation of the payoff 
matrix might be distorted under some cases. Contingent-fee arrangements might exist 
between the parties and their lawyers. These arrangements stipulate that in case of 
victory the lawyer will earn a predetermined percentage of the award and in case of a 
defeat will earn nothing more than a forfeit which can be nil.  Hence a “no win, no 
fee” arrangement destroys the possibility of a prisoner dilemma since taking a lawyer 
is always a dominant strategy. These types of contracts for unfair dismissals are still 
rare. Only three firms having reached the trial stage reported this kind of arrangement 
in the 1998 wave, the question has not been asked to the firms in the 2003 surveys. 
Twenty three workers in 1998 and 56 workers in 2003 acknowledge having used this 
“contingent-fee” arrangement, that is, seven and twenty percent respectively of the 
workers that have been represented by a lawyer at trial. We discard these cases from 
our analysis as their incentive structure differs from our problem statement30.  
In Great-Britain31, a tribunal may make pay the legal expenses of the winning side 
to the losing party -without an assessment of costs- if it finds that the case or defence 
                                                 
30 According to SETA 2003’ data 50% of these contingent-fee cases imply that the worker has to pay 
something in case of a defeat. 
31 Similar rule exists in France but an assessment of the costs is made by the judge. 
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was “misconceived, vexatious, and/or had no reasonable chance of success”. The 
prisoner’ dilemma will be less binding for a worker that thinks to have such a high 
quality case that she does not care on litigation costs since she is sure of getting her 
money back. In the same time, if the case is of a very high quality, it should not be 
difficult to the party to convince the opposite side that a settlement is preferable and 
these cases should not end up within the pool of adjudicated cases. Thirteen percent of 
workers and eleven percent of firms reaching the trial stage asked their costs to be 
awarded and six and three percent respectively have been reimbursed from their legal 
expenses. We conducted our analysis with or without these cases and do not find 
significant differences.  
Turning to the relationship between the representation and the outcome of the trial, 
sample t-tests on English data show that taking a lawyer correspond to a significant 
higher success probability  for the firm whether or not the worker is represented. In 
contrast with the studies mentioned above, we do find a significant difference in 
outcomes between the cases when both parties are represented and the cases when 
none of the parties are represented: the worker’s victory rate is higher when none of 
the parties are represented than when both parties have hired a lawyer. 
 
2.2. The French case 
The French labour justice is mainly dispensed by the "Prud’hommes" which is the 
relevant jurisdiction to every labour dispute arising at the individual level in France. 
The judges in the Prud’hommes are not professional judges and can be seen as 
performing a public duty. Each labour court comprises judges representing employers 
and judges representing employees in equal number. These judges are elected by 
employees, business owners and managers every five years within lists established by 
unions and federations. If an equal number of judges is pro worker and against her, 
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there is a tie (“solution de départage”). In that case, a single professional judge decides 
the outcome of the trial (less of 10% of the cases).  
Our data come from administrative records made at the level of each Prud’homme 
and collected by the statistical department of the French Ministry of Justice. Their 
primary goal is to monitor the labour courts’ activities with an emphasis on speed of 
treatment. The data source is exhaustive for the period 1990 to 2004. It includes 
approximately 2 millions of individual cases among which little more than 1 million 
have been brought to trial. Whatever is the outcome of the case, the characteristics of 
the representation of both parties are filled in. However, we restrict ourselves to the 
case having reached trial to draw a comparison with the British data set. The French 
data include a rough indicator of firm size (less or more than 10 employees), the 
industry of the firm, the age and sex of the plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the case, the 
eligibility for judicial assistance benefits, the right to appeal the decision of the court 
(that is the award at stake is larger than a given threshold: about 5,000 in 2006). 
In contrast to the UK, firms and workers are often represented by a lawyer in 
France (respectively (72% and 62% of the cases). As a consequence, a large fraction 
of French cases leads to the confrontation of two lawyers (46%). The more regulated 
French labour market might increase the complexity of the labour laws and hence 
makes more necessary the use of legal expertise. As underlined by Blanchard and 
Philippon (2004) or Algan and Cahuc (2007), due to the history of political and social 
movement, French industrial relations can be less smooth than their English 
counterparts. As in the UK, firms and workers can obtain legal help through other 
means than the hiring of a lawyer. The proportion of workers represented by a union 
member is much higher (23%) but the fraction of employer represented by an 
employer’s association is similar (4%). 
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3. Pay-off Matrix of the Game 
 
3.1. Legal representation and probability of worker’s victory  
The choice of hiring a lawyer for being represented is likely to depend on the 
quality of the case as perceived by both parties. Theoretical models of litigation stress 
differences in expectations (see Priest and Klein (1984)) or informational asymmetry 
(see Bebchuk (1984)) regarding this quality and draw predictions on win, trial, or 
settlement rates. In these models, litigation costs have no other influence on the 
judicial process than to give the parties an incentive to settle or to litigate. At the same 
time, the legal expenses do not impact the probability of winning or the size of the 
award and only correspond to entry costs of the litigation process. However, Cooter 
and Rubinfeld (1989) and Spier and Hay (1998) underline that the plaintiff’s litigation 
costs are endogenous rather exogenous: “the plaintiff's investment choice will reflect 
both the underlying facts of the case and the beliefs that the plaintiff holds about the 
future of the case – including those concerning the investments and responses of the 
defendant”. Hirshleifer and Osborne (2002) (H&S hereafter)  put together the quality 
of the case -considered as common knowledge- and the parties’ litigation costs as 
inputs of a litigation success function over which plaintiff and defendant optimize. 
Assuming risk-neutral parties, a Nash protocol will imply that plaintiff and defendant 
undertake the same level of legal expenses. This level is a quadratic function of the 
case quality reaching its peak midway.  Considering a Stackelberg game with the 
plaintiff as the leader, they show that the side with the better case fights harder and for 
a high quality case the defendant will concede. Hence theoretical models show that 
litigation costs and quality of the cases are likely to be intermingled. 
Unfortunately, except in the noticeable case of studies using medical malpractices 
in Florida in the early 80s (see Farber and White, 1990), the empirical literature on 
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legal process is plagued by the absence of direct measures of the quality of the cases. 
Our analysis is limited to individual labour disputes and thus guarantees some 
uniformity over the cases. Given the richness of our database, we are able to include 
numerous controls that are likely to be related to the quality of the cases. The presence 
of a union at the workplace and a firm large enough to possess a personnel department 
both making easier the access to legal expertise and knowledge in dealing with unfair 
dismissal cases are likely to filter out low quality cases. Skill and pay and industry 
might be also related to the ability to gauge the quality of one’s case. They are also 
related to the amount awarded that is taken into account by the parties when deciding 
to invest in legal representation.  
We ran probit regressions where the dependent variable is the probability of 
worker’s victory at trial. Our results are consistent with our observations on raw data. 
Regarding the French data, restriction tests show that the probability of victory meets 
some necessary conditions for the pay-off matrix to be prisoner’s dilemma alike. 
Hiring a lawyer increases the probability of victory whatever is the legal 
representation of the opposite party (see table 3.5). The worker’s victory rate is 
increased by .04 against represented firms (-.04-(-.08) = .04) and by .02 (.02-0) against 
unrepresented firms. The firm’s victory rate is increased by .08 against unrepresented 
workers and by .06 against unrepresented workers. However, contrary to what have 
been displayed in the (small) empirical literature, the (L,L) and (NL,NL) outcomes are 
clearly not equivalent: on one hand the worker is worse off in the (L,L) case which is 
consistent with a prisoner dilemma but on the other hand a higher probability of 
victory for the firm can make its investment worthwhile. British data show that when 
the firm hires a lawyer, its probability of victory increases substantially whatever the 
representation of the worker is. No significant difference is found for the worker. Once 
again the (L,L) cases display significant lower probabilities of worker’s victory than 
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the (NL,NL) cases and an assessment of the related cost is necessary to conclude to a 
prisoner’s dilemma where (L,L) should be a lower equilibrium outcome than 
(NL,NL). 
 
Table 3.5 
Marginal Probabilities from Probit Regressions on the probability of worker’s victory 
at trial 
 British data set French data set 
Variable Marginal probability* Marginal probability ** 
Lwlf -.17 (.04) -.04 (.006) 
Lwnlf .017 (.03) .02 (.006) 
Nlwlf -.24 (.03) -.08 (.005) 
Notes: *The marginal probability is computed from a probit regression of the probability of 
worker’s victory on legal representation characteristics and controls X. Reference is both parties 
not being represented (“nlwnlf”). At nlwnlf=1, the sample means of predicted probabilities is .63. 
For example, it is reduced by .17 when the sample means of predicted probabilities is computed at 
lwlf=1. X include:  2003 year dummy, jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local 
unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies.  
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. Observations: 1,363. SETA samples weights are used. 
** The marginal probability is computed from a probit regression of the probability of worker’s 
victory on legal representation characteristics and controls X. At nlwnlf=1, the sample means of 
predicted probabilities is .78. X include:  year dummies, jurisdictions, local unemployment rate, 
gender, age, firm size,sector , industry,region dummies.  
Sources: Prud’hommes data from French Ministry of Justice. Observations: 1,164,950. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the Prud’hommes, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
3.2. Legal Representation and Net Gain   
Administrative French data do not give any information on costs or awards. 
Serverin (2000) based on a survey of 7,962 cases collected in 1996 among 248 of the 
264 French labour courts estimates to 78, 000 Francs e.g. approximately an annual pay 
of gross minimum wage, the average award asked by the worker. Using this amount 
and the marginal probabilities displayed in table 3.5, we compute the payoff matrix. 
We obtain the threshold of litigation cost above which the pay-off matrix represents a 
prisoner’s dilemma.  The worker (firm) must pay less than 320 Euros (2,900 Euros) of 
lawyer’s fees to choose to be represented, whatever is the other party’s choice32. These 
                                                 
32 These thresholds might be actually lower since the award asked by the worker is likely to be an upper 
bound for the award actually received. One can notice than the forfeit usually paid by the worker in his 
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legal costs are below to what has been reported to us for unfair dismissal cases which 
are according to French lawyers we surveyed typically of a forfeit of 1,000 Euros for 
worker plus 18% of the potential outcome and a forfeit of about 8,000 euros for 
employers. As mentioned above -without any assessment of costs- workers are better 
off when no lawyers are involved rather than when both parties are represented since 
in the former case their probability of victory is higher. Providing that its legal costs 
are larger than 955 Euros, the firm is in the same position. Hence the (NL,NL) case is  
likely to be preferred to the (L,L) case and there is no evidence of an incentive 
structure leading to a (L,L) equilibrium. (see table 3.6))  
 
Table 3.6 
Estimates of the matrix of pay-off for French data using anecdotic evidence on 
litigation costs 
  Firm uses: 
  A lawyer No Lawyer 
Worker uses: A lawyer 6980,-17731 9297,-12556 
No Lawyer 8476,-16475 12243,-12242 
Notes: Expected gains are computed as iii CpJ −=Π where p is the predicted probability 
computed from a probit regression ran on Prud’hommes data from French Ministry of Justice. 
Controls include:  year dummies, jurisdictions, local unemployment rate, gender, age, firm size, 
sector, industry, region dummies.   J = one year of gross minimum wage=15 696 euros.  C=8 000 
euros cost of hiring a lawyer for the firm. C= 1 000 + .18% J euros cost of hiring a lawyer for the 
worker. J negative when firms’ expected gains are considered. 
 
Using the legal costs commonly reported for unfair dismissals mentioned above, 
the ranking of the different kind of representations are the same for the worker and the 
firm: (NL,NL)>(L,NL) >(NL,L)>(L,L). Hence both parties have the dominant strategy 
of not hiring a lawyer. 
                                                                                                                                            
fee-contingent agreement is even larger than the threshold. Lawyer’s hourly fees are typically around 
225 Euros. 
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The English data set allows us to take into account directly the cost of 
representation. We start by estimating OLS models regressing the net gain of the trial 
on the legal representation and additional controls. 
 
Table 3.7 
Net Gain and Legal Representation: OLS estimates 
Sample Workers Firms 
Dependant variable Net Gain* Net Gain 
   
lwlf -1054 -3140*** 
 (1089) (640) 
lwnlf 826.7 -1571 
 (836) (951) 
nlwlf -827.4 -2827*** 
 (510) (775) 
Observations 648 557 
R-squared 0.10 0.20 
Notes: *Net gain is defined as Award-Cost for the worker and –Award-Cost for the firms.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls :  2003 
year dummy, jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, 
skills, pay, tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region 
level.  
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. SETA samples weights are used. 
 
As the lawyer’s fees are known for the respondent of the questionnaire, we 
estimate separate regressions for the firms’ sample (Net gain =-Award-Legal fees) and 
the workers’ sample (Net gain=Award-Legal fees). The results are (partially) reported 
in table 3.7.  The parameters associated with legal representation do not differ 
significantly from zero in the workers’ regression. Hiring a lawyer (the “lwlf” and 
“nlwlf” variables) corresponds to smaller net gains for the firms. F tests show that 
these gains are significantly smaller only when the worker is not represented (see table 
3.8).  
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Table 3.8 
F Tests from OLS Regressions on the net gains 
Test P-value* 
Worker’s strategy  
lwlf=nlwlf .82 
lwnlf=nlwnlf .35 
  
Firm’s strategy  
lwlf=lwnlf .25 
nlwlf=nlwnlf 0.005 
Notes: *P-value from F tests of equality of parameters from a regression of the net gain on legal 
representation characteristics (reference=nlwnlf) and controls X. X include:  2003 year dummy, 
jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, 
tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Observations: 648 for the workers’ 
regression. 557 for the firms’ regression. SETA samples weights are used. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
One third of our observations contain no award and no legal expense and one half 
of trials lead to no award at all.  In order to take into account the mass point at zero of 
the award distribution, we could estimate a Tobit model. However, one can suspect 
that legal representation has a differentiated impact over the probability of prevailing 
and the amount awarded. For example, in case of an unfair dismissal33, in addition to a 
potential compensatory award a basic award calculated on the basis of the number of 
weeks of tenure and the weekly salary of the lost job is awarded to the applicant in 
case of success. The decision of the judge to award or not should not be based on these 
characteristics but on the intrinsic quality of the case. Hence we model the amount 
awarded using a double-hurdle model that offers more flexibility than a Tobit type I 
model: 
 ( )
( ) ( )[ ]{ }⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−Φ=>
Φ−==
− σσβφσβ
γ
//)log(/)1,)(log(
1) 0(
1 XawardXawardXawardf
XXwinP
  (3.1) 
 
We have:  
                                                 
33 In the SETA classification, other individual labour disputes are: redundancy payment, discrimination, 
breach of contract, wage contract. 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]σβσβσφβγ ///log XXXXXawardE Φ−+Φ=    (3.2) 
We do not need exclusion restrictions since residuals are assumed to be normal and 
independent between both equations. The double-hurdle is equivalent to run separately 
a probit and a truncated normal regression (McDowell, 2003). The Tobit model is 
nested in the model ( σβγ /=  (Cragg, 1971)).  
Table 3.9 shows that the legal representation has a differentiated impact on the 
probability of worker's victory and on the level of award which justified the use of a 
double-hurdle model. For instance, (L,L) cases are both related to a larger probability 
for the firm to prevail and a larger award for the worker in case of victory. The 
truncated regression shows that a lawyer is positively associated to the award. A 
likelihood ratio test confirms that the double-hurdles model beats the Tobit model in 
term of goodness-of-fit.  
 
Table 3.9 
Award and Legal Representation: Double-hurdles estimates 
   
Dependant variable Appwin Award (log) 
   
Lwlf -.53*** .62*** 
 (.1) (.16) 
Lwnlf .014 .57*** 
 (.14) (.11) 
Nlwlf -.66*** .43*** 
 (.08) (.15 
Observations 1249 658 
Pseudo R-squared 0.18  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls :  
2003 year dummy, jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, 
skills, pay, tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region 
level. SETA samples weights are used. 
Source : SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
We use the estimates of the double-hurdle run on awards and costs separately to 
compute the average pay-off for the firm and the worker. For illustration, the worker’s 
pay-off in the case (L,L) is computed as followed :  
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( )( )XnlwlflwnlflwlfawardE ,0,0,1logˆ ===      (3.3) 
where Ê is the sample mean. We estimate the standard-errors by the delta-method. The 
results are displayed in table 3.10. 
 
Table 3.10 
Estimate of the matrix of pay-off (Award) 
  Firm uses: 
  A lawyer No Lawyer 
Worker uses: A lawyer 3.1 (.3) 4.5 (.4) 
No Lawyer 2.7 (.2) 4.1 (.1) 
Notes: Mean sample of predicted values are computed in each representation case ((L,L), (L,NL), 
(NL,L),(NL,NL)). Standard deviations in parentheses are computed by delta-method. SETA 
samples weights are used. SETA samples weights are used. 1249 observations. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
Firms hiring a lawyer seem to secure lower workers' awards. In contrast, workers 
hiring a lawyer do not experience significantly higher awards. The expected gain at 
trial can be plausibly related not only to the legal representation but also by how much 
money is invested in this representation. Litigation costs are only known for the 
respondent of the questionnaire, we run our regressions using successively the 
workers' and the firms' survey. Legal representation is captured by the combination of 
the dummies lwlf, lwnlf and nlwlf   to which we add the legal expense (in log) of the 
respondent. The amount of legal costs is significant only in the firms’ truncated 
regression where it is positively associated to the award.  
Concerning the worker's victory in the firm regression, the (NL,NL) and (L,L) 
cases are not statistically different (see table 3.11). As for the worker regression, the 
presence of a worker lawyer is positively associated with a large award in case of 
victory (see table 3.12). 
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Table 3.11 
Award and Legal Representation: Double-hurdles estimates including legal costs as 
regressors: firms’ sample 
Dependant variable Worker’s victory Award (in log) 
   
Lwlf -0.471 0.113 
 (0.29) (0.42) 
Lwnlf 0.382** 0.283 
 (0.15) (0.22) 
Nlwlf -0.564*** 0.460* 
 (0.16) (0.28) 
expense (log) 0.00643 0.0780*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Observations 554 223 
Notes: "expense" are the firm's legal expense. Additional controls: 2003 year dummy, jurisdictions, 
union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, tenure,age, firm 
size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region level. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. SETA samples weights are used. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
Table 3.12 
Award and Legal Representation: Double-hurdles estimates including legal costs as 
regressors: workers’ samples 
Dependant variable Worker’s victory Award (in log) 
   
lwlf -0.585*** 0.586*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
lwnlf -0.336 0.804*** 
 (0.27) (0.26) 
nlwlf -0.833*** 0.201 
 (0.13) (0.24) 
expense (log) 0.0310 0.0244 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
Observations 648 421 
Notes: "expense" are the workers legal expense. Additional controls: 2003 year dummy, 
jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, 
tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region level. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. SETA samples weights are used. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. 
 
We use the estimates displayed in table 3.11 and table 3.12 to compute the pay-off 
matrix where the level of litigation cost is assumed to influence the outcome of the 
trial. For illustration, for the worker in the (L,L) case we write the pay-off as follows : 
 ( )( ) cost,cost,0,0,1logˆ −=== XnlwlflwnlflwlfawardE     (3.4) 
and for the firm: 
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( )( ) cost,cost,0,0,1logˆ −===− XnlwlflwnlflwlfawardE    (3.5) 
The standard-errors are obtained through the delta-method (see table 3.13). The 
worker is better-off hiring a lawyer when the firm is represented. The firm is better-off 
hiring a lawyer whatever is the decision of the worker. The firm would prefer the 
(L,L) case rather than the (NL,NL) case but this is the opposite for the worker so we 
do not have a prisoner dilemma stricto sensu.  
We consider the specification of table 3.13 as our baseline and describe some 
robustness checks which results are compared below. 
 
Table 3.13 
Estimate of the matrix of pay-off including level of costs in the regressors 
  Firm uses: 
  A lawyer No Lawyer 
Worker uses: A lawyer 2.72(.4),-5.24 (.53) 3.48(.63),-7.52 (.42) 
No Lawyer 1.91(.22),-5.12 (.23) 3.72(.14),-6.36 (.22) 
Notes: Award is estimated through double-hurdles including legal costs as explanatory variables. 
Mean sample of predicted values are computed in each representation case ((L,L), (L,NL), 
(NL,L),(NL,NL)). Standard deviations are computed by delta-method. Source: SETA surveys of 
1998 and 2003. SETA samples weights are used. Obs: 675 (Legal cost and award for worker) 574 
(Legal cost and award for firm). (Standard-deviation in the parentheses). 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. 
 
First we discard insignificant variables and adopt a more parsimonious approach. 
Using the firm survey, an interesting feature is that once the legal representation is 
included the worker’s probability of winning is primarily associated with the 
jurisdictions and the region of the case. Using the worker survey, in addition to region 
and jurisdictions, the firm size and the union density and the working time play a role. 
In both samples, the amount of the award is related to applicant’s characteristics such 
as tenure, pay, gender and skill. 
Second, previous results consider only firms opting for an outside lawyer as we 
assume that the service provided by an inside lawyer goes beyond to work on a single 
Employment Tribunal case. Nevertheless, our results could be driven by the presence 
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of in-house lawyers performing particularly badly. SETA 2003 shows that 25% of the 
legal specialists representing the firms are in-house lawyers. We restrict our analysis 
to small firms where the presence of a company lawyer is less likely.  
Third, as award and expense show a high level of variability and that our sample 
size is relatively small our results could be driven by outliers. Thus we discard 
observations for which award and expense are in the upper decile of positive values.  
Forth, we try to augment the homogeneity of our data set by only considering cases 
that have been brought under the “unfair dismissal” jurisdiction discarding the 
“discrimination”, “redundancy payment”, “breach of contract” and “wage” cases and 
allowing the observables to control more for the quality of the case.  
Finally, we distinguish the 1998 and the 2003 waves as a compositional effect that 
could be related to a change in regulation or legal environment or inflation in legal 
fees that might change the pay-off in being represented or develop alternative source 
of representations.  
We compare the pay-off matrix obtains from these specifications to our baseline 
bearing in mind that some of them leads to a significant drop in the sample size (see 
table 3.14). The preferences of the firms displayed by our baseline hold for all of our 
specifications except for two cases: when we restrict the sample to unfair dismissal 
cases where the firm is better off to be represented only when the worker is 
represented and when we consider only small firms for which “low equilibrium” (L,L) 
and “high equilibrium” (NL,NL) are found to be equivalent. The findings from the 
worker sample do not change except when considering separately the two waves.  
To sum up, after taking into account legal costs our data are not completely 
consistent with the prisoner’s dilemma suggested by Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) 
due to the ranking of the (L,L)  and (NL,NL) outcome by the firm. The necessary 
conditions regarding the probability of victory are met as in previous studies in our 
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both data sets (French and British): hiring a lawyer is associated with a larger 
probability of victory for the party, regardless of the decision of the opposite party. 
 
Table 3.14 
Estimate of the matrix of pay-off including level of costs in the regressors: robustness 
checks 
Preference: 
(L,L) 
> 
(L,NL) 
(NL,L) 
> 
(NL,NL) 
(L,L) 
> 
 (NL,NL) 
Obs. 
Specification:     
 Firms:    
baseline Yes Yes Yes 554/223 
Parsimonious Yes Yes Yes 554/223 
Small firms only Yes Yes No diff. 309/130 
Outliers Yes Yes Yes 435/164 
Unfair dismissal cases 
only 
Yes No diff. No diff. 287/107 
1998 wave Yes Yes Yes 237/88 
2003 wave Yes Yes Yes 317/135 
 Workers:    
baseline Yes No diff No. 648/421 
Parsimonious Yes No diff No. 648/421 
Small firms only Yes No diff No. 398/304 
Outliers Yes No diff No. 560/345 
Unfair dismissal cases 
only 
Yes No diff No. 230/110 
1998 wave Yes No diff No diff 282/187 
2003 wave No diff No diff No. 366/234 
Notes: We compute the estimate of the pay-off matrix for each sub-samples of firms and workers 
and compute the t-statistics corresponding to the comparison of pay-off. A difference is 
considered significant if p>.10. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. SETA samples weights are used. Observations: X/Y 
means X observations are used in the probit regression and Y in the truncated regression. 
 
 
Putting legal costs in the picture and focusing on British data, the gain in taking a 
lawyer for a worker is substantial only when the firm is represented. The firm 
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decreases substantially the worker’s probability of victory by hiring a lawyer making 
the choice of a lawyer a dominant strategy.  From the worker’s point of view “both 
parties taking a lawyer” is clearly Pareto-dominated by the outcome “none of the party 
represented” both in terms of probability of winning and expected gains. However, a 
firm is better-off facing a worker represented and hiring a lawyer rather than facing a 
worker not represented without the help of a lawyer. Put another way, the incentive 
structure does not put the firm in a low but in a high equilibrium. 
We have computed the observed pay-off matrix of a two-player game controlling 
for the observed characteristics of the parties. Concerning the worker, our findings 
suggest that the game played by the worker and the firm should lead to both parties 
being represented. Nevertheless, in case of the English data, (NL,NL) is the most 
prevalent cases (56%) and a natural question to ask is why some firms and workers 
choose not to be represented although the ex-post pay-off matrix suggests that  it is a 
dominant strategy. In the following sections, we search to characterize parties 
according to the choice of legal representation and test in our data whether this 
behaviour might correspond to large stakes, representation of the opposite party, pre-
trial bargaining low expectation or non-financial costs. The three latter effects are 
tested separately since they call for variables that are only present in the employer’s 
questionnaire. 
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4. Explaining the Choice of Legal Representation 
 
4.1. Legal representation in a model of strategic discrete choice 
In order to explain the choice of legal representation, we might specify a 
simultaneous equations model for discrete and limited dependent variables where the 
hiring decision depends on the opposite party’s decision: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ++=
++=
WFWWW
FWFFF
yXy
yXy
εγβ
εγβ
*
*
       (3.6) 
 
yF (yW) is a dummy equalling one if the firm (worker) is represented. X are some 
controls. (εF, εW) are random components (normally distributed and with zero means 
unit variance and correlation ρ)  and ),( ** WF yy  are latent variables for the choice of 
legal representation: *iy >0   the party i is taking a lawyer. We can interpret 
*
iy  as the 
expected utility of the party derived from the judicial process. Such models in which 
latent variables and dichotomous observations occur in different equations need some 
coherency restrictions in order to be statistically meaningful (see Heckman, 1978). For 
this model, the coherency condition is 0=⋅ WF γγ . If this condition fails, the sum of 
probabilities associated to each potential outcome might not equate to one and the 
relationship between (εF, εW) and (yF, yW) is not one-to-one. The coherency condition 
leads to “recursive probability models” eliminating simultaneity from (1). In our 
analysis, the expected pay-off for the firm (worker) from hiring a lawyer would be 
supposed not to depend on whether the worker (firm) has hired a lawyer. We estimate 
recursive bivariate probit models imposing in turn (γF, γW)=(0,0) ( the simultaneous 
probit)  and γF=0 (recursive model I) and γW=0 (recursive model II)  in model (3.6). 
As shown by Wilde (2000), exclusion restrictions are not necessary to make the model 
identifiable providing that each equation contains at least one varying exogenous 
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regressor. We adopt a parsimonious approach excluding insignificant variables from 
both equations by using estimates obtained from the bivariate probit specifying that 
the choice of hiring a lawyer as independent of the opposite party’s choice of legal 
representation ((γF, γW) = (0,0)).   
Starting with the simultaneous probit (see table 3.15 columns (1) and (2)), the 
hiring of a lawyer by a worker is found positively associated with the absence of a 
union at the workplace, her tenure and her skill. In order to build her case, she might 
ask the assistance of a union member who acts as a substitute for a lawyer. A large 
firm -more likely to be well equipped with legal expertise and experience with unfair 
dismissal cases- is likely to push him to invest in legal representation. The complexity 
of a case is expected to be an increasing function of her skill and a manager can be 
more prone to hire a lawyer and voice complaints. The tenure is an increasing function 
of the potential award that makes legal expenses worthwhile. Surprisingly, the pay is 
not significantly related to worker’s legal representation. We exclude tenure and skill 
for checking if colinearity problems might explain this result, and the pay variable 
remains insignificant. The jurisdictions of a case are key determinants. The easiness to 
prove the wrongdoing differs grandly among them: missing redundancy payments are 
more easily proved than sex discrimination at trial. In the former case bank account 
sheets might be a sufficient piece of evidence. The latter case might need witnesses 
and testimonies and call for a more discretionary power of the judge in the 
enforcement of the law. 
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Table 3.15 
Simultaneous probit and recursive models on legal representation 
 Simultaneous probit Recursive model I Recursive model II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Equation :  Firm Worker Firm Worker Firm Worker 
lawhear   0.821    
   (0.52)    
emplawhear      0.547 
      (0.36) 
breach -0.247** -0.152 -0.213** -0.137 -0.252** -0.118 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
wages -0.668*** -0.668*** -0.533*** -0.666*** -0.679*** -0.566*** 
 (0.084) (0.15) (0.099) (0.16) (0.083) (0.16) 
sexdisc 0.591*** 0.273 0.553*** 0.278 0.591*** 0.151 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) 
jurisredund -0.789*** -0.955*** -0.605*** -0.980*** -0.790*** -0.798*** 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) 
Ue -0.0564***  -0.0558***  -0.0699***  
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
payb2 0.332***  0.329***  0.342***  
 (0.092)  (0.093)  (0.086)  
payb3 0.239*  0.219*  0.236  
 (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  
payb4 0.516***  0.487***  0.512***  
 (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.13)  
btenure1 -0.561*** -0.429** -0.489*** -0.414** -0.558*** -0.345* 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18) 
btenure2 -0.310*** -0.213* -0.274*** -0.214* -0.320*** -0.174 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
btenure4 0.0127 0.238** -0.0358 0.248** 0.0129 0.229* 
 (0.19) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) 
largefirm 0.337***  0.368***  0.350***  
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  
public 0.293**  0.327**  0.258  
 (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.16)  
manuf -0.176  -0.150  -0.205  
 (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  
service -0.202**  -0.199**  -0.218**  
 (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.100)  
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Table 3.15 (Continued) 
Simultaneous probit and recursive models on legal representation 
 Simultaneous probit Recursive model I Recursive model II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Equation :  Firm Worker Firm Worker Firm Worker 
Union  -0.336**  -0.360**  -0.403** 
  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.19) 
Warningdes  0.163*  0.183*  0.158 
  (0.099)  (0.098)  (0.10) 
managerprof  0.261***  0.275***  0.241*** 
  (0.085)  (0.087)  (0.087) 
lowskill  -0.176*  -0.171**  -0.177* 
  (0.100)  (0.085)  (0.098) 
Constant 0.247 -0.308*** -0.0712 -0.330*** 0.361* -0.596***
 (0.16) (0.092) (0.25) (0.11) (0.20) (0.17) 
athrho 0.325*** 
(0.061) 
-0.154 
(0.29) 
-0.00643 
(0.20)  
Likelihood -1367 .84 -1366.21 -1366.64 
Notes: Additional controls: region dummies. Clustering at the official region level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustering at the region level. 
Observations : 1353. SETA sample weights. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. 
 
An interesting contrast is that a firm is more likely to be represented in a case 
involving a highly paid worker. In term of jurisdictions, sex discrimination cases are 
positively related to the probability that the firm takes a lawyer. Firms of the public 
sector and large firms are more likely to be represented. These results are consistent 
with firms taking a lawyer for risk-aversion purpose and for fear of bad reputation and 
also to be interested in “showing their muscles” to potential plaintiffs.  
With the same set of explanatory variables, we estimate the recursive models imposing 
in turn γF=0 and γW=0 (columns (3) & (4) and columns (5) & (6) respectively).  The 
parameters associated with the explanatory variables do not change substantially. 
Likelihood ratio tests show that recursive models perform better than the simultaneous 
probit. The legal representation is positively related to the legal representation of the 
opposite party. Marginal probabilities’ computations show that the hiring of a lawyer 
for the worker and the firm corresponds to about a significant .06 higher probability 
that the opposite party takes a lawyer (see table 20). The inclusion of the legal 
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representation of the opposite party picks up most of the correlation between the 
unobserved stochastic components as the correlation parameter between εF and εW falls 
down to zero.  
The recursive probability model implies strong assumptions that are not 
economically appealing. After having computed the pay-off matrix of a two-player 
game, we find it natural to draw from the literature on empirical models of discrete 
strategic choice which describe the preferences and choices of interacting agents (see 
Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991 for an introduction) and allow relaxing the logical 
consistency assumption. This approach has been initiated by Bjorn and Vuong (1984, 
1985) and extended by Kooreman (1994) who both applied their methodology to 
husband/wife labour force participation. It consists in adding an equilibrium concept 
to a stochastic specification of agents’ pay-off in order to identify the most preferred 
strategies. These strategies are derived from optimizing behaviours of a two-player 
game. We decompose the expected utility of the worker (firm) into a deterministic 
component (X) composed of the characteristics of the firm and the worker and the 
case and a random component ε and dummies α taking into account the decision of the 
opposite party. We note ( )wfk yyU ,  is the expected utility of the player k (w for 
worker and f for firm). Each of the four combinations of legal representation leads to 
the following expected utility:  
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The impact of a change in legal representation on the expected utility of the player is 
assumed to be independent on the controls X. We impose in turn the game played by 
the worker and the firm following a Nash or a Stackelberg protocol.  
We firstly consider that the observed legal representations (yF, yW) stem from Nash 
equilibrium. The Nash protocol implies that both parties choose simultaneously the 
nature of their legal representation and that each party’s selection is the best response 
to the opponent’s choice. Depending on their utility ranking, each party has four 
different strategies which lead to sixteen potential outcomes. The four strategies are 
the following: 
 -hiring a lawyer whatever is the choice of the opposite party; 
 -not hiring a lawyer whatever is the choice of the opposite party; 
 -hiring a lawyer only when the other party is hiring a lawyer; 
 -not hiring a lawyer only when the opposite party is hiring a lawyer; 
The actions of each player can lead to a single Nash equilibrium, several Nash 
equilibria or no equilibrium at all. As a matter of illustration, if the best strategy for 
the worker and the firm is to be represented whatever is the strategy of the opposite 
party, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game will be that both parties are 
represented. If the worker’s and firm’s best strategy is to mimic the action of the 
opponent, there will be two equilibria: both parties are represented or none of the 
parties are represented. If the worker’s best strategy is to mimic the action of the firm 
and the firm’s best strategy is to do the opposite of the worker there will be no 
equilibrium at all.  
The question is how to deal with multiple equilibria. As suggested by the 
literature, we randomize over them with an equal probability. A justification given by 
Bjorn and Vuong (1984) is that it can be shown that a mixed-strategy over the multiple 
equilibria would lead to an expected utility smaller than the one brought by only one 
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of the multiple available equilibrium. Using the model’s specifications, discarding the 
cases where no equilibrium exists, we compute the probability of each combination to 
happen. See Bjorn and Vuong (1984) for further details on the computation of the 
likelihood function34. We define fff 01 βββ −=  www 01 βββ −=  , fff 01 εεε −= and 
www
01 εεε −= . As for the recursive models, we assume that (εF, εW) are normally 
distributed and with zero means unit variance and correlation ρ.  
 
Table 3.16 
Strategic choice models of legal representation 
 Nash Stackelberg 
Firm leader 
Stackelberg 
Worker leader 
α1f  -0.393  
  (0.33)  
α0f  -1.088**  
  (0.52)  
α1w   -0.239 
   (0.33) 
α0w   0.150 
   (0.30) 
αf 0.808  0.656* 
 (0.63)  (0.37) 
αw 0.553 0.680  
 (0.55) (0.70)  
Athrho -0.409 
(0.55) 
-0.519 
(0.39) 
-0.348** 
(0.17)  
Likelihood -1365.31 -1364.37 -1365.03 
Notes: See table 17 columns (1) and (2) for the list of controls. Clustering at the official region 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations : 1353. 
SETA samples weights are used. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003 
 
Under the Nash concept, only fα  and wα  are identified. As we introduce 
constants among the controls, the model is identified only if the number of controls 
differs across players’ equations. Like for the recursive models, we use the set of 
variables selected from the bivariate probit. Both fα  and wα  are found not 
statistically significant from zero at conventional levels (see table 3.16). Nevertheless 
                                                 
34 We wrote the likelihood along their lines. Our Stata codes are available on request. 
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fα  is positive (with a p-value of .12) which means that the expected utility of firms is 
increased by taking a lawyer when the worker is represented.  A statistical model built 
on a Nash equilibrium game between worker and firm fits the data better than a 
bivariate probit when the decision of each party has no impact on the decision of the 
opponent.  
The concept of Nash equilibrium implies that each player provides the best 
response to the opponent’s decision ignoring the response of the opponent. Even if it 
can be seen as the outcome of a long lasting learning process the Stackelberg 
equilibrium concept appears to be more plausible in the context of litigation during 
which bargaining is likely to take place before the filing of the case and once the case 
is filed before the case reaches trial. In a Stackelberg game, one player is the follower 
and the other is the leader. The leader is maximizing her utility knowing what the 
response of the other player will be (the follower’s reaction function). For instance, 
consider a game for which the firm is the leader and the worker is the follower. 
Assume the worker is better-off being represented whatever the firm’s choice is and 
that the utility of the firm is larger in the (L,L) case than in the (L,NL) case then the 
firm will choose to be represented. The statistical model built from the Stackelberg 
game allows the identification of the i1α  and  i0α  for the leader i and the difference  
jjj
01 ααα −=  for the follower j.  By contrast with the Nash equilibrium, the 
Stackelberg game leads to a unique equilibrium. The recursive probability model is 
nested in the model derived from the Stackelberg game. It can be shown that when 
i
1α = i0α =0 is equivalent to the model (2) with γj=0. 
First, we consider the firm as a leader of the game. We find f0α  strongly 
significantly negative. f1α  is negative but not significant at a conventional level. A 
worker hiring a lawyer reduces the expected utility of the firm and this decrease is 
exacerbated when the firm is not represented. The firm’s choice might have an impact 
  92
on the utility of the worker in absolute term but this impact is not differentiated 
whether the worker is represented or not (remember that only 01 www ααα −=  is 
identified). Using a less parsimonious model specification that includes all the controls 
used by the bivariate probit above, wα  turns out to be significantly positive meaning 
that the difference in the expected utility of a worker when she uses a lawyer and 
when she does not is increased once the firm uses a lawyer. Likelihood ratio test show 
that Stackelberg firm leader model performs better than the recursive probability 
model where the legal representation of the worker has an impact on the choice of the 
firm only at a slight margin (at the 10% p-value level) (see table 3.16).  
When considering the worker as the leader, the Stackelberg model is not 
significantly different from the recursive probability model. W1α  and W0α  do not differ 
from zero. fff 01 ααα −=  is significantly positive: the firm gains in being represented 
particularly when the worker is represented. The likelihood of the model does not 
differ significantly from the recursive model I and is slightly below the Stackelberg 
firm leader model.  
Statistical models based on the Nash and Stackelberg concepts allow getting 
around the logical consistency assumption. They perform slightly better than the 
recursive models but do not differ significantly between each other. They go in one 
direction: the worker hires a lawyer independently of the firm’s decision but the firm 
does take into consideration the representation of the worker which has a substantial 
impact on its ex-ante expected utility of the legal process. In addition to the worker’s 
decision, the jurisdiction of the cases and the worker’s annual pay and subsequently 
the award at stake are key variables related to the firm’s decision to be represented. Up 
to now, we give preference to a larger sample size. We examine in turn other 
explanations focusing on the workers’ and the firms’ samples separately as well as on 
the steps preceding the trial stage.  
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4.2. Lawyer and settlement 
We have restricted our analysis to cases reaching the trial stage since the 
information on the representation of both parties is available only for this stage. The 
prisoner’s dilemma – the choice to be represented at a tribunal’s full hearing- might 
arise whatever have been the preceding steps to the trial. Nevertheless, one can claim 
that the return in hiring a lawyer obtained during the pre-trial stage might induce the 
choice in legal representation at trial. For instance, fearing a misalignment with the 
lawyer interest or a hardening of the judicial process, one party might decide not to be 
represented and in case of a settlement failure goes on unrepresented since most of the 
investment on the case has already been undertaken on her own: this could explain the 
absence of a lawyer at trial. The firms’ 2003 SETA shows that among firms reaching 
trials sixteen switch from no representation before the trial to representation by an 
outside lawyer at trial. Seventy four percent of the firms that hire a lawyer before the 
trial are also represented by a lawyer at the tribunal hearing. Hence the switch between 
no representation and representation by a lawyer at the time of the trial is relatively 
rare. We ignore the characteristics of the party facing the respondent during the 
settlement process and can not compute a pay-off matrix of the game of legal 
representation. However we can measure the impact of a lawyer on the settlement 
outcome and this impact might explain why a lawyer is not retained at trial even if it 
appears ex-post worthy. The UK data show that a vast majority of the cases (almost 
80%) are withdrawn or settled. Without dealing with the principal-agent problems that 
might arise when hiring a lawyer, we start by estimating a multinomial probit where 
the dependent variable is whether the case is withdrawn or dismissed, settled or goes 
to a full hearing. Concerning the firm and taking the settlement as the base outcome, 
we see that a lawyer is associated with a lower probability to withdrawn but not 
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differently related to the likelihood to settle or to go to trial35. (see table 3.17). The 
questionnaire allows us to distinguish between outside lawyer and company lawyer. A 
company lawyer is associated with a lower probability to go to trial and an outside 
lawyer is associated to a lower probability to dismiss or withdraw the case. It is worth 
noting that the hiring of an outside lawyer does not help the firm to avoid a trial and 
related additional costs36. 
 
Table 3.17 
Marginal Probabilities from a Multinomial Probit Regressions on the outcome of the 
case and legal representation; Firms’ surveys 
Case’s outcome Marginal probability Predicted value at sample means 
Withdrawn -0.02 (0.013) 0.20 
Settled 0.04 (0.026) 0.59 
Trial -0.02(0.024) 0.21 
*The marginal probability is computed from a multinomial probit regression for the independent 
variable: dislawyer (equalling one if an outside lawyer has been hired by the firm). The dependent 
variable is the outcome of the case (case withdrawn or dismissed, case settled, case adjudicated). 
Controls include: 2003 year dummy, jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local 
unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. 
Observations: 3,278. SETA samples weights are used. Clustering at the official region level. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
Turning to the financial impact of a lawyer and restricting ourselves to cases that 
have been settled dismissed or withdrawn, we estimate a double-hurdle model for the 
settlement amount awarded by the firm to the worker on one hand37 and the 
probability that the settlement might be positive on the other hand. We can not test 
whether the representation of the firm is related to the representation of the worker 
during the pre-trial stage. We include a dummy equalling one if a lawyer represents 
the party and the legal cost in log in the regressions. A lawyer representing the firm is 
associated with a larger settlement amount (see table 3.18, columns (2)). On the 
                                                 
35 A similar result holds for the worker. 
36 Firms’ average total loss at trial is 20% higher than firms’ average total loss when a settlement 
occurs. 
37 That might be zero in case of dismissing of the case. 
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employee side, we observe that a lawyer is positively related to the likelihood of 
obtaining a positive settlement. 
 
Table 3.18 
Settlement and Legal Representation: Double-hurdles estimates  
Sample: Firms Workers 
Dependant variable: settled settlement money Settled Settlement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lawyer 0.0318 0.138* 0.0218 0.295*** 
 (0.062) (0.072) (0.090) (0.11) 
expense (log) 0.0130 0.0650*** 0.0737*** 0.0923*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.015) 
Observations 2 486 1 489 2 473 1 661 
Notes: Lawyer is a dummy variable equalling one if a lawyer has been involved in the pre-trial 
stage and zero otherwise. Cases going to trial are excluded. Additional controls: 2003 year dummy, 
jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, 
tenure,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
Using these estimates, we compute the pay-off of the pre-trial stage for the firms 
and workers that do not reach the trial stage when they use or do not use a lawyer (see 
table 3.19). Firms are slightly better-off not using a lawyer during the pre-trial 
bargaining but lawyers appear to help workers to get more. 
 
Table 3.19 
Estimates of the pay-off of the pre-trial stage 
 Workers Firms 
No Lawyer 3.83 (.068) -7.37 (.068) 
Lawyer 4.10 (.136) -7.58 (.076) 
Notes: 2486 firms and 2 473 workers (Standard-deviation in parentheses). Standard deviations are 
computed by delta-method. SETA samples weights are used. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. 
 
A negative action of the lawyer during the pre-trial stage could justify her absence 
at the tribunal for the firms but not for the workers. As mentioned before, an 
unobservable component of the quality of the case might also explain the choice in the 
representation. 
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4.3. Quality of the case  
As common in the empirical literature of litigation, we do not have a direct 
measure of the quality of the case. However, an original feature of the SETA surveys 
is to provide us with the assessment of the case at its outset by the respondent to the 
questionnaire. Workers and firms are asked if they were thinking their case were likely 
to be successful when they filed the case or have been notified38. We do not have the 
exact timing at which the worker uses a lawyer -if she does- and the filing of the case 
and her personal assessment on her case might be influenced by a preliminary meeting 
with a lawyer. Given the question asked to the employer, it is likely that her own 
assessment is reported and it  is less likely than the optimism occurs because a lawyer 
has been retained . Firms and workers show a very high level of optimism on their 
cases39: 68% of the managers and 73% of the workers thought being likely to win at 
the beginning of the process. A high level of optimism is related to a higher likelihood 
to hire a lawyer both during the pre-trial bargaining and at trial. It is also associated 
with a higher probability for the firm to prevail (see table 3.20). Hence if we interpret 
at face value the assessment made by the employer on the case as a quality measure, 
the firm does not hire a lawyer because of an excess of optimism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 More precisely the SETA 2003 survey asks “When you first put in your Employment Tribunal 
Application form (or When you first received notification that [APPLICANT] had applied for an 
employment tribunal) did you think you were likely to be successful, likely to be unsuccessful, or had 
an even chance? “ The answer is coded in 5 categories : Very likely to be successful, Quite likely to be 
successful, Quite Likely to be unsuccessful, Very likely to be unsuccessful, Or that you had an even 
chance. In order to match the 1998 questionaire, we group the “very likely” and the “quite likely 
successful” categories the same for the “very likely” and “quite likely to be unsuccessful”.  
 
39 Which supports strongly the “optimism biais” assumption made in the literature to explain the 
litigation puzzle. 
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Table 3.20 
Legal Representation, Case Outcome at Trial and Assessment on the case at the start 
of the judicial process: Probit estimates 
Dependant variable Taking an outside lawyer Worker’s victory 
   
chanceeven -0.136 0.578*** 
 (0.086) (0.19) 
chanceplus -0.0971** 0.654** 
 (0.040) (0.27) 
Observations 3278 621 
Notes: chanceeven is a dummy variable equalling one if the manager was thinking that she had an 
even chance to win the case. chanceplus is a dummy variable equalling one if the manager was 
thinking the case was likely to be successful for the worker. Additional controls: 2003 year 
dummy, jurisdictions, union presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, 
pay, tenure ,age, firm size,sector, industry,region dummies. Clustering at the official region level. 
SETA samples weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Source: Employer SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003. 
 
4.4. Reputation 
The costs related to an unfair dismissal process might go beyond the payment of 
the award and the litigation cost. The firm might want to send its current employees 
the signal of being tough on shirking and lack of performance not only by firing 
shirkers but also by refusing them any compensation and going to trial. In the 2003 
SETA surveys, the employer is asked whether apart from any financial costs involved 
the case has any other negative effects on the organisation. Forty percent of employers 
having reached the trial stage recognize to have incurred non-financial costs. As it is 
an open question in both waves, the wording of the categories differs between the 
1998 and the 2003. Among those reporting non-financial costs and having reached the 
trial, an increase in staff stress, a bad reputation and damaged workplace relations are 
the most often reported in 1998 (respectively 65%, 31% and 21%). In 2003, among the 
38% of managers reporting non financial costs 38% mention an increase in the level of 
stress and an interruption in business , 25% a low staff morale 9% a bad publicity. 
Only 3% of the managers mention the fear of a contagion effect e.g. the case could 
push other people to make claims. Given these numbers, it is hard to conjecture that 
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the employers harden the judicial process hiring a lawyer for the only purpose to threat 
their current staff to file. Probit regressions run on the employers’ data both on the 
total number of the case and on the cases having reached trial show no significant 
relationship between the legal representation and the reporting of non financial costs. 
However restricting our analysis to large firms where a reputation effect is more likely 
to prevail we observe that reporting non financial costs corresponds to a significant 
increase of .1 in the probability to hire a lawyer whether the firm reaches or not the 
trial stage (see table 3.21). 
 
Table 3.21 
Marginal Probability from a Probit Regressions on Legal Representation; Firms’ 
surveys 
Hiring a lawyer Marginal probability Predicted value at sample means 
Non financial cost 0.044 (0.021) 0.50 
Notes: The marginal probability is computed from a probit regression for the independent 
variable: non financial cost (a dummy equalling one if the firm reports non financial cost). 
Dependent variable: dislawyer (equalling one if an outside lawyer has been hired by the firm). 
Large firms are workplaces of more than 25 workers. “Non financial cost” is a dummy equalling 
one if the firm reports non financial cost. Controls include: 2003 year dummy, jurisdictions, union 
presence at the workplace, local unemployment rate, gender, skills, pay, tenure,age, firm 
size,sector, industry,region dummies. Observations: 1,648. SETA samples weights are used. 
Clustering at the official region level. 
Source: SETA surveys of 1998 and 2003.  
 
5. Discussions 
We do not proceed to any causal inference. Halla (2007) uses propensity score 
techniques to draw a causal analysis on the efficiency of lawyers on divorce cases. 
This method still assumes that the choices made by the party rely on observable 
components. In this paper, we compute the pay-off matrix controlling for case and 
plaintiff and defendant characteristics including legal costs and see whether workers 
and firms using legal representation correspond to particular types.  
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One can suspect that our results are biased by a double selection process: the one 
leading to choose legal representation and the one leading to drop or settle or go to 
trial. Thus, with respect to their unobserved qualities, the cases in one of the fourth 
legal representation configurations might not represent a random sample of cases that 
fall under the Employment Tribunals jurisdictions.   
A lawyer might help to offset the poor quality of a case and no representation 
could correspond to cases of such high quality that plaintiffs and defendants do not 
feel the need of legal assistance. Under this conjecture, our results would 
underestimate the beneficial impact of lawyers. However, we observe that a 
preliminary negative assessment on the case is not positively associated to the hiring 
of a lawyer (see table 3.20).  
The relationship between lawyer and client can be modelled as a principal-agent 
problem and a misalignment could arise. Paid by the hour, a lawyer could lie to her 
client on the true merit of the case even if one could argue that a reputation effect 
might prevent the lawyer to do so. We can not trace back workers and firms deciding 
either to settle or dismiss after having consulted a lawyer and before filing the case but 
a smaller probability to drop the case associated to the hiring of a lawyer and no 
significant impact of the lawyers on avoiding trials seem to show that the assumption 
that lawyers filter out low quality cases does not hold.  
More formally, there is no bridge in the theoretical literature between explanations 
of the legal dispute puzzle and the choice of legal representation in a game theory 
framework. In H&S, both parties share the same beliefs on the quality of the case and 
corner solutions due to fixed legal cost of entry are ruled out. The probability of 
winning is a function of the quality of the case and the litigation costs of both parties. 
Under the Nash protocol assumption, plaintiff and defendant undertake the same value 
of legal costs: (L,L) cases should correspond to mid range quality cases and (NL,NL) 
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should mix low and high quality cases. Under the Stackelberg protocol assumption, 
the side with a better case fights harder. The (L,NL) and (NL,L) cases should 
correspond respectively to high and low quality cases and our results could 
overestimate the impact of a lawyer.  
H&S do not consider pre-trial selection of cases. The asymmetric information 
theory by Bebchuk (1984) and the different expectation theory by Priest and Klein 
(1984, P& K hereafter) mentioned in section 3 are the two prominent theories 
advanced in the literature to explain why parties prefer going to court rather than agree 
on a settlement. The difference expectation theory (DE) states than plaintiff and 
defendant form random unbiased estimates of the case quality. These estimates 
confronted with the legal standard give each party an estimation of the probability of 
victory for the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is sufficiently more optimistic than the 
defendant relatively to the litigation costs a trial occurs. More precisely the necessary 
condition for a trial to occur is: 
J
CCPP DPDP
+>−         (3.8) 
Where PP and PD are the probabilities of plaintiff’s victory predicted respectively by 
the plaintiff and the defendant (CP and CD being the additional litigation costs related 
to the trial stage and J the award at stake). Other things equals, the DE predicts that an 
increase in litigation costs leads to a greater selection of the parties and a closer 
convergence to equivalent plaintiff-defendant victories. This conclusion is mitigated 
when considering PP and PD as function of litigation costs and the choice of legal 
representation independent of the quality of the case. With respect to (L,L) cases and 
as soon as the marginal benefit of hiring a lawyer is positive, the (L,NL) should 
present a larger range of qualities by increasing the left hand side and decreasing the 
right hand side of the inequality (3.8). The (NL,L) cases should present a narrower 
range of case qualities. Nevertheless, the variance of the probability of winning of the 
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worker does not show significant differences among the legal representation 
categories which do not plead in favour of the DE selection process. 
In the asymmetric information (AI) framework, one of the party has an 
informational advantage on the quality of the case and then on the probability of 
victory. The poorly informed party makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the 
other. A rejection leads to trial. The hiring of a lawyer should give an informational 
advantage on the quality of the case. Ranking each of categories according to the 
average quality of the case, we could conclude that   (L,L) > (NL,L) and (L,NL) > 
(NL,NL)  on one hand and  (L,L) < (L,NL) and  (NL,L)< (NL,NL)  on the other hand. 
In that case, our results would overestimate the benefit from taking a lawyer.  
However, as noted before if such selection process is going on, a lawyer would have 
an impact on the settlement rate versus the trial rate which is not the case.  This casts a 
doubt on the potential bias resulting from the AI framework. 
We need to develop a theoretical model including both selection process to trial 
and selection process into legal representation within a game theoretic framework to 
analyse thoroughly the selection bias from which could suffer our results. Drawing on 
the existing theoretical literature, our data do not suggest selection bias due to 
difference in expectation or asymmetric information on the quality of the case. 
However, one can not rule out selection bias on the choice of legal representation 
based on a Stackelberg game where the quality of the case is common knowledge. As 
this model predicts that the side with the better case fights harder, our results could 
overestimate the impact of a lawyer. 
 
Conclusion  
Like in previous empirical literature but on a more complete set of data, we find 
that hiring a lawyer increases the probability of victory at trial. By contrast, lawyers do 
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not neutralize each other when retained on both sides of a dispute, and legal 
representation is more beneficial to the firm when both parties are represented than 
when neither of them uses a lawyer. This invalidates the presence of a prisoner’s 
dilemma in the game of legal representation on the whole sample of cases. However 
we do find a prisoner dilemma when we restrict ourselves to small firms or unfair 
dismissal case. Other necessary conditions for its existence are met in all 
specifications. When including the cost of the legal representation, we observe that 
lawyers allow the firms to obtain more than they cost. The net gain for the worker is 
significantly positive especially when the firm is represented. We could interpret this 
last result as workers good at making the trade-off between the quality of the case and 
the necessity of legal representation. Statistical models built on Nash or Stackelberg 
equilibria concept and interacting the choices of both parties show that the legal 
representation of the worker pushes the firm to be represented but that the opposite is 
not true. The use of a lawyer by the firms is also related to the complexity of the case 
and the amount at stake. The presence of non financial cost such as bad publicity or 
fear to have faced additional claims is related to the hiring of a lawyer for large firms.  
Our analysis has not been causal and Farber and White (1990) show that 
controlling for the quality of the case is of major importance to explain the outcome of 
a case. In addition to numerous observable variables that most of studies do not have, 
we use as proxy for the case quality the assessment given by the respondent at the start 
of the case. This assessment is likely to be biased by subjectivity and what has been 
the outcome of the case. Moreover, we have the assessment of only one of the two 
parties. An instrumental approach based on the institutional setting of the UK or the 
French system might be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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4. Legal cost allocation and judicial outcomes: the 
case of individual labour disputes in the UK  
A large amount of the literature in labour economics has been dedicated to the 
study of collective labour disputes. By contrast, labour disputes at the individual level 
have not been extensively investigated. However, data available in some European 
countries show that individual labour disputes constitutes a phenomenon of a large and 
increasing importance likely to weight on industrial relations and labour market 
characteristics. Hence, the yearly number of claims related to an individual labour 
dispute in the UK amounts for about 10% of the people claiming unemployment-
related benefits and it has roughly trebled from 1990 to 2003 reaching about 100,000 
in 2003. If as pointed out by Burgess, Proper and Wilson (2001) a large part of the 
increase can be explained by the introduction of new rights in the 1980 and 1990, the 
number of claims has also increased within most of the jurisdictions. These authors 
attribute to the drop in the union membership rate, the decline in manufacturing 
employment and the increase in the workforce employed in small firms this increase. 
The global picture of labor disputes of an economy on the path of post-
industrialization could be a shift from strikes and collective actions to the rise in 
individual disputes and judiciary claims. The rise in individual labor disputes and in 
the number of dismissals challenged in front of a tribunal is also likely to represent 
higher firing costs40 not only through litigation costs related to an on-going dispute but 
also through the expenditure in the judicial advising necessary to avoid them.  
A potential policy response to limit the growth of the number of judicial claims, 
the hardening of the judicial process and the deterioration of labor relations is to 
encourage settlements and discourage filings. The introduction of a notification period 
                                                 
40 See Autor and alii (2003) or Fraisse and alii (2007) for the impact of labor laws and their enforcement 
on labor market outcomes. 
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and a mandatory meeting to discuss the reasons of the dismissal between the worker 
and the employer are likely to encourage both since the parties are at least forced to 
discuss the matter41. The policy maker can also alter the allocation rule of legal costs. 
In Great Britain , the losing party risks not to bear only its own legal fees (known as 
the “American rule” in the literature) but also the legal fees of the opposite party (the 
“English rule”). Under a 2001 regulation42  the maximum amount of the deposit which 
may be imposed following a pre-hearing review and the maximum amount of costs 
which a tribunal may award against the losing party -without an assessment of costs- if 
it finds that the case or defence was “misconceived, vexatious, and/or had no 
reasonable chance of success”, increased respectively from £150 to £500 and from 
£500 to £10,000. Taking advantage of two successive samples of UK Employment 
Tribunal cases drawn in 1998 and 2003 collecting a very rich set of information on the 
plaintiff and the defendant, we assess the impact of this new regulation –that we 
interpret as a shift from the American rule to the English rule- on judicial behaviors 
for a widespread type of judicial action in Europe.  
Landes (1971), Posner (1973) and Gould (1971) were the first to implement 
theoretical models allowing to gauge the influence of the English rule on judicial 
behaviors. In their settings where plaintiff and defendant are assumed risk-neutral and 
their probability of prevailing at trial independent on the litigation costs, the judicial 
behaviors rely on divergent beliefs on the judicial outcome43.  Within their difference 
expectation framework (DE hereafter), the English rule is supposed to filter out low 
quality claims since –facing higher litigation costs- the expected gain of a bad quality 
                                                 
41 A legislation came into force in 2004 in Great Britain imposing a statutory minimum dispute 
resolution procedure in the event of an employment dispute follows this purpose. 
42 See Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001 SI 2001 No. 
1171 and the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 
2001 SI 2001 No. 1170 
43 This difference in beliefs might stem from a informational advantage possessed by one of the party 
(see Bebchuk, 1984)). 
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case will decrease. On the contrary it will enlarge the pool of low award-high quality 
claims which would not have be filed under the American rule since the award would 
not have covered the legal expense. Hence the impact on the filing rate depends on the 
distribution of claims according to their qualities and potential awards. Once the case 
is filed, parties must decide whether to settle or litigate. The settlement gap or 
“contract zone” is defined as the difference between the maximum amount the 
defendant is ready to offer and the minimum amount that the plaintiff is ready to 
accept in order to settle. If this settlement gap is positive, there is room for settlement. 
This gap depends on the expectation the parties have on the case and on the litigation 
costs.  The English rule is likely to exacerbate litigation as the expected gain of an 
optimistic party will be higher. In the same time, larger stakes might increase legal 
expense (Katz, 1987 or Hause, 1989) and give greater incentive to risk-averse parties 
to settle. As underlined by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), “the direction of the overall 
effect upon the frequency of trials of changing the rule for distributing legal costs 
cannot be determined from theory alone” and empirical and experiment studies are 
needed. 
The empirical analysis of the impact of the English rule is scarce since in most 
country the English rule prevails and the shift from a regime to another is rare. Perloff, 
Rubinfeld and Ruud (1996) using antitrust cases find that treble damages lead to an 
increase in the number of settlements. By contrast, Danzon and Lillard (1983) using 
medical malpractice claims filed in 1974 and 1976 find that larger potential damages 
lead to less litigation. Fournier and Zuehle (1989) grouping cases collected from a 
survey of civil filings collected in 1979 and 1980 into 99 categories with different fee-
shifting rules find that English rule reduce the probability of settlement. Avoiding 
results that might be driven by differences among jurisdiction, Snyder and Hughes 
(1990, 1995) exploit the adoption by the State of Florida of a mandatory fee-shifting 
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rule for medical malpractice claims during the period 1980-1985. They find that the 
English rule encourages litigations in the detriment of settlements and raises the 
dropping rate and the plaintiff success rate at trial. 
The next section describes the English institutional setting and the legislation 
change that have occurred over the period under review. Then we detail the theoretical 
predictions of the fee-shifting rule on the filing rate stressing the role of risk-aversion, 
the settlement rate and the amount of the legal costs before 4 describing the dataset 
and providing empirical results. 
 
1. English Institutional setting and legislation change 
The Employment Tribunals (ET hereafter) are in charge of adjudicating employer-
individual employee disputes since the Redundancy Payment Act of 1965. They 
acquired jurisdictions over unfair dismissals with the Industrial Relation Act of 1971. 
The trial is chaired by a professional judge assisted by two lay-members- one with an 
employer background, the other with a trade union or employee representative 
background. The lay judges are chosen by the administration from lists of persons 
proposed mainly by trade unions and employer groups. 
A conciliation service named Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS hereafter) was created in 1974 and is an integral part of the employment 
tribunal system. ACAS offers help and advice to parties who wish to conciliate but 
this conciliation step is not mandatory. 
A case –registered as soon an application form is send by the applicant to the 
Employment Tribunal- can either be withdrawn, settled (privately or through ACAS) 
or go to full tribunal hearing. From October 2004, and hence not under the scope of 
our data analysis, all employers and employees in Great Britain follow statutory 
minimum dispute resolution procedures in the event of an employment dispute. 
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Basically, these procedures make mandatory notification and formal meeting between 
employer and employee in the case of dismissal or grievance procedure. 
In addition to the new cost regime, several policy measures might have modified 
the pool of Employment Tribunal claims over the period under review. First, a new 
ACAS arbitration scheme has been set up to facilitate a speedy conciliation The 
scheme is designed to provide a private, more informal and speedy procedure for 
resolving unfair dismissal claims that do not achieve a settlement. Parties opt into the 
scheme voluntarily, by agreement. Only 43 cases in the population44 had been 
completed under the scheme over the 2001-2004 period45. Second, in an unfair 
dismissal case, the tribunal might award a “basic” award calculated according to a 
fixed statutory formula depending on the weekly pay and the length of service of the 
claimant and a “compensatory” award compensating for financial loss suffered as a 
result of the dismissal. In October 1999, the maximum limit of the compensatory 
award was increased from £12,000 to £50,000 (Employment Relations Act 1999 
s.34(4)). We can not exclude that this increase in the maximum compensatory award 
might have an impact on judicial behaviours but our data set shows that the total 
amount awarded (that is the basic and the compensatory awards) tops these limits for 
only 7 cases that is 2% of unfair dismissal cases awarded46 in our samples. Third, the 
qualifying period to claim in the unfair dismissal47 decreases from 2 to 1 year of 
employment. We try to control this shortening of the tenure clock by discarding in a 
separate analysis unfair dismissal cases with tenure below 2 years48. 
                                                 
44 There have been 51,512, 45,373, 44,942 unfair dismissal cases in 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
See  Employment Tribunal Services Annual Report 2004-2005. 
45 See «The Acas Arbitration Scheme: An evaluation of parties’ views » ACAS/RP03/04 for an 
assessment of the scheme. 
46 Which is an upper bound since our award variable includes basic AND compensatory award. 
47 There is no qualfying period in other jurisdictions. 
48 There are "automatical" unfair dismissals for which the probationary period does not apply ("parental leave, minimum 
wage,trade union...). In 2003, we are able to distinguish them from the others. Not in 1998. In 2003, 13% of non automatic unfair 
dismissals have a tenure of less than one year. This proportion is the same in 1998 (over the unfair dismissal category since we 
are not able to distinguish automatical unfair dismissal in 1998). In 2003, the proportion of unfair dismissal cases between 1 and 2 
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Several acts adopted between 1998 and 2003 (minimum wage act, working time 
regulation act, maternity and parental Leave Regulation) have enlarged the grounds 
for unfair dismissals. Fortunately, the 2003 survey keep track of these types of 
disputes (11% of the ET cases in 2003) and we discard them for making the 
comparison with the 1998 data set.  
 
2. Theoretical Predictions 
The new cost regime intends to “weed out unmeritorious and low quality cases”. A 
simple framework can illustrate what legislators had in mind. In order to introduce 
risk-aversion, taking on Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (1996), we consider that 
expected utilities of applicant (A) and employer (E) depend on the mean and variance 
of their income yk ( ) 2kkkkyEU σδμ −=  k=A,E where µk is the mean of yk, σk its 
variance and δk a parameter characterizing risk-aversion. We define pA and pE the 
probabilities of applicant victory at trial and DA and DE the award at stake such as 
respectively assessed by the applicant and the employer, CA and CE their litigation 
costs. Under the American rule, the expected gain of applicant from the judicial 
process is: 
2
AAAAAA
Am
A DCDpGain σδ−−=       (4.1) 
The first two terms are the expected gain at trial. The second term is the risk-aversion 
cost measured by the variance of the award ( ( ) ( ) 22 1 AAAAAA DppDDV −==σ ) 
compounded by a risk-aversion parameter. It becomes under the English rule:  
( )( ) ( )221 BAAAABAAAAEnA CCDCCpDpGain ++−+−−= σδ     (4.2) 
Hence providing the applicant is very optimistic on his case, the English rule 
encourages the filing of high quality cases (those for which pA tends to 1 for which 
                                                                                                                                            
years of tenure has increased (from 12 to 22%). Rather than including interactions terms in our regression, we prefer to discard 
unfair dismissal cases with less than 2 years of tenure from our analysis. We keep cases from the other jurisdictions without 
regard to the tenure since they are not constrained by a probationary period. 
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expected legal costs and risk aversion do not bite) and high quality/low awards cases 
(that were not worth filing because of negative expected value under the American 
rule)49. Low or average quality cases are more deterred from filing under the English 
rule as soon as the defendant has substantial litigation costs. Letting temporarily aside 
risk-aversion, under the American rule, a case is filed as soon as DA / CA≥ pA. Under 
the English rule, this condition becomes DA/CA≥ (1-1/pA) (1+CB/CA). Hence large 
employer threaten to invest in the case can prevent from filing applicants that would 
have sued under the American rules.  
The English rule might also lead to larger litigation costs by increasing the 
marginal benefit of judicial costs since they are externalized toward the employer. If 
we consider a risk-neutral applicant and that DA is an increasing concave C1 function 
of the applicant’s legal cost, the optimal legal cost –which maximized the expected 
gain from the judicial process is defined through the first order condition as 
( ) AAA pCD /1' =  for the American rule and ( ) ( ) AAAA ppCD /1' −=  for the English 
rule.  
In order to measure the impact of the English rule on the settlement rate, we define 
the settlement gap as the difference between the expected costs of the employer and 
the expected gain of the applicant from the judicial process. A positive settlement gap 
might lead to settlement since the offer the employer is ready to make to the applicant 
is above the expected gain of the applicant from the judicial process. An increase in 
the settlement gap enlarges the contract zone and the likelihood of a settlement. Under 
the English rule, the settlement gap is: 
( )BAEEEAAAAAEEEnAEnE CCDDDpDpGainCost ++++−=− 2222 σδσδ    (4.3) 
This becomes under the American rule:  
                                                 
49 One could object obviously that an applicant very optimistic on his case will not undertake any legal 
expenses and that the allocation of cost will have no impact anyway. 
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Switching from the American rule to the English rule lead to a change in the 
settlement gap of:  
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )( )BAAE
EBAEEEABAAAA
CCpp
DCCDDCCD
+−+
−+++−++ 222222 σδσδ    (4.5) 
 
Hence, an optimistic applicant for which pA≥ pE makes a settlement gap less likely 
under the American rule. If the firm and the worker share the same expectation on the 
outcome of the judicial process, the American rule makes the settlement more likely 
because of risk-aversion. If firm and worker agree on the high quality of the worker's 
case, the worker optimistic bias (pA=pE=1) as well as the risk averse terms rule tend to 
zero the American and the English rule should not have any differentiate impact.  
To sum up, theoretical models show that the English rule encourages high quality 
– low award cases and larger litigation costs to file in. Ambiguous predictions are 
found for the settlement rate as the size of the risk aversion and the legal expenses on 
one hand and the optimist bias of the applicant on the other hand go in opposite 
directions. 
 
3. Data set and estimations 
We use the 1998 and 2003 waves of the Survey of Employment Tribunal 
Applications series (previous waves were collected in 1987, 1992 and 1998). The 
2003 wave is composed from a random sample of 4,517 cases divided into two 
independent samples of applicants (2,236 cases) and employers (2,281 cases). Each 
2003 samples was drawn across all jurisdictions from tribunal cases completed 
between March 2002 and March 2003. Both samples are representative of cases 
completed in Great Britain during this period. In 1998, a disproportionate sampling 
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has been adopted in order to get a meaningful analysis at the regional and jurisdiction 
levels. The 1998 wave is also composed of two independent samples of applicants 
(1,384 cases) and employers (1,292 cases) representative of cases that have been 
registered between January 1995 and April 1997. In contrast with 2003, they only 
cover the five main jurisdictions50 -Unfair Dismissal, Breach of Contract, Wage Act, 
Redundancy Payment, Discriminations- to which we will restrict our analysis 
hereafter. Even if we control in our multivariate models for the stratifying variables 
(regions and jurisdictions in 1998) we use sample weights in all of our regressions to 
be sure that change in the sampling is not mistakenly attributed to a treatment effect. 
Bearing in mind the drawbacks of any information gathered ex-post and requiring 
recalls, the information collected from employers and applicants are obviously richer 
than the one administratively collected. Indeed, characteristics of the employee -before 
and after the judicial process-, characteristics of the firm, the representative, the 
settlement offers, the costs of litigation, the amount awarded are provided at a very 
detailed level. Ex-post subjective expectations over the outcome of the case are 
gathered. Reasons for decision made along the process such as reasons for not being 
represented, for withdrawing or for rejecting settlement are given. Awareness of the 
cost regime and the litigation process system is also investigated. Information are also 
given on the way the dismissal was handled —with or without a formal meeting or a 
written notification, or on the presence of a human resource department or unions at 
the workplace- which could help us to understand the bargaining process between 
employer and employee. However, our aim to compare the 1998 and 2003 outcomes 
requires to limit ourselves to variables available in both waves and in the most 
extensive data set to those available in the employer AND the applicant surveys. 
                                                 
50 In 2003, 89% of the cases belong to these five jurisdictions. 
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As the vast majority of empirical studies on litigating claims, we can not do better 
that considering the cases that have been filed. Even if the Employment Tribunal 
process is safer judiciary speaking, a bargaining process between the applicant and the 
employer on the dismissal decision or on the amount of severance payments might 
obviously take place in the “shadow of the law” without any notification to the 
Employment Tribunal.  
Following our theoretical overview, cases reach the settlement-litigation choice 
conditionally on not being dropped. We observe neither the applicant expected gain of 
the judicial process nor the employer expected loss. We write them as latent variables: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
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       (4.6) 
 
The applicant will drop her case if her expected gain from the judicial process is 
negative. Conditionally on not dropping the case, we assume that the case is settled if 
the settlement gap is positive:  
 ( ) ( )
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The English rule is captured by a dummy equalling 1 for the 2003 wave. Following 
Marinescu (2007) we use the regional unemployment rate and the regional VAT 
deregistration rate by industry at the time of application in order to control for changes 
in economic activity. 
In case of unfair dismissal, a basic award calculated on the basis of the number of 
weeks of employment and the weekly salary is automatically awarded to the applicant 
in case of success. A compensatory award taking into account among others the 
current and future loss of wages, the loss of perks, employment protection rights or 
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pension benefits might also be awarded. Hence X and Z must include the weekly pay 
and the tenure for a proxy of the basic award. For the potential loss and difficulty to 
find a comparable new job we include the level of skills, working time regime, age, 
gender, industry of the former job. 
The presence of a union at work place, a written contract including the terms and 
conditions of employments might help the worker to assess the quality of his case. On 
the employer side, we might consider that the size of the workplace and the sector are 
good proxies for the judicial knowledge and the experience in dealing with Industrial 
Tribunal cases. As underlined by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), some parties are likely 
to be more concerned by the outcome of the judicial process because they might face 
similar litigations in the future. As a proxy, we use here the number of unfair dismissal 
cases in which the firm has been involved in the last 2 years. Finally, unfair dismissal 
is the only jurisdiction for which a separated analysis is possible. We include 
jurisdictions dummies. The awarding rule differs with jurisdiction:  for example, there 
is no limit on discrimination cases. The easiness to prove the wrongdoing also differs 
grandly: lack of redundancy payments is more easily proved than discrimination at 
trial. 
Every sample taken separately is supposed to be “representative” of the pool of 
Employment Tribunal cases but some variables of interest are only collected by the 
applicant survey -union membership, current employment status- or by the 
employment survey –previous experience of Employment Tribunal cases, Employer 
Association memberships. As we will see below, the presence of union at the 
workplace is a key variable determining the case outcome. As this variable is present 
in every sample beside the 1998 employer sample we compute a proxy by predicting 
the presence of unions at the workplace by the variable “recognition” (“worker’s right 
of being represented by a union in a labour dispute”) using the applicant survey in 
  116
1998. Using “recognition” in the 1998 employer survey, we obtain a proxy for the 
presence of union at workplace51.  
Some variables are subject to large difference in appraisal: about 80% of the 
employers consider having issued a written statement of conditions and terms of 
employment to their employees. This percentage drop to 60% when ask to the 
applicants. Hence even it causes a large drop in our sample size, we also run 
regression separating the employer from the applicant waves. 
We group cases in three categories: cases dismissed or withdrawn after having 
been filed (the “drop” category hereafter), cases that lead to a settlement and cases that 
go to a full hearing.  From 1998 to 2003, the proportion of cases settled increases by 
16% resulting mainly in a decrease in the proportion of cases going to trial (33%) as 
the proportion of cases that have been dropped did not change ( 21% in both waves, 
see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
Table 4.1 
Variables description 
Variable Description 
Costrule Dummy equal 1 if case of 2003 wave 
Economic Activity  
VAT Regional VAT deregistration rate 
UE Regional Unemployment 
Case 
Characteristics  
settle Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case settled) 
withdw Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case withdrawn) 
dismets Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case dismissed) 
trial Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if case reach full hearing) 
appwin Case outcome (dummy equal 1 if applicant win at trial) 
chanceplus Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if likely to win) 
chanceeven Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if even chance) 
chanceless Perceived likelihood  of success (dummy equal to 1 if likely to lose) 
unfair Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  unfair dismissal) 
breach Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  breach of contract) 
wages Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  wage contract) 
discri Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  any discrimination) 
redund Main jurisdiction (dummy equal 1 if  redundancy payment) 
writproc Written Procedure (dummy, equal 1 if applicant issued with written 
statement stating terms and conditions of employment ) 
                                                 
51 The variable “recognition » is absent from the 2003 wave so we can not use it as a proxy for union in 
our analysis. 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description 
warningdes Warning before dismissal (dummy equal 1 if the employer warned the 
applicant before dismissal) 
Applicant Characteristics 
age Age 
female Female 
ann_pay Annual Pay 
managerprof Occupation (dummy, equal 1 if Managerial/Professional occupation) 
Lowskill Occupation (dummy, equal 1 if Elementary Occupation or Process, Plant, and Machine Operatives occupation) 
Partime Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if employed part time) 
Union Union (dummy, equal 1 if union present at the workplace) 
Unionmemb Union Member (dummy, equal 1 if applicant union member) 
Currempl Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if currently employed) 
moremoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns more money in her new job) 
samemoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns same amount of  money in her new job) 
lessmoneynewjob Current Employment Status (dummy, equal 1 if applicant earns less money in her new job) 
nonprofit Public/Private/Non Profit sector statys (dummy, equal 1 if non profit sector) 
sicgp1 Industry (dummy equal 1 if agriculture and fishing) 
sicgp2 Industry (dummy equal 1 if mining and utilities) 
sicgp3 Industry (dummy equal 1 if manufacturing) 
sicgp4 Industry (dummy equal 1 if construction) 
sicgp5 Industry (dummy equal 1 if whole and retail) 
sicgp6 Industry (dummy equal 1 if hotels and Rest.) 
sicgp7 Industry (dummy equal 1 if Transports, Comm. And Utils) 
sicgp8 Industry (dummy equal 1 if finance) 
sicgp9 Industry (dummy equal 1 if other services and public administration) 
ea Firm is member of employers association (dummy equal 1 if member) 
nbcases0 Previous Experience with ET (dummy equal 1 if no experience) 
nbcases1 Previous Experience with ET (dummy equal 1 if at least one case) 
Representation,Cost and Award: 
lawhear Representation at hearing (dummy equal 1 if lawyer, sollicitor or barrister represented applicant) 
emplawhear Representation at hearing (dummy equal 1 if outside lawyer, sollicitor or barrister represented employer) 
settlemoney Monetary Settlement (if any) 
award Award at Trial if any 
proposettlemoney Amount of settlement money (if any) proposed and refused by the applicant 
legalfee Legal fees personally paid (if any) 
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Table 4.2 
Variables means (weighted) 
Survey:  Employer Applicant Employer Applicant 
Number of observations 1292 1384 2033 2003 
Variables     
Costrule 0 0 1 1 
Economic Activity     
VAT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
UE 8.35 8.25 5.21 5.31 
Case Characteristics     
Settle 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.60 
Withdw 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.17 
Dismets 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Trial 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.19 
Appwin 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.13 
Chanceplus 0.18 0.75 0.11 0.73 
Chanceeven 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.25 
Chanceless 0.73 0.20 0.65 0.02 
Unfair 0.62 0.60 0.48 0.45 
Breach 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.14 
Wages 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.27 
Discri 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Redund 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 
Writproc 0.52 0.32 0.88 0.57 
Warningdes 0.70 0.20 0.74 0.28 
Applicant Characteristics     
Age 39 41 38 42 
Female 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.38 
non white 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.09 
ann_pay 15837 13831 36077 31082 
Managerprof 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.31 
Lowskill 0.26 0.20 0.29 0.25 
Partime 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.13 
Union 0.34 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Unionmemb 0.22 na 0.24 na 
Currempl 0.76 na 0.79 na 
Moremoneynewjob 0.30 na 0.42 na 
Samemoneynewjob 0.18 na 0.16 na 
Lessmoneynewjob 0.51 na 0.41 na 
Tenure 5.55 6.39 4.49 5.77 
Firm Characteristics     
Public 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.20 
Private 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.77 
Nonprofit 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 
asizew1 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.47 
asizew2 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.14 
asizew3 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.24 
asizew4 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.15 
Manuf (sigcp=1,2,3,4) 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.27 
Service (sigcp=5,6,7,8) 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.43 
Otherservice 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.30 
Ea 0.37 Na 0.35 na 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Survey:  Employer Applicant Employer Applicant 
nbcases0 0.57 na 0.52 na 
Representation,Cost and Award:    
Lawhear 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.20 
Emplawhear 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.41 
Settlemoney 2185 53971 3077 4242 
Award 872 2438 4728 3788 
Proposettlemoney 1657 1507 3065 4242 
Legalfee 779 396 2756 739 
Source: Employer and applicant data from SETA 1998 and SETA 2003. 
 
The answer to the question “When you sent off your Industrial Tribunal 
application did you think you were likely to win your case, likely to lose or did you 
think your chances were about evens?” may help to assess the “optimistic bias” of the 
applicant. In 1998, this perception of success was coded into 3 categories against 5 in 
2003 which makes risky the comparison across time. If we interpret this answer along 
pA and pE, both applicant and employer are very optimistic on their case and seem to 
suffer from a self-serving bias (Loewenstein, 1994) –which is a robust result in the 
empirical literature (Bar-Gill, 2005).  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Allocation of costs: Settlement and dropping rates 
We start by running multinomial logit regressions letting aside the selection 
process occurring at the dropping or settling decision node (see Table 4.3). When we 
consider the applicant survey and the employer survey together, we observe that the 
English rule has no significant impact on the “drop” decision but decreases 
substantially the likelihood of trial with respect to the one of a settlement52. When 
considering the employer and applicant surveys separately with the same set of 
                                                 
52 When we do not weight the data a negative and significant impact of the english rule is also found on 
the dropping rate.  
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explanatory variables, we observe that this result is mainly driven by the employer 
data. Since both applicant and employer surveys should be representative of the 
population of cases, one possible explanation is the difference in the quality of 
answers of the respondent.  
Table 4.3 
Multinomial logit on the outcome of the case 
Dependent Variable: Outcome of the case (Base: Settlement) 
Sample: Applicants and Employers Applicants only Employers only 
 Drop Trial Drop Trial Drop Trial 
Costrule -0.204 -0.430** 0.192 -0.0169 -0.642 -0.828***
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.29) (0.35) (0.57) (0.26) 
Vat -0.147 -1.424 1.748 1.608 -3.291 -5.377* 
 (2.89) (1.95) (3.24) (2.29) (3.03) (3.18) 
Ue -0.0597 0.00696 0.00292 0.129 -0.132 -0.113* 
 (0.089) (0.059) (0.066) (0.10) (0.16) (0.059) 
Union 0.424*** 0.0147 0.619*** 0.126 0.179 -0.0378 
 (0.088) (0.066) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.069) 
Writproc 0.0161 -0.0513 -0.0563 -0.0407 0.0553 -0.0575 
 (0.058) (0.078) (0.076) (0.100) (0.11) (0.16) 
Discus -0.0377 0.0298 0.0134 0.129 -0.0614 -0.0707 
 (0.066) (0.084) (0.086) (0.11) (0.11) (0.093) 
Warningdes -0.120* 0.0627 -0.00851 0.0830 -0.223*** 0.0287 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.071) (0.12) (0.081) (0.10) 
Breach -0.307*** 0.192* -0.171 0.248** -0.429** 0.0951 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.10) 
Wages -0.489*** 0.216* -0.655*** 0.399*** -0.377*** 0.00509 
 (0.079) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.097) (0.20) 
Sexdisc 0.123 -0.156 0.177 -0.0396 -0.00413 -0.232 
 (0.095) (0.13) (0.21) (0.26) (0.12) (0.20) 
Jurisredund 0.245 0.804*** 0.0391 0.785*** 0.451* 0.792*** 
 (0.22) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17) (0.27) (0.24) 
Female -0.371*** -0.278*** -0.366*** -0.273* -0.357*** -0.297** 
 (0.090) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) 
Partime -0.206 -0.140 -0.241 -0.0727 -0.167 -0.150 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Occupation (job3-job5)      
managerprof -0.0714 0.0121 -0.0857 -0.0664 -0.0112 0.0474 
 (0.11) (0.094) (0.17) (0.15) (0.063) (0.088) 
Lowskill -0.0659 0.0203 -0.105 -0.00937 -0.0192 0.0555 
 (0.12) (0.097) (0.092) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) 
Annual Pay (<10K£)      
£10000-£14999 -0.241** -0.133 -0.308* -0.128 -0.166** -0.0988 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.17) (0.083) (0.12) 
£15000-£19999 -0.251* -0.204* -0.287 -0.251 -0.165 -0.0990 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
£20000+ -0.364*** -0.234* -0.262 -0.148 -0.493*** -0.335 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.26) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: Outcome of the case (Base: Settlement) 
Sample: Applicants and Employers Applicants only Employers only 
 Drop Trial Drop Trial Drop Trial 
Tenure (between 3 and 7 years)     
< 1 yr. 0.582*** -0.0500 0.559*** -0.0730 0.575*** -0.0771 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.079) 
1-2 yrs. -0.0329 0.0572 -0.115 0.0402 -0.00142 0.0507 
 (0.091) (0.068) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) 
>7 yrs. 0.217* 0.167* 0.123 0.214 0.307* 0.105 
 (0.13) (0.099) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.14) 
Age ( 25- 34 yrs)       
(<25 yrs.) -0.0579 -0.194 0.0244 -0.0355 -0.0972 -0.300 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23) 
(35-44 yrs.) -0.0982 -0.0289 0.157 0.156*** -0.333** -0.163 
 (0.082) (0.073) (0.11) (0.049) (0.15) (0.15) 
(45-54 yrs.) -0.150 0.131 -0.155 0.324** -0.0837 -0.0361 
 (0.12) (0.092) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
(>54 yrs.) -0.182 0.0666 -0.127 0.258** -0.201 -0.0859 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) 
Largefirm -0.0437 -0.295*** -0.206 -0.316** 0.0813 -0.295***
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.23) 
Public 0.260*** -0.125 0.200* -0.408** 0.363*** 0.211 
 (0.080) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.13) 
Unionmemb   0.167 -0.292*   
   (0.14) (0.16)   
Currempl   0.000274 0.0666   
   (0.10) (0.18)   
moremoneynewjob   0.158 -0.0618   
   (0.12) (0.083)   
samemoneynewjob   0.0624 0.0659   
   (0.13) (0.11)   
nonwhite   0.0416 -0.283***   
   (0.22) (0.090)   
Nbcases1     -0.0131 0.0981 
     (0.11) (0.14) 
Ea     -0.172* 0.137*** 
     (0.094) (0.043) 
Pseudo R2 0.0359 0.0511 0.0440 
Observations 6671 3376 3295 
Notes: Additional controls: regional and industry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
region, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Employer and applicant data from SETA 1998 and SETA 2003. Use of sample weights 
 
The variables added when we consider applicant and employer surveys separately do 
not modify the result. We learn that the union and federation members are less likely 
to settle. However, it should not be associated with a hardening of the judicial process. 
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Indeed, the presence of a union at the work place seems to filter out low quality cases 
at it is associated with a higher likelihood to drop the case. 
Judicial behaviours might vary across jurisdictions since in comparison with unfair 
dismissal cases, breach of contracts, wage acts and redundancy payments cases are 
more likely to reach the full hearing while discrimination cases do not differ. As noted 
before, given the representativeness of the samples, only an analysis for unfair 
dismissal jurisdiction is possible. Restricting our analysis to unfair dismissal cases, the 
English rules still decreases the relative likelihood of litigation but is not significant 
anymore at conventional levels. 
In order to take into account the 1999 shortening –from two years to one year- of 
the probationary period during which the worker can not sue her employer for unfair 
dismissal, we discarded applicants that sue for unfair dismissal and that had a tenure of 
less than 2 years at the time of application in both waves. They represent about 15% of 
the cases. As before, the English rule decreases the trial rates when considering the 
employer survey or the applicant and employer surveys together. No significant 
impact is seen on the drop rate. 
 
4.2. English rules and legal expenses 
English rule might encourage higher legal expenses: the marginal cost of an 
additional expense - discounted by the probability of losing- is lower and the marginal 
benefit is higher since more is at stake. The theoretical setting above does not take into 
account the influence of legal expenditure on the probability of victory at trial and the 
amount awarded or settled. One could imagine that the level of legal cost is set 
through a maximisation of the expected gain of the judicial process under a resources 
constraint and an assessment of the quality of the case. As these expenses are positive 
for around 40% for employers and 20% for applicants, this program leads to corner 
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solutions and we model the legal expenditure as a Tobit model. We use the same 
controls than for the drop/settlement decision since the optimal legal costs derived 
from the arguments of the expected utility. 
 
Table 4.4  
Tobit model for legal costs 
Sample: Applicant and Employer Applicant Employer 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Amount of legal expense   
  
costrule -3430 -2526 -3640 
 (2116) (1754) (2990) 
settle  1061*** 1588*** 550.8 
 (298) (337) (498) 
trial 1769*** 1399*** 2184*** 
 (446) (321) (585) 
vat -3978 963.4 -852.6 
 (5347) (8046) (6114) 
ue -490.4 -127.3 -724.3 
 (472) (411) (778) 
union -543.2 -284.9 -587.4 
 (419) (671) (452) 
writproc 1658*** 799.1 258.5 
 (597) (534) (367) 
discus 522.4 289.0 1113* 
 (477) (560) (602) 
warningdes 1010*** -265.8 274.6 
 (328) (427) (305) 
breach -1191*** -1635* -896.4** 
 (455) (877) (408) 
wages -3854*** -3763*** -3703*** 
 (1057) (1102) (1028) 
sexdisc 1279* 344.2 2404*** 
 (716) (889) (921) 
jurisredund -2071** -2559** -1013 
 (846) (1117) (1092) 
female 512.6* 792.6** 91.11 
 (304) (336) (619) 
partime -1316* -1061 -1179** 
 (744) (999) (558) 
Occupation (job3-job5) 
managerprof 665.4*** 808.5*** 544.1 
 (180) (301) (448) 
lowskill -651.1* -1238** -671.0 
 (390) (482) (546) 
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Sample: Applicant and Employer Applicant Employer 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Amount of legal expense   
Annual Pay 
(<10K£) 
   
£10000-£14999 517.4 626.9** 453.8 
 (324) (312) (435) 
£15000-£19999 1074** 1380** 1406** 
 (502) (547) (550) 
£20000+ 3250*** 3797*** 3332*** 
 (1135) (1357) (1197) 
Tenure (between 3 and 7 years)   
< 1 yr. -707.1** -1165*** -682.3 
 (294) (433) (562) 
1-2 yrs. 564.5 133.8 724.8 
 (410) (387) (573) 
>7 yrs. 531.5 839.3** 661.1 
 (412) (424) (540) 
largefirm 229.5 631.1* 416.5 
 (384) (367) (513) 
public -1554* -1005 -1714 
 (917) (1387) (1238) 
unionmemb  -1878***  
  (673)  
currempl  -404.9  
  (510)  
moremoneynewjo
b 
 -905.0*  
  (467)  
samemoneynewjo
b 
 -667.3  
  (421)  
nonwhite  -817.7  
  (891)  
nbcases1   -323.6 
   (344) 
ea   -1127** 
   (444) 
Pseudo R2    
Observations: 6344 3226 3118 
Expense=0  4946 2141 1965 
Notes: Additional controls : regional and industry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
region, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Use of sample weights. 
Source : Employer and applicant data from SETA 1998  and SETA 2003.  
 
1998 and 2003 SETA surveys provide information on legal expenses. The solicitor’s 
fee has been introduced in the computation of the UK Consumer Price Index in 2006 
but we do not have any information concerning the inflation of legal costs over the 
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period under review and the best we can do is to correct by the overall CPI. We find 
that the English rule decreases the amount of litigation costs although not significantly 
at conventional level (See Table 4.4).  
 
4.3. Quality of the cases brought to trial 
By encouraging the filing of high quality-low award cases, a consequence of the 
English rule should be a higher average quality of cases reaching trial. The risk-
aversion and the English rule do not byte on these highly optimistic workers and a 
large majority of these cases should proceed to trial. Hence even after the filtering of 
cases made by the settlement process, we should observe a higher victory rate of 
worker53. We model the trial rate taking into account the selection process of the 
settlement stage. In addition of the controls capturing the preliminary estimate of the 
quality of the case that we use above, we identify the selection process by the annual 
pay which should not impact the decision of the tribunal. Again, we can see that the 
English rule decreases the likelihood to litigate. We can observe here a selection 
process (see Table 4.5), a Wald test leads to reject the independence of the equations 
and the cross-equation disturbance correlation is significantly different from 0. As 
predicted, the English rule corresponds to a higher victory rate at trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Assuming that the judicial decision is not biased and actually captures the quality of the case. See 
Ichino & alii (2001) and Marinescu (2007) considering the unemployment rate might distort the 
decisions of the judges. 
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Table 4.5 
Heckman probit for trial outcomes 
Sample: Applicant and Employer  
Equation Trial Settlement 
Dependent Variable:  1=applicant wins, 0=applicant loses 1=trial, 0=settlement 
costrule 0.379*** -0.254* 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Vat 1.348 -0.728 
 (1.57) (1.13) 
Ue 0.0125 0.00228 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Breach -0.0402 0.0981 
 (0.079) (0.063) 
Wages 0.247** 0.109 
 (0.099) (0.075) 
Sexdisc -0.220 -0.0697 
 (0.14) (0.080) 
Jurisredund 0.0181 0.470*** 
 (0.16) (0.085) 
Female 0.168* -0.178*** 
 (0.088) (0.062) 
Partime 0.0576 -0.0586 
 (0.077) (0.075) 
Occupation (job3-job5)  
managerprof 0.0453 0.00806 
 (0.061) (0.049) 
lowskill -0.0574 0.0214 
 (0.081) (0.059) 
Tenure (between 3 and 7 years)  
< 1 yr. 0.113 -0.0460 
 (0.078) (0.064) 
1-2 yrs. 0.0149 0.0274 
 (0.098) (0.037) 
>7 yrs. -0.162*** 0.108** 
 (0.041) (0.054) 
largefirm 0.0394 -0.135*** 
 (0.058) (0.040) 
Union  -0.0617** 
  (0.030) 
writproc  -0.126*** 
  (0.039) 
Discus  -0.0146 
  (0.033) 
warningdes  0.0220 
  (0.034) 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Heckman probit for trial outcomes 
Sample: Applicant and Employer  
Equation Trial Settlement 
Dependent Variable:  1=applicant wins, 0=applicant loses 1=trial, 0=settlement 
Annual Pay (<10K£)   
£10000-£14999  -0.0188 
  (0.053) 
£15000-£19999  -0.0102 
  (0.096) 
£20000+  -0.0914 
  (0.060) 
rho -0.955 
 0.0422 
Observations 1451 5303 
Notes: Additional controls : regional and industry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
region, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Use of sample weights. 
Source : Employer and applicant data from SETA 1998  and SETA 2003.  
 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
5.1. IIA assumption 
The multinomial logit is based on the strong assumption that the choice of settling 
the case is independent of the one of not to have dropped the case at the first place. We 
can suppose that unobserved components –such that taste for litigation or an 
overoptimistic bias- both determine the decision not to drop and not to settle. 
Hausman tests lead to negative statistics -results that can be attributed to finite sample 
properties and do not invalidate the IIA hypothesis (see Hausman and MacFadden 
(1984), pp 1226).  
When discarding one of the potential outcomes, we obtain parameter estimates that 
in most cases are very close (see Table 4.6). A noticeable exception is the parameter 
associated to the deregistration rate which substantially differs when we include the 
“settle” category. Chi-square statistic is near 0 when we do not consider the drop 
category. 
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Table 4.6 
Hausman-McFadden Tests (weighted) 
Variables : Model (Drop,Trial) / 
Model 
(Drop,Settle,Trial)* 
Model (Drop,Settle) / 
Model 
(Drop,Settle,Trial)* 
Model (Settle,Trial)/ 
Model 
(Drop,Settle,Trial)* 
costrule  0.061 0.000 -0.035 
Vat 0.748 -0.551 -0.026 
Ue -0.005 0.005 -0.009 
Union -0.002 0.006 -0.005 
Writproc -0.009 0.009 0.010 
Discus 0.019 -0.008 -0.008 
Warningdes 0.014 -0.001 0.010 
Breach 0.017 0.007 -0.012 
Wages 0.016 0.002 -0.010 
Sexdisc 0.054 0.001 0.016 
Jurisredund 0.029 -0.017 -0.003 
Female 0.004 0.004 -0.007 
Partime -0.030 0.012 0.008 
Managerprof 0.062 -0.007 0.008 
Lowskill -0.003 0.004 -0.009 
Annual Pay (£10000-
£14999) 
-0.022 0.012 -0.005 
Annual Pay (£15000-
£19999) 
-0.013 0.000 0.000 
Annual Pay (£25000+) -0.068 0.016 -0.009 
tenure (<1 year) 0.003 -0.012 0.009 
tenure (1-2 yrs.) 0.022 -0.003 0.011 
tenure (>7 yrs.) -0.016 -0.013 -0.001 
age (<25 yrs) -0.034 0.026 -0.008 
age (35-44 yrs.) -0.031 0.016 0.008 
age (45-54 yrs.) -0.021 0.013 0.003 
age (>54 yrs) -0.032 0.008 0.010 
Largefirm -0.002 0.011 -0.006 
Public 0.003 -0.004 0.015 
Hausman MacFadden 
Test 
chi2(45)=-8.48 chi2(45)=-1.61 chi2(45)=-.45 
Notes: *Difference in the parameter estimated by Model A and by Model B. Use of sample weights.
Source: Employer and applicant data from SETA 1998 and SETA 2003.  
 
Even if IIA tests and logit regressions do not conclude for a selection process at 
the dropping stage, we run a heckman probit model taking advantage of the sequential 
decision process. The applicant once he has filed his claim decides or not to drop the 
claim.  
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Table 4.7 
Bivariate Probit with Selection equation 
Sample: Applicant and Employer  
Equation Settle Drop equation 
Dependent Variable:  1=Litigated, 0=Settled 1=Not Dropped, 0 Dropped 
costrule -0.287** 0.0501 
 (0.12) (0.18) 
Vat -0.675 -0.178 
 (1.02) (1.76) 
Ue -0.00619 0.0387 
 (0.032) (0.053) 
breach 0.0730 0.194*** 
 (0.067) (0.059) 
wages 0.0698 0.300*** 
 (0.073) (0.044) 
sexdisc -0.0513 -0.0986* 
 (0.077) (0.051) 
jurisredund 0.486*** 0.0342 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
female -0.201*** 0.169*** 
 (0.056) (0.046) 
partime -0.0869 0.0989 
 (0.074) (0.099) 
Occupation (job3-job5)  
managerprof 0.00262 0.0332 
 (0.059) (0.051) 
lowskill 0.00274 0.0398 
 (0.063) (0.060) 
Annual Pay (<10K£)   
£10000-£14999 -0.0968 0.118* 
 (0.067) (0.060) 
£15000-£19999 -0.131* 0.111 
 (0.069) (0.088) 
£20000+ -0.163** 0.177** 
 (0.073) (0.071) 
Tenure (between 3 and 7 
years) 
  
< 1 yr. 0.0268 -0.332*** 
 (0.078) (0.062) 
1-2 yrs. 0.0346 0.0255 
 (0.040) (0.050) 
>7 yrs. 0.120** -0.0944 
 (0.048) (0.081) 
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Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Sample: Applicant and Employer  
Equation Settle Drop equation 
Dependent Variable:  1=Litigated, 0=Settled 1=Not Dropped, 0 Dropped 
largefirm -0.159*** -0.0187 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
union  -0.240*** 
  (0.057) 
writproc  -0.0199 
  (0.025) 
discus  0.0267 
  (0.031) 
warningdes  0.0821** 
  (0.033) 
public  -0.176*** 
  (0.053) 
Rho  -0.394 
  (0.43) 
Observations 5303 6711 
Notes: Additional controls: regional and industry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
region, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source : employer and applicant data from SETA 1998 and SETA 2003. Use of sample weights. 
 
We assume that this decision partly depends on the state of labour relationships at the 
workplace which is captured by the presence of a union, the issuance by the employer 
of a written procedure, a formal meeting between the applicant and the employer 
before the filing and the sector of the firm (public, private or non-profit). 
These variables allow the applicant to determine more precisely if he is at fault or 
not and are supposed to help the applicant to produce a first estimate of the quality of 
his case. Once the case is not dropped, it is plausible that they do not to modify the 
assessment of the case anymore. The model shows a negative impact of the English 
rule on the litigation rate (see Table 4.7). The selection process is still hard to detect, a 
Wald test leads not to reject the independence of the equations and the cross-equation 
disturbance correlation is not significantly different from 0. 
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5.2. Awareness of the case 
 
Table 4.8 
Multinomial Logit (Awareness of Costs) 
Dependent Variable: Outcome of the case (Base: Settlement)   
Sample: Applicant and Employer Applicant only Employer only 
Variable Drop Trial Drop Trial Drop Trial 
awareness -0.208*** -0.213*** -0.513*** -0.302** 0.151 -0.187** 
 (0.071) (0.065) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.080) 
vat 1.786 2.772 2.240 7.179 0.441 -0.746 
 (4.01) (2.89) (5.99) (4.89) (4.60) (4.32) 
ue 0.205 -0.237 0.230 -0.297 0.269 -0.177 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.22) (0.33) (0.20) (0.31) 
union 0.515*** -0.0210 0.711*** 0.101 0.311** -0.0121 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18) 
writproc -0.0581* 0.0217 -0.0273 0.0840 -0.118 0.0842 
 (0.034) (0.092) (0.079) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
discus 0.00350 0.0249 -0.0146 0.115 0.0172 -0.118 
 (0.095) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17) 
warningdes -0.131* 0.0954 -0.0431 0.00601 -0.180 0.157* 
 (0.072) (0.092) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.093) 
breach -0.0866 0.268** 0.117 0.294 -0.304 0.220*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.25) (0.077) 
wages -0.240*** 0.202 -0.312** 0.468*** -0.195* -0.108 
 (0.067) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.30) 
sexdisc 0.0608 -0.370 0.208 -0.397 -0.149 -0.361 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) 
jurisredund -0.149 0.613*** -0.0672 0.748*** -0.292 0.514 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.29) (0.28) (0.43) (0.32) 
female -0.289*** -0.246** -0.337*** -0.337 -0.248* -0.172 
 (0.094) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.13) (0.16) 
partime -0.311** -0.177 -0.467* -0.110 -0.199 -0.240 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.27) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30) 
Occupation (job3-job5)      
managerprof -0.129 0.0380 -0.0707 0.111 -0.145 -0.0816 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.13) 
lowskill 0.00649 -0.0755 -0.0997 -0.0266 0.122 -0.0865 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.24) (0.16) 
Annual Pay (<10K£)      
£10000-£14999 -0.208*** -0.0648 -0.450*** -0.0357 -0.0335 -0.0912 
 (0.070) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.22) 
£15000-£19999 -0.309* -0.0932 -0.539** -0.150 -0.111 -0.0173 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.26) (0.17) (0.15) (0.35) 
£20000+ -0.355*** -0.188 -0.365* -0.156 -0.403*** -0.236 
 (0.091) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.29) 
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Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable: Outcome of the case (Base: Settlement)   
Sample: Applicant and Employer Applicant only Employer only 
Variable Drop Trial Drop Trial Drop Trial 
Tenure (between 3 and 7 years)     
< 1 yr. 0.0331 0.0135 -0.113 0.151 0.231 -0.186 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) 
1-2 yrs. -0.246* 0.203** -0.414** 0.339* 0.00313 0.0584 
 (0.14) (0.084) (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23) 
>7 yrs. 0.113 0.362*** -0.0765 0.523** 0.355 0.242 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (0.37) 
largefirm -0.0319 -0.353*** -0.256* -0.367*** 0.0758 -0.368*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.22) (0.26) 
public 0.161* -0.152 0.168** -0.276 0.129 0.0698 
 (0.083) (0.16) (0.081) (0.23) (0.17) (0.19) 
unionmemb   0.175 -0.380**   
   (0.19) (0.17)   
currempl   0.0150 -0.142   
   (0.13) (0.18)   
moremoneynewjob   0.131 0.0507   
   (0.21) (0.11)   
samemoneynewjob   -0.0531 0.106   
   (0.19) (0.16)   
nonwhite   0.0240 -0.215   
   (0.22) (0.14)   
nbcases1     -0.0195 0.0931 
     (0.14) (0.21) 
ea     -0.251 0.151 
     (0.16) (0.11) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0368 0.0621 0.0452 
Observations 3977 2006 1971 
Notes: Additional controls : regional and industry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
region, between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source : employer and applicant data from SETA 2003. Use of sample weights 
 
The impact of the English rule on judicial behaviours can be mitigated by the 
degree of awareness of such a rule. Fortunately, in the 2003 survey, applicants and 
employers are asked if they were aware of this rule at the start of the judicial 
process54. We estimate the multinomial logit on the 2003 data substituting our 
“costrule” dummy by this variable (see Table 4.8). Awareness of the cost regime 
                                                 
54 “If a Tribunal decides that a case should not have been brought to Tribunal or that the people 
involved in the case have acted unreasonably in pursuing it, they can penalise those involved by making 
them pay towards the other side’s costs. Did you know this when you put in your application for an 
employment tribunal? »  
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increases the likelihood to settle rather than to go for a full hearing. It also encourages 
applicants not to drop their cases.  
 
5.2. Difference in difference Estimators 
We had run before-after analyses but we can ask whether there is a general 
downward trend in the tendency to litigate for reasons other than the change in the 
regulation. The web provides applicants and defendants an easy and cheap access to 
information not only on the steps to follow to avoid an unfair dismissal but also the 
judicial knowledge to challenge it and the related legal costs. Main findings from 
SETA surveys where can be found information on litigations costs or winning rates 
are freely available55. In that context, one could expect that both parties are better in 
assessing the quality of the case reducing both the divergence in expectations and the 
asymmetry of the information. Fortunately, we can assume than the impact of the new 
allocation of costs rule is more likely to be relevant for some types of cases namely the 
unfair dismissal and discrimination cases. 
First, 1998 data show that the outcome of an unfair dismissal case seems to be 
more uncertain than those for the "Wage Act" and "Redundancy payment" for which 
proofs are more easily provided to the court. In 1998, the worker prevails at trial in 
69%, 71% of the cases under these jurisdictions respectively (vs 40% for unfair 
dismissal)56. Second, unfair dismissal and discrimination cases are more risky. The 
risk-aversion terms57 ( )[ ]222 ABAAA DCCD −++σ  observed for the "Wage Act" and 
“Breach of contract” and "Redundancy payment" and “Unfair dismissals” cases 
adjudicated in 1998 amount to 23% 40% 48% and 80% respectively of the “sex 
                                                 
55 Main findings from the 1998 SETA survey can be found ont the website of the BERR (Department 
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform- http://www.berr.gov.uk/) 
56 In 1998, legal costs might be also awarded (the upper limit being very low in comparison with 2003) 
but the number of cases is to small to draw reliable conclusions 
57 We do not have employer-applicant matched data on the costs  and use sample means. 
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discrimination” ones (see Table 4.9). Third, they exhibit the largest legal expenses 
making less likely than the new rules increases substantially the pool of cases 
adjudicated by more low award-high quality cases. Finally, the contract zone defined 
by equation (5) depends the difference-in-expectation term ( )( )BAAE CCpp +− . We 
do not have applicant-employer matched data to compute good proxy of this term. 
Tentatively, we make use of the answer to the 1998 wave question “When you sent off 
your Industrial Tribunal application did you think you were likely to win your case, 
likely to lose or did you think your chances were about evens?” weighting the “likely 
to lose”, “about evens” and “likely to win” categories respectively by 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 
to get proxies of pA and pE. As both employers and applicants are very optimistic on 
their case, the difference-in-expectation term is negative. For both employer and 
applicant, the expectation on the outcome of the case at the start of the process varies 
little across jurisdictions. 
 
Table 4.9 
Risk aversion ( ( )[ ]222 ABAAA DCCD −++σ  ) and expectation across jurisdictions in 1998 
 Risk aversion PE PA 
unfair 80% 0.36 0.63 
wages 23% 0.36 0.65 
breach 40% 0.35 0.66 
jurisredund 48% 0.42 0.65 
sexdisc 100% 0.36 0.61 
Notes: Terms are expressed as the fraction of the ones obtained for the discrimination category 
which exhibits the largest value. Risk-aversion terms are computed using sample analogue. We use 
the question: “When you sent off your Industrial Tribunal application did you think you were likely 
to win your case, likely to lose or did you think your chances were about evens?” weighting the 
“likely to lose”, “about evens” and “likely to win” categories respectively by 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 to get 
compute the expectations terms. Use of sample weights. 
Source: employer and applicant data from SETA 1998. Observations: 1330 applicants, 1245 
employers.  
 
Given the difference in risk aversion terms, we run a difference-in-difference 
approach adding interaction term year*jurisdiction in our regressions. Our basic 
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theoretical model would suggest that the English rule is more likely to affect the unfair 
and discrimination cases. Presenting lower risk aversion terms and higher probability 
to prevail, the settlement rate of the “wage act” “breach of contract” and “redundancy” 
cases should be less sensitive to the introduction of the new cost rule. As recalled by 
Ai and Norton (2003), in non linear models one can not conclude on the effect of 
interaction terms simply by looking the estimated parameters. The magnitude of the 
impact depends on all the covariates in the models. Using their computational 
routine58, we display for each jurisdiction the mean and z-score of the marginal 
probabilities associated to each jurisdiction interacting with the 2003 dummy. No 
significant difference is found for the unfair dismissal cases but the discrimination 
cases show a higher likelihood settlement rate in 2003 with respect to all the other 
jurisdictions.  
Table 4.10 
Consistent estimates of the marginal probabilities of interaction terms 
jurisdiction*year settlement versus trial 
 Mean of Marginal probabilities Mean of z-statistic Min Max 
Wages 0.05 1.26 0.02 0.07 
Breach -0.03 -0.92 -0.04 -0.02 
Jurisredund -0.08 -1.21 -0.08 -0.04 
Sexdisc -0.12 -2.12 -0.16 -0.06 
Notes: Marginal probabilities of the interaction terms from a multinomial probit on the outcome of 
the case (dropped ,settled or at trial) computed following Ai and Norton (2003). Differences in trial 
versus settlement. Use of sample weights. 
Source: employer and applicant data from SETA 1998. Observations : 4589.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The UK has experienced over the last twenty years a very strong increase in the 
number of individual labour disputes filed to employment tribunals. This phenomenon 
challenges the economists thinking that flexibility and deregulation were at the heart 
of a performing labour market since an increase in judicial battles and substantial legal 
                                                 
58 See the code inteff in stata®. 
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costs were offsetting the effects of a decrease in union rate and more generally a 
legislation tending to the “employment-at –will” doctrine.   
The implementation of a fee-shifting rule “loser pays all” is one of the most 
attractive tool among those available to policy makers willing to soften the litigation 
process and curb the increase in trial and filing rates. This is paradoxical since 
theoretical models of litigation do not provide clear cut predictions of such rules. Risk-
averse parties would favour settlement rates but it might also encourage high quality 
and low award case to file in and lead to larger legal expense since it becomes possible 
to recoup the costs. Thus the total effect remains an empirical question. Exploiting a 
change in regulation that occurs in 2001 and two surveys representative of 
Employment Tribunal cases collected in 1999 and 2003, we run a before-after analysis 
controlling for local change of the economic environment consistent with an increase 
in the settlement rate. We do not observe a significant increase in legal costs. As a 
robustness check, we also find plaintiffs and defendant that were aware of this new 
rules in 2003 are also more likely to settle and in a difference-in-difference approach 
that some cases more likely to be affected by such a rule tend to settle more.  
Although benefiting from a unusual wide range of characteristics for plaintiffs and 
defendants, our study could still suffer from selection bias on the unobserved quality 
of the case which as shown by Farber and White (1991) on Floridian medical 
malpractices might be of great importance in explaining judicial behaviours. Our 
statistical test undermines this assumption from the decision to drop to the decision to 
go to trial but we can not totally exclude it as we do not have any information -as for 
the vast majority of empirical studies- on the steps preceding the filing of the case. 
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5. Conclusion  
The impact of the EPL on labor markets has most often been assessed through 
cross-country analyses which make it hard to control for all various potential 
interactions between labor market institutions. Within country analyses have most 
often used difference-in-difference estimators and tended to ignore the extent to which 
EPL was enforced and was acting as a binding constraint for the firm or the worker. 
Both of these strands of literature do not address the problems of EPL endogeneity and 
enforcement of the EPL. By contrast, in order to measure EPL in France --a country 
with a highly regulated labor market—we use the time varying judicial activity of the 
local courts in charge of ruling the individual labor disputes (Prud’hommes). We find 
that the disposition of the cases depends on the business cycle which shows that EPL 
indices capturing the strictness of the EPL but enable to render the degree of 
enforcement are fragmented. Instrumented by the institutional settings of the 
Prud’hommes and their legal environment, the case disposition is found to have an 
impact on local labor markets. Large victory and agreement rates, a small rate of 
dismissed cases, an intensive use of lawyers cause lower labor flows volatility. Yet 
impacts on net job creations are not significant. Using labor force surveys we show 
that a decrease in labor flows volatility goes along with a lower employment rate, 
lower female and youth employment rates, and increases in the long term 
unemployment and temporary jobs. From a welfare perspective, judicial activity 
allows to increase job stability and to protect workers from employer abuse and unfair 
dismissals. The downsides are to exclude from the labor markets unskilled and 
inexperienced workers, to let workers employed in less productive jobs and to induce 
unnecessary litigation costs.  
British data on individual labor disputes allow us to test the existence of such 
costs. Like in previous empirical literature but on a more complete set of data, we find 
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that hiring a lawyer increases the probability of victory at trial. By contrast, lawyers do 
not neutralize each other when retained on both sides of a dispute, and legal 
representation is more beneficial to the firm when both parties are represented than 
when neither of them uses a lawyer. This invalidates the presence of a prisoner’s 
dilemma in the game of legal representation on the whole sample of cases. However 
we do find a prisoner dilemma when we restrict ourselves for robustness checks to 
small firms or unfair dismissal cases. Other sufficient and necessary conditions for the 
existence of a prisoner’s dilemma are met in all samples. Statistical models built on 
Nash or Stackelberg equilibria concept and interacting the choices of both parties 
show that the legal representation of the worker pushes the firm to be represented but 
that the opposite is not true. The use of a lawyer by the firms is also related to the 
complexity of the case and the amount at stake. The presence of non financial cost 
such as bad publicity or fear to have to face additional claims is positively related to 
the hiring of a lawyer for large firms.  
The United Kingdom has experienced over the last twenty years a very strong 
increase in the number of individual labour disputes filed to employment tribunals. 
This phenomenon challenges the economists thinking that flexibility and deregulation 
were at the heart of a performing labour market since an increase in judicial battles 
and substantial legal costs were offsetting the effects of a decrease in union rate and 
more generally a legislation tending to the “employment-at –will” doctrine. The 
implementation of a fee-shifting rule “loser pays all” was thought as one of the most 
attractive tool among those available to policy makers willing to soften the litigation 
process and curb the increase in trial and filing rates. This is paradoxical since 
theoretical models of litigation do not provide clear cut predictions of such rules. Risk-
averse parties would favour settlement rates but it might also encourage high quality 
and low award case to file in and lead to larger legal expense since it becomes possible 
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to recoup the costs. Thus the total effect remains an empirical question. Exploiting a 
change in regulation that occurs in 2001 and two surveys representative of 
Employment Tribunal cases collected in 1999 and 2003, we run a before-after analysis 
controlling for local change of the economic environment consistent with an increase 
in the settlement rate. We do not observe a significant increase in legal costs. As a 
robustness check, we also find plaintiffs and defendant that were aware of this new 
rules in 2003 are also more likely to settle and in a difference-in-difference approach 
that some cases more likely to be affected by such a rule tend to settle more.  
